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Abstract
This thesis focuses on the determinants of unemployment in the OECD countries. 
In particular, we look at three different explanations of unemployment and analyse 
their potential impact on labour market dynamics. The three explanations under 
consideration are technological factors, capital flows and capital market integration, 
and labour market institutions.
Chapter 1 and 2 focus on the relationship between technological progress and 
unemployment. We specify and estimate a structural model of labour demand, wage 
setting, and capital accumulation, for a panel of EU countries, the United States and 
Japan over the period 1960-1995. The adjustment paths of unemployment, following 
a shock to productivity growth, are traced explicitly in simulation exercises.
Chapter 3 focuses on the labour market effects of high international (physical) 
capital mobility. The aim of this part of the thesis is to assess whether, and to what 
extent, capital flows contribute to unemployment volatility. We test the effects of 
capital mobility on unemployment persistence and on the adjustment dynamics of 
unemployment in response to TFP shocks.
Finally, Chapters 4 and 5 examine job flows characteristics in the 1990s for a 
sample of 16 European countries. Using unique homogenous firm-level data, we 
provide comparable estimates of job flows and identify cross-country differences and 
similarities. We also look at the impact of institutional differences on job reallo­
cation. The effects of the business cycle on job flows, and to what extent firing 
restrictions may affect the cyclicality of job flows, are also considered.
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Introduction
The high level of unemployment in the European countries is still an open question 
in empirical macroeconomics, despite a large number of theoretical and empirical 
studies which try to address this issue. During the 1960’s and the early 1970’s the 
unemployment rate in the European countries was well below the unemployment 
rate in the United States, but in the mid 1970’s the situation started to change with 
European countries experiencing significant increases in unemployment relative to 
the US (Figure 1).
Previous studies explained the persistent high rates of unemployment experi­
enced by the EU countries in the last three decades by assessing the inflexibility 
of the labour market (Layard et al., 1991; OECD, 1994, Nickell et al., 2003). De­
spite a widely accepted evidence of the role played by labour market imperfections 
in explaining high levels of unemployment, explanations entirely based on labour 
market institutions may tell only part of the story. Most of the institutions were 
already present in the early 60s when unemployment was low and have not changed 
too much in the last decades. Moreover, after a decade of labour market deregu­
lation in several EU countries, the empirical evidence on the relationship between 
labour market rigidities and firms employment decisions appears to be still unclear 
(OECD, 1999; Mardsen et al., 2001). More recently, the attention has been shifted 
from labour market rigidities to the potential impact of interest rate, capital accu­
mulation and technological progress on employment (Blanchard, 1998, 2000; Arestis
13
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Figure 1: Unemployment rate dynamics
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and Marsical, 2000; Cristini, 1999; Phelps, 1994).
High and persistent unemployment is only one aspect of the poor labour mar­
ket performance in many OECD countries in the last decades. Between the 1980s 
and 1990s the increase in unemployment has been accompanied by an increase in 
labour market instability and job insecurity (OECD, 1997). This has coincided with 
significant increases in international capital mobility among industrialised countries. 
Despite higher international capital mobility can produce undesirable welfare effects, 
the impact of capital flows on unemployment dynamics has been largely overlooked 
in the literature. It has been argued that in a world in which labour is intrinsi­
cally less mobile than capital, workers have to face greater instability in earnings 
and hours worked in response to country-specific shocks when international capital 
mobility increases. This implies bigger and sharper fluctuations in the aggregate 
labour demand and real wages. In absence of perfect insurance market, this results 
in an increase of the risk associated to labour income and a reduction in the welfare
r \
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of individuals investing in human capital (Azariadis and Pissarides, 2003).
Job flows statistics are particularly important in capturing the dynamics under­
lying aggregate employment fluctuations. A growing body of research shows how the 
good or bad performance of an economy is related to its capacity to adjust quickly 
to shocks and reallocate resources among competing activities and locations. Job 
creation and job destruction are an important part of this process of adjustment, 
reallocation and growth. It has been shown that market economies exhibit high 
rates of job turnover (the sum of job creation and job destruction) in almost every 
sector and regardless of the cycle phase. This provides evidence of the complexity 
of the dynamics underlying the adjustment process in the labour market and the 
heterogeneity in the behavior of both workers and firms. The main limitation of 
the existing studies on job flows is the lack of internationally comparable job flows 
statistics (OECB, 1994). Differences in definitions,-sampling intervals, sectoral cov­
erage and sampling frames may lead to misleading interpretations of cross-country 
differences in estimated job flows.
Cross-country comparisons of job turnover rates provide the basis for an investi­
gation of the link between job flows and labour market institution and policies. For 
example, barriers to the layoff of workers are expected to hinder both job creation 
and destruction, resulting in an ambiguous effects on the average level of the unem­
ployment rate (Bertola, 1990). However, if job turnover is one of the factors that 
influence the dynamism of an economy, countries with more strict firing restrictions 
are more likely to suffer during periods of rapid economic change.
This thesis focuses on the determinants of unemployment in the OECD countries. 
In particular, we look at three different explanations of unemployment and analyse 
their potential impact on labour market dynamics. The three explanations under 
consideration are technological factors (Chapters 1 and 2), capital flows and capital 
market integration (Chapter 3), and labour market institutions (Chapters 4 and 5).
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In the first part of the thesis (Chapters 1 and 2) the focus of the analysis is 
on factors largely unexplored in the empirical literature on unemployment: the role 
of technological growth in explaining the unemployment patterns in the US and 
Europe.
Chapter 1 is a comprehensive survey of the economic literature on the rela­
tionship between technological progress and unemployment. First, we discuss the 
economic models behind the major findings in literature, with particular attention 
to models with frictions and quasi-rents (among others Pissarides, 1990; Aghion 
and Howitt, 1994; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1998). Next, we survey and discuss 
the findings of some recent empirical studies on the relationship between technolog­
ical growth and unemployment (among others Blanchard and Wolfers 2000; Phelps 
1994).
In Chapter 2, we specify and estimate a structural model of labour demand, wage 
setting and capital accumulation for a panel of EU countries, the United Sates and 
Japan over the period 1960-1995. The methodology followed by previous empirical 
studies has been based on the estimation of a reduced form equation for unemploy­
ment, neglecting interactions among the variables of interest and assuming capital 
stock as exogenous (e.g. Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Phelps, 1994). Our empir­
ical model makes explicit the essential interactions among the variables of interest 
and the channels through which they affect employment, and allows for short run 
dynamics. Moreover, the long-run neutrality of capital stock and TFP and other 
restrictions implied by economic theory are tested and then imposed in the estima­
tion, while TFP growth is allowed to affect the steady state unemployment rate as 
suggested by search equilibrium models. The adjustment paths of unemployment 
following a shock to productivity growth are traced explicitly in simulation exercises. 
The empirical model does a good job in attributing the rise in unemployment in the 
United States after 1973 and its subsequent decline to the productivity slowdown
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and subsequent recovery. It is also fairly successful at tracking other dynamics in the 
US unemployment rate. The slowdown in productivity growth in Europe was bigger 
than the US slowdown, and the model attributes a substantial rise in the European 
unemployment to it. However, a large fraction of European unemployment remains 
yet to be explained.
Chapter 3 focuses on the labour market effects of high international mobility of 
physical capital. Specifically, the aim of this part of the thesis is to assess whether 
and to what extent capital flows contribute to unemployment volatility. The benefits 
of capital mobility are well known: the removal of barriers to factor mobility increases 
efficiency and by lowering the cost of financial transactions, improves saving and 
investment both from a quantitative and qualitative point of view. In the long run, 
higher capital mobility enhances capital accumulation and then economic growth. 
However,, in a world in which labour is less mobile than capital, perfect capital 
mobility will also amplify the impact on the domestic unemployment rate of country- 
specific productivity shocks (Rodrik, 1997; Azariadis and Pissarides, 2003).
On the empirical side, little attention has been devoted to the effects of inter­
national market integration on labour market volatility and the existing empirical 
results are far from conclusive. In this part of the thesis, we present econometric 
evidence of the effect of capital mobility on unemployment persistence and on the 
adjustment dynamics of unemployment in response to TFP shocks as predicted by 
Azariadis and Pissarides model (2003). The empirical analysis is based on macro 
data from the OECD and the IMF for a panel of 20 countries. As predicted by 
the theory, the empirical evidence suggests that countries characterized by larger 
penetration of international capital are more responsive to idiosyncratic shocks (and 
consequently experience amplified fluctuations in employment) though the duration 
of the response is shorter. Moreover, simulations based on the empirical model show 
that an economy with more capital mobility exhibits higher unemployment volatility
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than an economy with no capital mobility.
Studies in the US have stressed the importance of looking at the net changes in 
employment and unemployment as the resultant of gross job flows of job creation 
and job destruction. Despite a large amount of empirical evidence for the United 
States, only a limited number of studies of job flows are available for EU countries. 
This is mainly due to a lack of comparable data across European countries at an 
appropriate level of disaggregation.
Chapter 4 examines job flows characteristics in the 1990s for a sample of 15 Eu­
ropean countries and the potential impact of labour market institutions and policies 
on firms’ job turnover. Using unique homogenous firm-level data that covers the 
whole spectrum of productive sectors, we provide some comparable estimates of job 
flows for a panel of European countries and examine cross-country differences and 
regularities. Job flow magnitude and persistence in relation to some firm character­
istics (e.g. size, relevant sector, capital intensity, etc.) is reported as well in order to 
identify if patterns of job reallocation if any among different groups of firms across 
countries. We also focus on the impact of institutional factors on job reallocation. 
The theory suggests that job turnover is partly determined by labour market poli­
cies such as employment protection legislation (EPL) and unemployment insurance. 
Consistently with previous studies, bivariate analysis shows little or no association 
between unemployment and employment protection strictness. However, there is 
evidence of a strong correlation between EPL and job turnover in the economy. The 
evidence on the correlation between job turnover and EPL still persists when multi­
variate techniques are used to control for other factors influencing job creation and 
job destruction decisions.
The relationship between job flows and the business cycle is examined in Chapter 
5. The prevailing view in the business cycle literature predicts an unambiguous pro­
cyclical behavior of job creation and counter-cyclical behavior of job destruction. As
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a consequence, the effects of the cycle on job reallocation (the sum of job creation 
and job destruction) remain undetermined. Previous evidence regarding the cyclical 
patterns of job reallocation is far from conclusive. Davis and Haltinwanger (1992) 
and Davis et al. (1996) find a negative relationship between job reallocation and the 
cycle in the US manufacturing sector. The same cyclical pattern in job reallocation 
has been observed for Canada (Baldwin et al., 1994) and the UK (Konings, 1995). 
For the countries of Continental Europe the evidence is mixed and in general job 
reallocation has been found to be largely a-cyclical. According to Garibaldi (1998), 
differences in employment protection legislation between countries may explain the 
dichotomy in the cyclical behavior of job flows between Anglo-Saxon and European 
countries. He shows that when costs associated with dismissals are negligible, job 
destruction is instantaneous while job creation takes time. As a consequence, job 
destruction varies more than job creation and job reallocation should move counter­
cyclical^.
We analyse the effects of the cycle on job flow rates and to what extent firing 
restrictions may affect the cyclicality of job flows. More stringent employment pro­
tection legislation is found to increase the cyclical volatility of job creation relative 
to job destruction, making job reallocation more pro-cyclical. This finding sheds 
further light on the importance of employment protection in shaping employment 
dynamics in these countries, and provides empirical support to the theoretical in­
sights discussed by Garibaldi (1998).
Part I
Productivity G rowth and 
U nem ploym ent
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Chapter 1
U nem ploym ent and Growth: A  
Survey
1.1 Introduction
Does productivity growth have any impact on equilibrium unemployment? While the 
neoclassical theory postulates that there is no long run relationship between growth 
and unemployment, the more recent endogenous growth theory provides a number 
of reasons why productivity growth may affect the equilibrium unemployment rate.
This chapter reviews the most relevant theoretical literature in order to identify 
the channels through which higher productivity growth affects firms’ employment 
decisions. On the labour demand side, two competing effects have been detected. 
On the one hand, the capitalization effect boosts job creation by increasing the 
present discounted value of job matches. On the other, the creative destruction ef­
fect increases unemployment through the destruction of jobs that become obsolete.
21
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Supply-side incentives identified in the literature are likely to strengthen any pos­
itive influence of growth on employment. As a result, the sign of the relationship 
remains undetermined and even the available empirical evidence does not provide 
clear evidence.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the core literature on 
the relationship between growth and unemployment. Both the demand side and 
supply side aspects are considered. Section 1.3 discusses the most relevant empirical 
evidence. Section 1.4 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical foundations
1.2 .1  P ro d u ctiv ity  grow th and  job  creation: th e  cap ita lisation  ef­
fect
In the last decade, the question of how technological progress affects unemployment 
has received a lot of attention in the equilibrium unemployment literature. The 
first theoretical study that derives a long run relationship between technological 
change and unemployment is that of Pissarides (1990, ch.2).1 Using a conventional 
matching model of technological change, he shows that faster technological progress 
reduces the long run unemployment rate by boosting job creation. Intuitively, this is 
due to the intertemporal nature of the firm’s employment decision. The firm incurs
some hiring cost today in order to acquire a worker who will yield some profits in the
1 As Aghion and Howitt (1994) pointed out, before the Pissarides’ model little attention was paid 
to economic growth as a potential determinant of long run employment. For example, the seminal 
paper of Phelps (1968) concludes that the natural rate of unemployment does not depend on the 
rate of productivity growth.
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future. If hiring costs grow at the same rate as profits, the firm will find profitable 
to anticipate some hiring in order to economize on future hiring costs. An increase 
of labour augmenting technological progress will then increase the present value of 
a worker, leading to more job openings and lower unemployment in equilibrium 
(capitalisation effect).2
As in the standard neoclassical framework, the basic feature of Pissarides’ model 
is that technological progress increases productivity uniformly in all jobs (disembod­
ied technology) without affecting the job destruction rate. However, if the allocative 
aspect of the growth process is explicitly accounted for by assuming that productiv­
ity gams are embodied in new jobs at the expense of old jobs3, faster growth rate 
may increase the unemployment rate through the “creative destruction” of skill - 
obsolescent jobs and their replacement by new high productive ones. As a conse­
quence, two competing effects on unemployment may arise from faster technological 
progress. First, as in Pissarides (1990), faster growth reduces the rate at which firms 
discount the future profits from opening new vacancies and then has a positive im­
pact on job creation (capitalisation effect). Second, it leads to faster obsolescence of 
skills and technologies, thus reducing the duration of job match and then increasing 
the equilibrium unemployment (Shumpeterian creative destruction effect).
In the following section, we discuss the effects of growth on unemployment when
technological progress is embodied in new capital. In this case, either only new jobs
2 The term capitalization effect was firstly introduced by Aghion and Howitt (1994).
3 The idea that technological change can have a negative impact on unemployment is not recent, 
being a concern of both economists and policy makers since the beginning of the Industrial Revolu­
tion. However, only recently economic theory has sistematically investigated the relation between 
technological progress and unemployment.
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may benefit from technological progress (Aghion and Howitt, 1994) or firms can still 
implement the new technology in the existing jobs by incurring a fixed renovation 
cost (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1998). A more general view is taken in a recent 
paper by Pissarides and Vallanti (2003), in which productivity grows in new jobs as 
well as in existing jobs, though only at a lower rate.
1.2 .2  Job  destruction  th rou gh  obsolescence: cap ita lisa tion  effect 
vs. creative d estru ction  effect
Aghion and Howitt (1994) examine the relative strength of the capitalisation effect 
and the creative destruction effect by using a variant of the conventional search 
model developed by Pissarides (1990). They adopt the Schumpeterian assumption 
of embodied technology and interpret it as implying that existing jobs cannot benefit 
from new technology. Therefore, new ideas have to be embodied in new machines 
matched with appropriate workers in order to be implemented.
Inside each firm, the production of the final good at any point in time takes place 
within a continuum of “production units”4 according to the following production 
function:
ys = A t ■ ip{xs -  a) (1.1)
where x  is human capital, a is the minimum amount of human capital in the pro­
duction process, ip(.) is a standard production function5, and At = Aoegt is a pro­
4 Each “production unit” consists of a machine embodying a technology of some vintage t, a 
worker and a given amount of human capital.
5ip(.) is such that ip{z) =  0 for all z  <  0, >  0 and ^// <  0, and the standard Inada conditions
hold (i.e. ip/(0) =  -f-oo and ^ /(+oo) =  0).
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ductivity parameter which depends on some exogenous innovation process.
In this framework unemployment occurs because of labour reallocation across 
firms. When a technological shock hits a firm at time t, this will open access for 
that firm to the leading technology A t. Thus, provided the firm incurs a fixed 
implementation cost, it will be able to establish a new productive unit of vintage 
t and employ a suitable skilled worker. However, since in each production unit 
productivity remains fixed at the level of job creation time while the price of human 
capital increases in steady state at the economy growth rate (Ps = Poe9S)6, the 
surplus flow generated by each unit (i.e. the output minus the rental cost of human 
capital) declines over time until it eventually becomes zero at time T. At that time 
the production unit shuts down forcing the worker into unemployment. T is thus 
the life-time of a production unit or, equivalently, the duration of the match between 
a worker and the corresponding production unit. Therefore, higher g will lead to a 
faster decline in profits during the life-time of a production unit and consequently 
to a reduction of the life-time of the unit. Following the conventional search theory, 
the equilibrium rate of unemployment is defined as
u =  1 — T • p(v)
where p{v) is recruiting-success rate as defined in Pissarides7 (1990, Chap.l), v is
6 All fixed cost have to grow at the economy growth rate in order to guarantee the consistence 
of a steady state equilibrium.
7 The variable p(y)  is determined by the matching function as follows
(1.2
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the number of vacancies in the economy (with p(v) increasing in v) and 1 is the 
total mass of worker in the economy, each of them endowed with one unit of labour 
services and X  units of human capital.
Equation 1.2 shows that an increase in the rate of growth (g) can affect unemploy­
ment through a number of channels. First, it reduces the life-time of production units 
T  and then, holding the number of vacancies constant, raises the job-destruction rate 
and the equilibrium unemployment rate (direct creative-destraction effect). In ad­
dition to the direct effect which works through job destruction, a indirect effect can 
be identified working through job creation (p(v) in equation 1.2). The decrease in 
T  implies a faster decline of profits associated to a given production unit and then 
of the benefits of creating new vacancies. This indirect creative destruction effect 
reinforces the direct effect of increasing the unemployment.
So far, the relationship between unemployment and growth is unambiguously 
positive, due to the fact that jobs are created by production units which cannot 
benefit from productivity growth. The presence of a fixed set-up cost Dt = D0egt, 
which is paid by the firm in order to enter the market, allows however to identify a 
negative capitalisation effect of growth on unemployment similar to that in Pissarides 
(1990). The explanation is simple to understand. When the firm incurs a fixed set­
up cost, any increase in the growth rate g reduces the discount rate at which the 
firm capitalises the expected future profits and therefore increases the benefit of 
entering the market. The capitalisation effect works in the direction of increasing
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the equilibrium number of vacancies and hence decreasing unemployment. Whether 
the overall effect will be to rise or reduce unemployment depends on the relative 
strength of the conflicting forces and more precisely on the parameters of the model. 
In particular, the comparative static results from the steady-state analysis suggests 
an inverted U-shape relationship between equilibrium unemployment and growth 
rate (that is decreasing for small value of g and then increasing for values of g 
sufficiently large).
The relationship between growth and unemployment has been recently re-examined 
by Mortensen and Pissarides (1998). They use a standard matching model to show 
that growth may have either a positive or negative impact on unemployment depend­
ing on the particular technological assumption adopted. As in Aghion and Howitt 
(1994), new jobs embody the most advanced known technology and job destruction 
occurs when existing jobs are no longer profitable.8 The two models differ in the 
way the new technology can be adopted. While in Aghion and Howitt (1994) firms 
can update their technology only by closing the existing jobs and opening new va­
cancies, in Mortensen and Pissarides firms can always update their technology by 
incurring some fixed renovation costs and continue producing with the same worker. 
As a result, the effect of productivity growth on unemployment crucially depends 
on the size of the cost of updating. If the technological choice of the firm is totally 
irreversible (i.e. renovation costs tend to infinity), Aghion and Howitt’s creative de­
struction effect occurs, and an increase in productivity growth unambiguously leads
8 In Mortensen and Pissarides, jobs are also destroyed because of the arrival of some exogenous 
shock, governed by a known Poisson process.
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to higher unemployment.9 The mechanism through which unemployment occurs 
is similar to that illustrated in Aghion and Howitt model. Wages of existing jobs 
grow in line with the growth rate of wages of more productive new jobs induced by 
technical progress. This wage growth, which is in part independent from the path 
of the worker’s own productivity, leads to a decrease in the profitability of existing 
jobs and eventually to job destruction.
Formally, given that jobs are destroyed either because they reach the age of 
obsolesce or they experience a shock that arrives at the exogenous rate s, the total 
job destruction flow (JD) is n s+ JC ex p  {—JT°}, where T° is the equilibrium optimal 
age of job destruction and n is the number of employed workers. Job creation and 
job destruction are the same in steady state and job creation is simply equal the 
rate at with workers are matched the job, that is
JC  = m(0°, 1 )u =  ns +  J C exp { - s T 0} = JD  (1.3)
where m(0 °, 1 ) is a standard matching function and 6° is market tightness defined as 
the vacancy to unemployment ratio. From equation 1.3 and defining unemployment 
as u = 1 — n, the equilibrium unemployment rate is
s +  [1 — exp {—sT0}] m(6°, 1)  ^ ^
9 Notice that, when firms cannot take advantage of growth because renovation costs are too high, 
the negative capitalization effect of growth on unemployment is absent due to the fact that the 
model does not impose any positive setup costs.
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According equation 1.4, an increase in the economy growth rate negatively affects 
the steady state unemployment rate both directly by lowering the life time of existing 
jobs (T°), and indirectly by reducing the incentive of opening new vacancies, which 
in turn leads to a reduction in market tightness.
In a more general case with finite positive renovation costs, firms have the option 
of updating their technology at a given date t , after incurring a fixed cost I ( t ) =  Ie9t. 
When a firm chooses to renovate, the value of its job jumps from J ( r , t) to J ( t7t) 
where r  is the time at which the job has been created (job vintage) . 10 When all the 
firms decide to renovate, the job destruction rate is exogenous and equal to s. In 
this case the steady state unemployment rate is simply
“ =  s +  m(6°, 1 ) (1'5)
and faster growth affects unemployment only through its effect on market tightness. 
Thus, the relevant question is in what direction growth affects job creation. As before 
job creation depends on the value of creating a new job. But now the increase in the 
economy growth has two opposite effects on the value of new jobs. On the one hand, 
it increases the growth rate of wages and then, given the technology, reduces the net 
surplus from that particular job. On the other, since firms have always the opportu­
nity of updating their technology, faster technological progress implies higher future 
productivity and then higher discounted value of future profits from opening new
10Since firms have the option of adopting new technology through creative destruction as well, 
the optimality of the updating strategy requires the relevant “renovation horizon” T  to be lower 
than the “destruction horizon” T°.
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jobs. The relative strength of these two opposite forces depends on the size of I(t). 
If I(t.) tends to zero, the updating process occurs continuously (T = 0) precluding 
technological obsolescence. In general, if renovation costs are small enough, growth 
has a pure capitalisation effects and by boosting job creation reduces equilibrium 
unemployment. In an extension of the model which allows different job-updating 
costs among firms, Mortensen and Pissarides find that faster technological progress 
increases the job reallocation rate both across firms and sectors without necessarily 
implying a lower equilibrium number of jobs. However, when heterogeneity among 
firms is taken into account, the model does not provide an unambiguous prediction 
about the relationship between economy-wide productivity growth and unemploy­
ment.
A more general view is taken in a recent model by Pissarides and Vallanti (2003). 
As in the previous models, growth influences job creation through capitalisation 
effects and job destruction through obsolescence. The precise influence on each 
depends, however, on whether new technology can be introduced into ongoing job 
relationships, or whether it can only be embodied in new jobs. If technology is 
fully disembodied (neoclassical Solow model) existing jobs can take full advantage 
of new technological improvements. As in Pissarides (1990), this makes existing jobs 
more valuable during periods of fast growth, because their creation cost is sunk, and 
so faster growth increases employment. When technology is fully embodied as in 
Aghion and Howitt (1994) existing jobs cannot benefit from new technology. In this 
case faster growth decreases employment because profit opportunities outside the
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firm rise faster and existing jobs become less valuable.
Pissarides and Vallanti (2003) re-interpret the Schumpeterian assumption of cre­
ative destruction as saying that although some major technological advances require 
the establishment and growth of new jobs and new sectors, firms can still increase 
the productivity of existing jobs by investing more and implementing new technolo­
gies on the job. This is formalized assuming that a fraction A of productivity gains 
arising from new technology is disembodied and can be beneficial to all jobs and 
a fraction (1 — A) is embodied in new jobs only. The main implication of this hy­
pothesis is that both the capital-labour ratio and productivity can grow in existing 
jobs, but productivity growth in existing jobs is below the productivity growth in 
new jobs when technology is not fully disembodied (A < 1).
In this framework, the mechanism through which obsolescence occurs is similar 
to that illustrated in Aghion and Howitt (1994). Wage growth in existing jobs 
depends on two components: an inside component that grows at rate Ag (where 
g is the overall rate of technological progress) and depends on labour productivity 
inside the firm and an outside component that grows at the rate g and depends on 
the rate of the overall technological progress because all new jobs are created on 
the technological frontier. Since inside the firm wages grow faster than the labour 
output, the profit flow generated by each job declines over time and eventually 
becomes negative leading to job destruction through obsolescence.
Formally, the model yields the following steady state conditions for the three 
unknowns of the model, namely the destruction age T, the market tightness 6 and
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the unemployment rate u11
m In 0  — In cj ^
r  =  l T 3 A ) 7 -  (L6>
(i -  P)(y{>^ 9)4> -  y(9)u) =  (1-7)
_ ________ n +_s________
(l — e- (n+s)T) m{9) +  n +  s
Equation 1.6 determines the optimal life of the job. Intuitively, a job is destroyed 
when the reservation wage of the worker (cj) becomes equal to the marginal product 
((/>).12 It follows from (1.6) that if all technology is of the Solow disembodied type 
(A =  1), the firm will never want to destroy a job through obsolescence. Job de­
struction in this case takes place only because of the exogenous separation process.13 
But if A < 1, some technology is embodied in new jobs and jobs become obsolescent 
through competition from new jobs, which pushes wages up at a faster rate than 
the marginal product of labour in existing jobs. Faster growth leads in this case to 
more job destruction, as by differentiation of (1.6) , dT/dg < 0.
11A more detailed derivation of the model is available upon request.
12 The reservation wage is defined as
u =  b +  j ^ m ( 0 ) V
where b is unemployment income, /3 is the surplus share of labour, m{0) is the rate at which job 
matches occur, and V  is the present discounted value of expected profits from a vacant job.
Note that the reservation wage captures the external influences on wages, which make attractive 
quitting the job, namely the unemploymnet compensation (6) and the remuneration in new jobs. 
In the case of Cobb-Douglas production function, (j) is defined as
4>= (1 -  a) r +  5
where r is capital rental cost, S is the depreciation rate and a  is the share of capital in the Cobb- 
Douglas production function.
13 As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) jobs, in this model jobs are destroyed because either 
they become obsolete or they experience a negative shock that arrives at the exogenous rate s.
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Equation 1.7 is a standard job creation condition and corresponds to a marginal
condition for the demand of labour. If m(9) is a standard matching function and
c9c is the cost of opening a vacancy, ——  is the expected value of the firm’s hiring 
costs. Equation 1.7 says that that the expected gain from a new job must be equal 
to the expected hiring cost that the firm has to pay.14 Differentiation of equation 
1.7 with respect to g shows that the effect of growth on market tightness (9) can be 
either positive or negative. At A =  0, when all technical progress is embodied, the 
sign is negative, whereas at A =  1 , the sign is positive. It can be shown that there is 
a unique A*, such that for values of A < A* faster growth reduces market tightness 
and for values of A > A* it increases it. At A =  A* growth has no effect on 9.
Finally, equilibrium unemployment in equation 1.8 is simply obtained from the 
equality of the flow into unemployment (JD) and out of it (JC ) . 15
According to equations 1.6-1.8 , an increase in the rate of growth has the following 
effect on firm’s employment decisions:
• It rises the job destruction rate because the age of obsolescence T increases 
with g\ and
• It has an ambiguous effect on job creation depending on whether and to what 
extent the new technology is embodied in new jobs or can be incorporated in 
existing jobs.
I  _  g —(r+a —Aa)T j _  g-(r+s-a)T
14 The present discount factors y(Xg) and y(g)  are equal to --------------  a n d -----------------------
r  +  s — A a r  +  s — a
respectively.
loNotice that equation 1.8 is identical to equation 1.5 in Mortensen and Pissarides (1998). In 
equation 1.8 n  is the exogenous labour force growth rate. In Mortenen and Pissarides (1998) labour 
force is assumed to be constant.
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Thus, the overall effect of growth on unemployment crucially depends on the 
fraction A of technological progress that can be adopted by existing jobs. The 
smaller A, the more likely is to obtain a positive effect of growth on unemployment.
1 .2 .3  C ap ita lisa tion  effect w ith  en dogenou s in terest rate
In the models considered so far the interest rate is assumed to be exogenous and 
constant. If this hypothesis is plausible for a small open economy with perfect capi­
tal mobility, this can not be the case in a closed economy or in a large open economy, 
where the interest rate is likely to depend on the economy growth rate. Eriksson
(1997) considers the capitalisation effect of growth on unemployment when the in­
terest rate is no longer exogenous but it is endogenously derived from a Ramsey 
model. The job creation side of the model is similar to that in Pissarides (1990) but 
now the consumer’s behavior is endogenized by introducing utility maximizing indi­
viduals. Solving both consumer and firm’s optimization problems, market tightness 
in equilibrium (9) turns to depend negatively on the effective discount rate defined 
as (r — g) where r is real interest rate and g is the (exogenous) productivity growth 
rate. Similar to Pissarides (1990), a change in the economy growth rate has an 
impact on market tightness 9 (and consequently on the equilibrium unemployment 
rate) through the effective discount rate (capitalisation effect).
The relationship between market tightness and unemployment is still negative: 
more vacancies lead to a higher probability for the unemployed workers to find a 
job, and thus reduce unemployment.
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However, when the interest rate is endogenous the total effect of an increase in 
g on the effective discount rate is ambiguous. On the one hand, keeping r constant, 
it lowers (r — g) and then increases the present value of profits from creating new 
vacancies. On the other, faster growth reduces the amount of capital available per 
efficiency unit of labour and increases the interest rate with a negative impact on 
( r —g). The overall effect of g on unemployment depends on the value of the elasticity 
of intertemporal substitution. Eriksson shows that if the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution is small enough16, the relationship between the economic growth rate 
and unemployment turns to be positive.
1*2.4 R everse  causality: does un em ploym ent affect grow th?
In the above literature, causality runs in one direction, from growth to unemploy­
ment. However, there are several theoretical reasons to assess causality running 
in the opposite direction. In a learning-by-doing framework high and prolonged 
unemployment can negatively affect growth by leading to a loss in skills and hu­
man capital. Incorporating unemployment into a generalized augmented Solow-type 
growth model, Brauninger and Pannenberg (2000) show that, when human capital 
enters the production function and productivity growth is endogenously determined 
in the economy, an increase in unemployment leads to a decline in the long run pro­
ductivity growth rate. Conversely, efficiency wage theories such as Rebitzer (1987)
suggest that greater unemployment reduces the probability of re-employment and
16 A low elasticity of intertemporal substitution implies that individuals’ consumption patterns 
exhibit small reactions when the intertemporal prices change. As a consequence, the interest rate 
has to change a lot when the growth rate varies, for the household to be in optimum.
CHAPTER 1. UNEMPLOYMENT AND GROWTH: A SURVEY  36
thus increases worker’s effort and productivity growth.
Another channel through which higher unemployment can affect growth is by 
reducing savings available for investment. Bean and Pissarides (1993) develop this 
argument using a simple overlapping generations model modified to allow for en­
dogenous growth and equilibrium unemployment17, where both capitalisation and 
creative destruction effects are absent. 18 In this framework, they show how the 
potential co-movement of growth and unemployment, that are both endogenously 
determined in the model, can be seen more as the result of changes in the under­
lying economy, than the result of a causality relationship between the two. More 
specifically, a reduction in hiring costs or an increase in taxation to finance gov­
ernment spending is found to have a positive effect on employment and, through 
the impact of unemployment on workers’ savings, it fosters capital accumulation 
and growth. This implies a negative correlation between growth and unemployment 
even in absence of capitalisation and reallocation effects. However, if changes in the 
growth rate are caused by changes in variables which do not have a direct impact 
on employment (e.g. saving rate in the model), no correlation between growth and 
unemployment can be detected. This is not really surprisingly from a theoretical 
point of view and suggests that any observed relationship between growth and un­
employment can be due to variations in other factors that are responsible for changes
in unemployment and growth rate.
1( Endogenous growth is obtained by adopting a Romer (1986)-style production function that 
exhibits constant return to scale in reproducible inputs. Equilibrium unemployment arises because 
of matching frictions into the labour market which make the match between workers and jobs costly.
18 This is equivalent to the neoclassical assumption that economic growth does not affect equilib­
rium unemployment.
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The findings in Eriksson (1997) are in line with those in Bean and Pissarides 
(1993). According to Eriksson’s model the correlation between growth and unem­
ployment depends on what kinds of changes one is considering. There is a trade-off 
between employment and growth, as long as changes that directly affects growth rate 
are considered. This holds both when there is endogenous and exogenous growth and 
happens through a variation in the effective discount rate as shown above. With this 
exception, however, it seems like changes that promote employment also promote 
growth. When such changes happen (i.e. changes in capital tax or unemployment 
compensation) what is good for employment is also good for growth.
1.2 .5  Supply-side effects o f  grow th
Supply-side incentives are likely to strengthen any positive influence of growth on 
employment. Two hypotheses have been put forward in the literature. Phelps (1994) 
argues that the supply of labour depends on the ratio of wage to non-wage income.19 
Using a general equilibrium incentive-wage model, he shows that an unexpected 
increase in the rate of technological progress decreases the nonwage-income-to-wage 
ratio, and so increases the incentives to work and then increases employment. In 
a closed economy this effect is temporary. In the long run, faster technological 
progress induces an equal increase in the interest rate. This restores the equilibrium
relation between the two types of income and incentives (and so employment) return
19 Nonwage income per worker is defined as the maximum amount of income from wealth that can 
be consumed under the contraint that individual wealth ui keeps growing at the steady state growth 
rate g. Formally, this is equal to (6 +  r  — g)w  where 6 is the job-worker exogenous separation rate 
and r the real interest rate (Hoon and Phelps, 1997).
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to their initial level. This may not, however, be the case in a small open economy. 
When the domestic interest rate is exogenously determined, an increase in the rate 
of technological progress leads to a permanent fall in the non-wage income relative 
to wage income, reducing the equilibrium unemployment rate.
A temporary (but long-lasting) effect of growth on employment may also arise 
from the slow adjustment of worker’s wage aspirations to an unanticipated change 
in the productivity growth rate. It has been argued that when productivity growth 
changes unexpectedly “aspirations” of wage growth do not adjust immediately, cre­
ating a gap between the new rate of productivity growth and wage growth. This gap 
temporarily increases the “non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment” when 
there is a productivity slowdown and decreases it when there is an acceleration of 
productivity growth. In the long run, aspirations (and wages) adjust and eventually 
the unemployment rate will move toward the previous level of steady-state.20
In contrast to the previous models, who posit permanent links between produc­
tivity growth and employment, the link that has been emphasized in the "wage 
aspirations" approach is just temporary.21 Such a temporary link, however, may 
be used as further reasons for the existence of deviations between the long-run and
short-run effects of changes in growth rates.
20 Many authors have interpreted the relationship between unemployment and growth along this 
lines. Recent example include Blanchard and Katz (1997), Stiglitz (1997), Blanchard (2000) and 
Ball and Moffitt (2002). However, a comprehensive theory on wage aspirations has not been fully 
developed yet.
21 This temporary effect could be long-lasting, depending on the time "wage aspirations" adjust 
to the new productivity levels (Blanchard, 2000).
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1.3 Empirical findings
The previous section outlined the relationships existing between the equilibrium 
unemployment and growth from a theoretical perspective. There are a number of 
reasons why the unemployment rate might be affected by a change in the rate of 
productivity growth due to technological developments. The relative importance 
of the links and channels emphasized by the different models is however ambiguous 
and no definite conclusions can be reached. As a result, searching for more definitive 
results is an empirical matter.
There are few empirical studies which try to estimate the direct impact of pro­
ductivity growth on unemployment.
Grubb et al. (1982) estimate conventional wage and price equations of a partial 
equilibrium system for 19 OECD countries, and use the estimated equations to 
simulate the events of the late 70s. According to their study, the fall in productivity 
growth experienced by almost every country since the early 70s has not been followed 
by a corresponding decrease in the target growth rate of wages at a given level of 
employment. As a consequence, lower real wage growth has been obtained through 
a mixture of higher unemployment and, since the economy is characterized by some 
nominal inertia, higher inflation.
Dreze and Bean (1990) estimate wage and price equations derived from a gen­
eral macro model that includes productivity growth. They do not test any direct 
effect of productivity growth on unemployment. However, they find that changes in 
productivity growth are quickly incorporated in wages in European countries, while
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this phenomenon is less evident for the United States. From a theoretical point of 
view, the incorporation of productivity gains into real wages leads to capital-labour 
substitution which turns to be wasteful when the economy is operating with an un­
employment above its natural level. They argue that this can explain the differences 
in relative job creation over the 80s.
More recently, Wilson (1995) examines the dynamic response of unemployment 
to shocks in productivity growth for five G7 countries. She estimates a reduced 
unemployment equation which relates unemployment to productivity growth. Simu­
lations show that temporary increases in productivity growth have a positive even if 
small impact on unemployment in the short run. This suggests that wages and prices 
are slow to adjust to technological shocks. On the contrary, there is no evidence of 
any long-run relationship, being the effects of permanent productivity shocks on 
unemployment not significant. The presence of feedbacks from unemployment to 
productivity growth is also tested using VAR methodology.22 The estimated im­
pulse response function shows that the impact of unemployment on productivity is 
small and, in general, not significant.
A VAR methodology is also used by Zagler (2000) to detect a possible relation 
of causality between equilibrium unemployment and productivity growth for four 
European countries. The causal implications of three different models of endogenous 
growth and unemployment, namely a matching model, an efficiency wage model and
a union model, are tested using standard bivariate Granger causality tests .23 The
22 Apart from the unemployment rate and the productivity growth rate, the VAR includes demand 
variables, oil price, and labour supply.
23The three models have different implications on the relationship between unemployment and
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results of the analysis are not conclusive and a clear pattern for this relationship 
across Europe cannot be identified.
To account for both the long run and short run relationships between unem­
ployment and growth rate, Zagler (2003) uses data from four European countries 
to estimate a vector error correction model of economic growth and unemployment. 
The results indicate that, in the long run, economic growth and unemployment 
appear to be positively correlated, while,in the short run, an increase in the equilib­
rium employment rate has a negative impact on the economic growth rate. The main 
drawback of the above analysis is that both Granger causality tests and the vector 
autoregression analysis do not control for other variables influencing both produc­
tivity growth, and unemployment. As a result, it is possible that additional factors, 
such as low aggregate demand or high interest rate, can drive this correlation.
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) use aggregate data but panel techniques tu assess 
the long run impact of productivity growth on unemployment. They estimate a 
reduced unemployment equation for a panel of OECD countries and focus on the 
impact of different “shocks”24, namely productivity growth, real interest and labour 
demand, on the equilibrium unemployment rate .25 Moreover, they interact these 
“shocks” with labour market institutions in order to verify a possible role of labour
market institutions in amplifying the effects of negative macroeconomic events. They
growth. More specifically, matching models predict a causal relationship from growth to unemploy­
ment, efficiency wage models predict the opposite direction of causality, and finally union models 
indicate causality in both ways. See Zagler (2000) for a brief review of the three classes of models.
24 As Nickell et al (2001) point out, it is not really appropriate to define the long run changes in 
TFP growth, real interest rate and labour demand as shocks, since they are not mean reverting 
over the length of the sample.
2oThey use five year averages of the data to capture the long run effects of their variables of 
interest on unemployment.
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show that long-run changes in the level of TFP growth have a negative impact on 
unemployment, with the impact being bigger in some countries because of institu­
tional differences. A similar approach is followed in Fitoussi et al. (2000). Their 
specification differs from the one used by Blanchard and Wolfers in the way they try 
to estimate a separate impact of institutions on both the size and the persistence 
of the effect of TFP growth on unemployment. The effect of growth is in line with 
the that obtained by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), though its magnitude appears 
to be substantially higher.
In a recent study for the OECD countries Nickell et al. (2001) introduce “gen­
uine” productivity shocks in a reduced-form unemployment equation in order to 
capture real wage resistance to an unexpected change in productivity growth. In 
accordance with the hypothesis of "wage aspirations", they find that an adverse pro­
ductivity shock, which leads to a persistent decrease in trend productivity growth, 
has a positive impact on real wages and, consistently, a temporary positive effect on 
unemployment.
Finally, Ball and Moffitt (2002) explicitly model real-wage aspirations in an 
otherwise standard model of the Phillips curve in order to explain the apparent 
improvement in the unemployment-inflation trade off occurred in the last ten years. 
Using aggregate US annual data for the period 1962-2000, they find that productivity 
growth relative to wage aspirations has a negative and significant effect on inflation. 
They also use their estimates to forecast inflation over the period 1996-2000 and they 
conclude that inflation remains low despite the low unemployment rate because
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productivity acceleration leads to an increase of the productivity-wage aspiration 
gap.
1.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we discussed the theory and empirical evidence underlying the re­
lationship between growth and equilibrium unemployment. Several channels have 
been suggested in the literature. The overall effect of growth on unemployment re­
mains undetermined from a theoretical point of view and the empirical studies do 
not provide clear evidence on the sign and magnitude of the relationship.
In the light of the above theoretical and empirical findings, in Chapter 2 of the 
thesis we further investigate the effects of productivity growth on employment by 
specifying and estimating a structural labour market model where employment, wage 
and capital accumulation are endogenous choice variables. Differently from previous 
empirical studies based on the estimation of a reduced form unemployment equation, 
our empirical model allows to test and impose long run restrictions derived from the 
theory such as the long run neutrality of capital stock and TFP, and to investigate 
the main channels through which technological progress may affect unemployment. 
The key objective of the analysis is to see to what extent the dynamics of productivity 
growth from the 1960s to the 1990s can explain the US-Europe differences in the 
unemployment experience in the last thirty years.
C hapter 2
U nem ploym ent and Growth: 
Panel E stim ates
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the relation between exogenous growth in 
total factor productivity (TFP) and employment, when wages and capital are both 
endogenous choice variables. We estimate a three-equation system with annual data 
from 1964 to 1995 for a panel of countries consisting of the United States, Japan 
and thirteen of the countries of the European Union.
The aim of the analysis is not to provide any definite evidence for a theory, since 
more than one theory can be consistent with the data. We specify a broadly general 
empirical model which allow to test and impose long run restrictions and identify 
the channels through which productivity growth affects unemployment.
44
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The empirical model draws heavily on models with frictions and quasi-rents by 
Pissarides (2000, Chapter 3), Aghion and Howitt (1994), Mortensen and Pissarides
(1998), Pissarides and Vallanti (2003) and others.
The methodology followed by previous empirical studies has been based on the 
estimation of a reduced form equation for unemployment, neglecting interactions 
among the variables of interest and assuming capital stock-as exogenous (e.g. Blan­
chard and Wolfers, 2000, Phelps 1994). Moreover short run dynamics have been 
neglected and the analysis has been mainly focused on the long run effects of growth 
on unemployment. Our empirical model makes explicit the essential interactions 
among the variables of interest and the channels through which they affect em­
ployment and allows for short run dynamics. Moreover, the long-run neutrality of 
capital stock and TFP and other long run restrictions implied by economic theory 
are tested and then imposed in the estimation, while TFP growth is allowed to affect 
the steady state unemployment rate as suggested by search equilibrium models.
There has been virtually no work on the out-of-steady-state properties of growth 
models with frictions.1 This poses a problem for econometric work, since the data 
that we use to estimate the model are generated in real economies, whose adjust­
ment to the steady state in response to TFP shocks may take several years. Our 
approach is to test and impose the long run restrictions on the steady-state solution 
of the estimated empirical model. But in the estimation we allow for data-driven
unrestricted adjustment to the steady state. We then simulate the estimated ad­
1A notable exception is the recent paper by Postel-Vinay (2002), which calibrates the out-of­
steady-state behavior of the Schumpeterian model discussed in the previous chapter.
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justment paths and show that although steady states are stable and satisfy the long 
run restrictions, the simulated adjustment paths can be very long.
A much-discussed empirical question in the literature is whether the slowdown 
in TFP growth after 1973 can explain the rise in unemployment that followed. A 
related question is whether the acceleration of productivity growth in the 1990s has 
reduced, or is likely to reduce, the unemployment rate .2 The simulation shows that 
the productivity slowdown and subsequent recovery in the United States can account 
for virtually the entire dynamics of unemployment, save for the extremes of cyclical 
peaks and troughs. But in Europe, although productivity growth can account for 
bigger changes in unemployment, the productivity slowdown of the 1970s fails to 
track the full rise in unemployment in the 1980s, and more the recent productivity 
recovery fail also to explain the persistence of unemployment into the 1990s.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 explains the derivation of the 
three estimated equations. Section 2.3 describes the data and the growth accounting 
that we used to calculate TFP growth for each country in the sample, and discusses 
some econometric issues. Section 2.4 presents the results of the econometric analysis 
and uses the results to simulate the effects of the observed productivity changes. This 
section also calculates the fraction of TFP growth embodied in new jobs as defined 
in Pissarides and Vallanti (2003), and finds it to be a very small number. Section
2.5 concludes.
2 This discussion goes back to Bruno and Sachs (1985) and several other authors. For more 
recend discussions of the role of producitivity slowdowns see Phelps (1994), Blanchard and Wolfers 
(2000), Fitoussi et al (2000) and Krueger and Solow (2002).
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2.2 Empirical specification
The aim of the empirical analysis is to estimate the productivity growth effects 
implied by the equations for the capital stock, wages and employment. We estimate 
the structural equations and allow for unrestricted short-run adjustment lags by 
including up to two lags of the dependent variables and TFP. The following long 
run restrictions are tested and then imposed on the estimated model:
1. The rate of growth of wages and the capital-labour ratio in the steady state 
are equal to the average rate of growth of TFP:
k ™ / o uT  — ~  CL. (2.1)k w
2. Changes in the capital stock and TFP do not affect steady-state employment:
dL dL dw , .
' d k + dw'dk =  ’  ^ ^
dL dL&w
dA dw dA  1 1
2.2 .1  T he em ploym ent equation
The empirical employment equation includes the structural variables influencing 
both job creation and job destruction in the models with search frictions and labour- 
augmenting exogenous technological progress, as described in the previous chapter 
under the assumption that job creation costs are exogenous and unobservable. These 
variables are the level of marginal product, the wage rate, the interest rate and the
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expected rates of growth of the marginal product and the wage rate. The marginal 
product is proxied by its arguments, including the level of TFP and the level of 
the capital-labour ratio. The expected rates of growth of marginal product and the 
wage rate are proxied by the rate of TFP growth.
Since job creation and job destruction depend on the same variables, making it 
impossible to identify them separately, we estimate a single employment equation 
and make what inferences are possible about job creation and job destruction from 
it.
In our employment equation the dependent variable is the ratio of employment 
to population of working age and the independent variables are the level and rate 
of change of TFP, the level of the capital stock normalized to the working age 
population, the real cost of labour and the real interest rate. The capital stock and 
the real wage rate are treated as endogenous. In the short run we allow the capital 
stock and TFP to have different effects on employment (e.g. because the costs of 
adjustment in capital are different from the technology implementation lags) but 
in the long run their effects are restricted by (2.2)-(2.3). The different adjustment 
lags in job creation and job destruction also imply differential short-run and long-run 
effects. Recall that TFP growth increases job destruction, by reducing the useful life 
of a job, but may increase or decrease job creation. Supposing that job destruction 
reacts faster than job creation to shocks, as usually found in the data ,3 we should
expect the impact effect of productivity growth on employment to be negative, and
3The standard reference is Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996). In some European countries, 
however, job creation sometimes reacts faster than job destruction because of firing restrictions. 
See Boeri (1996) and Garibaldi (1998).
CHAPTER 2. UNEMPLOYMENT AND GROWTH: PANEL ESTIMATES  49
either remain negative or turn positive in the medium to long run, when job creation 
has had time to adjust.
From a theoretical perspective there has not been much formal work on the out- 
of-steady-state behavior of job creation and job destruction. Some recent simulation 
results by Postel-Vinay (2002), however, lend further support to our empirical spec­
ifications. His main claim is that the short-run effects of changes in growth rates 
are likely to differ and be “perverse” vis-a-vis the steady-state effects.
2 .2 .2  T h e  w age equation
In models with search frictions the wage setting decisions are formalized as the 
result of a bargaining process (typically bilateral Nash bargaining) between firms 
and workers. In particular, firms and workers set wages in order to share the rent 
from job matches. Such a rent has to compensate both firms and workers for the 
costs incurred in the search process including foregone wages and profits. The real 
wage then depends on an internal component representing intrinsic job productivity 
and on an external component representing workers’ outside option .4 The variables 
influencing the external component are the expected returns from search and the 
unemployment income. In this framework the way unemployment rate enters the 
wage equation is through the bargaining power each party has. Given the number of
vacancies, a higher unemployment rate implies that rate at which vacant jobs arrive
4 While in the case of disembodied technological progress both the internal and the external 
component grow at the same rate as the aggregate productivity, in case of (partially) embodied 
technological progress the internal component grows at a lower pace. If technological progress is 
fully embodied as in Aghion and Howitt (1994), productivity in existing job remains fixed at the 
level of job creation time.
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to unemployed worker is lower than the rate at which unemployed workers arrive 
at vacant jobs. As a consequence the workers’ bargaining power is lower, implying 
lower wage rate.
Following this approach, we then estimate an error-correction equation for wage 
determination and impose the restriction that real wages in the steady state grow at 
the rate of TFP growth. In the empirical specification, the unemployment income is 
represented by two parameters of the unemployment insurance system, the ratio of 
compensation to mean wages and the duration of entitlement. The marginal product 
of labour and the expected returns from search are represented by the level and rate 
of growth of the capital-labour ratio and TFP, where now, in contrast to their effects 
on employment, both levels and rates of growth should have a positive impact on 
wages. The capital stock is divided by the labour force (rather than employment) 
to avoid spurious correlations due to cyclical noise in the employment series.5 In 
the stead}' state the unemployment rate is constant, so steady-state results are not 
influenced by this change.6 We also include the first difference in the inflation rate as 
an additional cyclical variable to pick up temporary deviations from the steady-state
path due to information imperfections or long-term contracts.
5 The use of capital to labour force ratio as an indicator for trend productivity is very common 
in the empirical specification of the wage equation. See Layard et al. (1991) for a cross-country 
comparison of the estimates of the wage equation.
6 Notice that this empirical specification of the wage equation is quite general and its predictions 
may be consistent with other wage setting mecchanisms. For example, competitive models or 
efficiency wage models have broadly similar implications. See Bean (1994) for a review of the 
different wage setting mechanisms and their implications.
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2.2 .3  T h e  in vestm en t equation
The specification of the investment equation is consistent with a standard neoclas­
sical approach. A profit maximizing firm demands capital stock at the point where 
the marginal productivity of capital is equal to the user cost of capital.
Following Blanchard (1998), we then specify the investment equation as a func­
tion of factor prices, namely the cost of capital and the real wage (in efficiency units). 
In the long run the equation converges to a value of the capital stock proportional 
to TFP and the factor of proportionality depends on the cost of capital and the cost 
of labour. For the cost of capital we use the real interest rate but we also include 
a variable for government debt, on the assumption that more government involve­
ment in capital markets makes it more difficult for private business to acquire funds 
(Phelps, 1994).7
2 .2 .4  T h e sy stem
In accordance with the discussion above and the theoretical considerations in the 
previous chapter, the empirical specification for the employment equation takes the 
following log form :
In(L/P)u  =  c*o +  ot\ ln (L /P)u-i  +  c*2 ln(L/P)i t - 2  +  c*3 lnit;;t_i +  0 4  \n(K7P)u  + 
a 5 In An +  aedIn An +  0 7 d In An - 1 +  ot^rn + c” + A" + ejj (2.4)
7 The estimated growth effects are unaffected by the inclusion of the government debt variable 
in the investment equation.
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where (L/P)u  is the ratio of employment to population of working age in country i 
and in year £, (K / P ) is the ratio of the capital stock to the population of working 
age, A is measured technological progress, w is the real wage rate, and r the expected 
(ex ante) real interest rate, q  and Xt capture country-specific effects and time effects 
respectively.
The wage equation takes the following form
din wit = Po + Pid\nwit- i  + (32d\n{K/LF)n + /3sdlnA it + /?4 Inu/i*-!
+P5\n(K /L F )it- i  + (3q InAit-i + fi j lnuu  + ft8(BDit * ln uit) + /39unionit 
+f310dtax -f /3n rerii +  /?12d21 npu +  c™ 4- X? 4- eft (2.5)
where u is the unemployment rate, B D  stands for benefit duration, dtax for change 
in the tax wedge, rev is the benefit replacement ratio, union for union density, LF  
for labour force and p is the price level. The interaction between benefit duration 
and log of unemployment captures the fact that the effect of unemployment on wages 
depends on the degree of unemployment protections. In particular, we expect that 
longer benefit duration lowers the moderating influence of unemployment on wages. 
Finally, the log specification of the capital accumulation equation is
din K it =  7o +  l \d ln-Kit- i  + j 2d n^ K it-2 +  7 3r ^  +  7 4 lnwit +  7 5 In Ait + 7 6d l n A ^  
+ ^7dlnAit - \  4- 7 8 ln{K/P)n-i  +  7 9 (D /K )u  4- (2-6)
where D is the level of Government debt.
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2.3 D ata and estim ation
2.3 .1  D ata: M easuring T F P
The data are annual for the period 1965-1997 for the countries of the European
Union, the United States and Japan .8 We measure TFP growth by making use of
a conventional growth accounting framework. The aggregate production function is 
Cobb-Douglas with labour augmenting technological progress:
Y  = K a(AL)l~a (2.7)
where Y, K  and L  are aggregate output, capital and employment and A  denotes 
technological progress. Converting (2.7) to logs, and denoting by d the change in a 
variable between two consecutive periods, we obtain
( l - a ) d \ n A  = d \n Y  - a d \ n K  -  (1 -  a)dlnL. (2.8)
where a  is the average of a between two periods. As in conventional growth ac­
counting exercises we replace Y, K, L  by the measured level of GDP, capital stock 
and employment. One problem in measuring TFP is that the share of labour in
value added is too volatile. Some authors suggest to smooth the observed labour
8See Appendix 2.6.3 for the definitions and the sources of the data used in the empirical analy­
sis. The countries of the European Union in the sample are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the United King­
dom. Greece is excluded from the analysis because some of the institutional variables are missing, 
and Spain because the fast rise in the unemployment in the 1980s and the introduction of temporary 
contracts in 1984 make it an outlier for reasons unrelated to productivity growth. The statistical 
properties of the regressions deteriorate when Spain is included although the main messages of the 
results are unaffected.
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shares using the properties of the translog production function (see Harrigan, 1997; 
Griffith et al., 2000).
with i denoting countries and t years in the sample.
Employment is measured by persons employed, which is our measure of employ­
ment in the main iegressions, and total hours worked. When TFP growth is adjusted 
for hours worked, the contribution of TFP growth is larger because of the fall in 
mean hours (especially in European countries) over the sample period.
Table 2.1 reports summary results (results for individual European countries 
are reported separately in Appendix 2.6.1 ) for the whole period and for three 
sub-periods 1965-1973, 1974-1989 and 1990-1997. Note that when we adjust for 
hours worked the number of countries included in the panel is reduced given the 
unavailability of the series "hours" for some of the EU countries.9
The results in Table 2.1 highlight the stylized fact of growth accounting in the 
comparison between Europe and the United States. In Europe employment growth
has contributed a mere 6 .6  per cent to GDP growth (which becomes negative when
9 The series hours is only available for Austria, Finland, France Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan.
Assuming a translog production function and the standard market clearing con­
ditions, the labour share can be expressed as a function of the capital-labour ratio
and a country-specific constant:
sharen =  consti 4- (3
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Table 2.1: Growth accounting for the European Union, United States and Japan,
1965-1997
GUP growth 
(%)
persons hours
Percentage contribution from 
capital labour TFP  
persons hours persons hours persons hours
1965-1997
European Union 3.1 3.0 39.6 37.7 6.6 -3.2 53.8 65.6
United States 2.8 - 37.1 - 43.3 42 6 19.6 20.3
Japan 4.7 - 52.9 - 13.9 11.6 33.2 35.5
1965-1973
European Union 4.8 4.3 42.6 42.1 4.7 -9.8 52.6 67.7
United States 3.7 - 37.4 - 38.6 33.5 24.0 29.1
Japan 9.0 - 47.0 - 9.6 9.2 43.4 43.8
1974-1989
European Union 2.5 2.6 38.8 38.0 14.9 -12.5 46.3 74.6
United States 2.5 - 37.3 - 52.8 56.2 9.9 6.5
Japan 3.6 - 54.1 - 16.7 12.2 29.2 33.7
1990-1997
European Union 2.2 2.3 34.2 28.1 16.5 18.3 49.3 53.6
United States 2.4 - 36.0 - 32.2 33.5 31.8 30.6
Japan 2.1 - 64.3 - 25.1 17.8 10.6 17.9
Notes: The European Union figures are simple averages calculated over the sample.
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employment is measured by hours of work for the countries where data are available) 
whereas in the United States the contribution of employment is over 40 percent. In 
Japan, the contribution of employment is lower but still positive. The difference 
between the contribution of employment in the United States and Europe is reflected 
in the contribution of TFP growth. In Japan, however, capital accumulation is also 
a more important contribution to growth.
Looking at the evolution of our variables over the sub-periods, it appears that the 
contribution of employment (persons) increases over time in Europe and in Japan, 
while it slightly decreases in the United States. The increase in the employment 
contribution in Europe is mostly due to a deficit in capital accumulation, with 
capital growth rate failing to recover at the pre-oil shock level. Growth in Japan is 
mainly driven by labour and capital, with the contribution of TFP sharply declining 
over time. Conversely, the contribution of TFP increases moderately in the. United 
States and remains roughly constant in Europe.
Figure 2.1 plots the computed TFP (persons) for the United States, the average 
for the countries of the European Union and Japan. The main stylized fact of pro­
ductivity is fast growth in the 1960s, especially in Japan which was still undergoing 
reconstruction following the war, followed by a slowdown in the second half of the 
1970s and a recovery in the 1990s, especially in the United States. There is a clear 
evidence of catching up with the United States in both Europe and Japan, with the 
exception of the 1990s, when Japanese productivity growth fell behind. Another 
notable feature of the computed series is that no strong cyclical pattern is evident,
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Figure 2.1: TFP in the United States, European Union and Japan, 1965-1997
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giving us more confidence that the estimates pick up the long-run effects. 
Lim itations of grow th accounting
There are several issues that can affect the interpretation of the Solow residual as a 
measure of technological change. Generally speaking, since TFP growth is calculated
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biased during the boom since the increase in output will be entirely attributed to 
technological progress, the actual utilization of factors being not shown in the input 
data. As a consequence, computed TFP growth turns to have a cyclical pattern, 
leading to serious problems when growth accounting is used to calculate changes of 
TFP over the business cycle (Wilson, 1995; Fay and Medoff, 1985). The cyclicality of 
TFP growth may be a major issue in the interpretation of the results in the empirical 
session since the estimated coefficients on TFP and TFP growth may be dominated 
by cyclical effects. We tiied to address this issue in a number of ways. We checked 
the robustness of the empirical results to different measures of TFP and TFP growth, 
which account for both capital utilization and hours worked.10 The results of the 
basic specification turned to be remarkably robust to these adjustments.
The second issue is related to the nature of the total factor productivity growth 
itself. The methodology outlined above assumes that all technical progress is of the 
disembodied variety. But if the contribution of embodied technical progress is large, 
the Solow residual can give an upward biased estimate of the contribution of tech­
nological progress to growth. In order to account for embodied technical progress 
(in capital) and of improved human capital (in labour) some researchers have con­
structed augmented labour and capital series. In the case of labour, adjustments 
can be done by disaggregating labour inputs into many categories based on educa­
tion, experience, gender and so on and weighing each category in accordance with
its average wage rate. Griffith et al. (2000), for example, control for differences in
10The idea is that firms costlessly adjust hours worked when adjusting employment is costly (Ball 
and Moffitt, 2002).
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the quality of inputs by expressing the aggregate labour input as a translog index 
of two types of workers, production workers and non-production workers, and using 
as weights the shares of each type of workers in the wage bill. Another approach is 
including a separate variable for human capital in the production function (see, for 
example, Mankiw at al., 1992).
Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) have demonstrated that the Solow residual is 
reduced substantially if improvements in the quality of capital stock are accounted 
by using vintage capital models. Such models allow for technical progress to be 
reflected in the age of capital, with new capital stock being more productive.
The failure to take this quality changes into consideration tends to understate 
the contribution of inputs and to overstate the fraction of GDP growth due to the 
residual. However, improvements in the quality of labour (such as skills) and in the 
quality of capital stock are poorly measured (Topel, 1999; OECD, 2001) and when 
some adjustments can be done, comparable measures across countries are difficult 
to obtain. As a consequence, if we interpret TFP growth as a broad index of overall 
productivity, an approach based on changes in physical quantities of inputs can still 
give a good proxy of the evolution of economic growth over time and the relative 
importance of its determinants.
2 .3 .2  E conom etric issues
The structural model is estimated by three-stage least squares. In each equation 
we include fixed effects for each country, and one time dummy for each year in the
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sample. We also include country-specific dummies for German unification.11 The 
inclusion of lagged dependent variables can lead to finite sample biases with the 
within-group estimator. The results in Nickell (1981), however, show that the mag­
nitude of the bias diminishes in the length of the time series in the panel. Since the 
sample runs for 31 years, the size of this bias is likely to be small. The asymptotic 
unbiasedness of the coefficients crucially depends on the absence of serial correlation 
in the errors. This will be investigated by using a serial correlation test described 
by Baltagi (1995).12 Finally, with lags of the dependent variable included, when 
coefficients differ across countries, pooling across groups can give inconsistent esti­
mates (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). We test for differences in the coefficients across 
the sample by using a poolability test described by Baltagi (1995).13
2.4 E stim ation results 
2.4 .1  S y stem  estim ation
The results of the estimation for the pooled sample are reported in column (1) of 
Tables 2.2-2.4. The long-run restrictions (2.1)-(2.3) are imposed and not rejected at 
the 5% level, with x 2 (4) =  9.60. The time dummies remove the common employment
trends and cycles in the countries of the sample and they are entered to avoid spu-
11 The dummies for German unification are obtained by interacting the fixed effect for Germany 
with the time dummies for the post-unification years, 1991-95.
12The test is an L M  statitistic which tests for an AR(1) and/or an M A {  1) structure in the 
residuals in a fixed-effects model. It is asymptotically distributed as IV(0,1) under the null. See 
Baltagi (1995).
13The poolability test is a generalized Chow test extended to the case of N  linear regressions, 
which tests for the common slopes of the regressors. The test statistic is asymptotically distributed 
as x(q)  under the null. See Baltagi (1995, 48-54).
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Table 2.2: Employment equation
In ( L / P ) it All countries EU countries US-Japan diff.
(1) (2) (3)
Independent Variables
\n (L /P ) i t - \ 1.180 1.164 -0.087
(27.12) (26.16) (-0.52)
ln (L /P )it - 2 -0.263 -0.270 0.095
(-6.03) (-6.44) (0.58)
lnu/it_ i -0.057 -0.078 0.026
(-4.47) (-6.40) (0.51)
In (K /P )U 0.027 0.021 0.017
(4.35) (3.00) (0.79)
In An 0.030 0.057 -0.002
(4.26) (5.37) (-2.25)
d In Ait -0.084 -0.166 0.310
(-3.69) (-4.67) (2.49)
din A n - 1 0.160 0.270 -0.164
(7.63) (8.23) (-1.45)
Tit -0.074 -0.075 0.062
(-2.70) (-2.76) (0.93)
Year dummies yes yes -
Fixed effects yes yes “
Serial Correlation 0.57 -0.26 _
p-value 0.28 0.39
Heteroskedasticity 16.38 16.38 -
p~value 0.29 0.29 -
Obs. 462 462
Fixed effects 15 15 -
Years 1964-1995 1964-1995
Notes for Tables 2.2-2.4. The estimation method is three stage least squares. Numbers in brackets 
below the coefficients are t-statistics. (L )P )u  is the ratio of employment to population of working 
age in country i in year t, (K / P ) is the ratio of the capital stock to the population of working 
age, A  is measured TFP progress, w  is the real wage rate, and r the real interest rate. Serial 
Correlation is an LM test (Baltagi 1995) distributed N(0,1) under the null (Ho : no autocorrelation). 
Heteroskedasticity is a groupwise LM test, distributed x 2(N  — 1) under the null (given v u  =  
Ci 4- At +  fit, Ho : tit  is homoskedastic). * Instrumented variables: the instruments used are all the 
exogenous variables in the three regressions and lags of the endogenous.
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Table 2.3: Wage equation
din Wit
Independent Variables
All countries 
(1)
EU countries 
(2)
US-Japan diff.
(3)
din w n - i 0.058 0.053 0.049
(1.46) (1.34) (1.47)
dln(K/LF)*it 0.503 0.270 0.783
(4.24) (1.98) (1.98)
din An 0.241 0.310 0.004
(5.89) (6.15) (6.15)
In w u - 1 -0.177 -0.162 -0.052
(-6.65) (-5.89) (5.88)
WKK / L F ) l t - i 0.083 0.043 0.036
(4.84) (5.88) (0.37)
lnA it-x 0.094 0.119 -0.088
(5.45) (5.17) • (-1.88)
In Uit -0.010 -0.012 0.012
(-2.31) (-2.29) (1.40)
B D u  * In ua 0.006 0.006 -0.001
(2.88) (5.64) (-0.65)
0.043 0.028 0.081
(2.10) (2.10) (0.48)
(htfCLCC -0.055 -0.066 0.098
(-0.84) (-0.97) (0.48)
reru -0.020 -0.018 -0.074
(-1.30) (-1.50) (-0.57)
d2 In pu -0.203 -0.208 0.113
(-3.55) (-3.54) (0.78)
Year dummies yes yes -
Fixed effects yes yes -
Serial Correlation 1.21 1.02 .
p-value 0.11 0.15 -
Heteroskedasticity 16.40 16.39 .
p-value 0.29 0.29
Obs. 462 462 _
Fixed effects 15 15 -
Years 1964-1995 1964-1995 -
Notes. See notes to Table 2.2. All variables have been defined except: L F  is the labor force, u 
the unemployment rate, B D  the maximum duration of benefit entitlement, union the fraction of 
workers belonging to a union (union density), rer  the benefit replacement ratio, tax  the tax wedge 
and p  the price level.
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Table 2.4: Investment equation
din Ait All countries EU countries US-Japan diff.
(1) (2) (3)
Independent Variables
din K u - i 0.963 0.910 0.211
(21.72) (19.95) (0.98)
din  K u - 2 -0.141 -0.097 -0.177
(-3.20) (-2.06) (-0.87)
Tit -0.036 -0.026 -0.002
(-2.70) (-2.02) (-0.06)
In wit -0.012 -0.021 0.019
(-1.83) (-3.53) (0.79)
In An 0.021 0.041 -0.032
(5.12) (6.89) (-2.20)
din  Ait 0.064 0.076 0.273
(5.88) (4.51) (4.18)
din  A it-i 0.026 0.048 -0.104
(2.37) (2.79) (-1.05)
ln(AT/P)it- i -0.009 -0.020 0.013
(-2.29) (-4.43) (0.89)
d l n ( D / K ) it -0.005 -0.008 -0.006
(-2.08) (-3.24) (-0.55)
Year dummies yes yes _
Fixed effects yes yes -
Serial Correlation 0.38 0.12 _
p-value 0.35 0.45 -
Heteroskedasticity 18.46 20.77
p-value 0.19 0.11
Obs. 462 462 _
Fixed effects 15 15 -
Years 1964-1995 1964-1995 -
Notes. See notes to Table 2.2. All variables have been defined except for D,  which is the level of 
government debt.
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rious correlations due to those co-movements. Therefore, the estimated coefficients 
rely on the differences across countries in the evolution of each independent variable 
and how these differences impact on employment in each country.
The estimated coefficients on the lagged dependent variables imply long lags, 
which we illustrate with simulations in section 3.4.3. In the employment equation, 
the dependent variable is the employment rate, defined as the employment to the 
working age population ratio. Consistently, capital stock is normalized to working 
age population as well. The terms of the employment equation can be rearranged 
to yield
In(L /P)t = 1 .2 1  ln (L /P)t_ i -  0.271n(L/P)*i2 -  0.059 In wt- i  -  0.076r*(2.9) 
+0.027 In kt +  0.031 In At — 0.086d In At +  0.16d In At—h
where kt is the ratio of capital to employment. The lag in the employment equation 
is long, implying large differences between impact and steady-state effects. The 
wage elasticity is —0.059 on impact but rises to —1.02 in the steady state. The 
interest semi-elasticity is even higher, rising to —1.31 in the steady state. There 
are significant influences from the rate of growth of TFP on employment, which are 
negative in the first year but turn positive in the second.14
The wage equation is an error-correction equation with a long estimated adjust­
14 We also experiment by including cyclical measures as independent variables, to make sure 
that the estimeted coefficients on TFP are not dominated by cyclical effects. We use the cyclical 
component of the GDP and the deviation of "hours'1 from the trend as proxies of the business cycle. 
The latter appears to be a better proxy for the business cycle in relation to labour market dynamics 
(Nickell, 1996). We decide to omit it from our final specification because of the lack of information 
on "hours worked" for some of the countries in the sample.
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ment lag. The key variables of the model are statistically significant and with the 
predicted sign. The capital stock and TFP affect the wage rate with positive coeffi­
cient, in both levels and rates of change. Unemployment has a restraining influence 
on wages, as predicted by the model, but its influence is reduced in countries that 
have long durations of benefit entitlement. This is consistent with the view often 
expressed in policy analyses, that long entitlement to benefit encourages the build 
up of long-duration unemployment, and reduces the economic role of unemployment 
in restraining wage demands. 15 This is the only parameter of the unemployment 
compensation system that we found statistically significant. We did not find that 
taxes increase wage costs but found that unionization does.
The capital stock in the wage equation is divided by the labour force instead 
of the level of employment to avoid introducing cyclical noise but of course since 
InL — In LF  =  ln(l — u) «  —u, the estimated equation is approximately equivalent 
to an equation that has the ratio of capital to employment and three lags of the 
unemployment rate as independent variables. The steady-state semi-elasticity of the 
wage rate with respect to the unemployment rate for a country whose unemployed 
lose half their entitlement after one year’s unemployment is estimated to be —0.04.
As with the wage equation, the capital equation is an error-correction equation
which is also characterized by a long adjustment lag. The interest rate, wage rate
and growth in government debt reduce private investment. 
loSee, for example, Layard et al. (1991).
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H eterogeneity  in th e  coefficients
We consider the possibility of heterogeneity in the coefficients across countries by 
comparing the results from the basic specification of the system with a specification 
that allows the coefficients to vary across countries. In the heterogeneous coefficients 
estimation we interact each regressor with the country fixed effects. The null hy­
pothesis of common slopes is tested by comparing the sum of squared residuals of the 
constrained model with that of the unconstrained model (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). 
The test statistics for the three equations are xi(126) =  25.89, X™(180) =  176.69 
and xjfc(126) =  41.36 respectively. So the null of common slopes is not rejected, 
confirming the qualitative findings of the more parsimonious model.
We also allow for different coefficients for the EU countries and the non EU coun­
tries, namely the United States and Japan. Columns (2) and (3) in Tables 2.2-2.4 
report the coefficients for the EU countries as a whole and the differences respect to 
the United States and Japan. The most interesting feature of the estimated differ­
ences between the two sets of countries is in the coefficients of unemployment rate 
and capital growth in the wage equation. It appears that unemployment rate plays 
a significant role in explaining wage setting decisions in the EU countries while the 
coefficient for the United States and Japan is zero, though the difference in the coef­
ficient between Europe and the other two countries does not appear to be significant 
. On the other hand, real wages seem to be more responsive to changes in pro­
ductivity in the non-European countries, with productivity gains arising from faster 
capital accumulation having a much stronger impact on short run wage dynamics.
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However, the interactions on the coefficients in each equation turn to be jointly not 
significant (xi(9) =  0.72 and Xw( 12) =  0.39 and x|c(9) = 0.39). Therefore the 
pooled model remains our preferred specification.
R obustness checks
Since the emphasis of the analysis is on the effect of TFP growth on unemployment, 
we check the robustness of the results to different measures of TFP and TFP growth. 
In Tables 2.5-2.7 we present three kind of corrections, namely TFP estimated using 
the regression approach (column (1)) , TFP adjusted for capital utilization (column 
(2)) and hours v/orked (column (3)).16
The basic model is remarkably robust to all these adjustments. TFP growth is 
significant in all the three equations and the sign and magnitude of coefficients re­
mains almost unchanged. In the employment equation the coefficient on the current 
and lagged TFP growth adjusted for capital utilization is considerably larger than 
in the basic specification. However, the net effect of TFP growth on employment 
is not significantly affected. When we adjust TFP for hours worked the number 
of countries included in the panel is reduced given the unavailability of the series 
"hours" for some of the EU countries. All the results of the previous specification
apply to this smaller sample.
16See Appendix 2.6.2 for a description on how we obtain the different measures of TFP.
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Table 2.5: Employment equation-- Robustness checks
Dependent variable H L / P ) u
Adjustments to TFP Regression Capital Hours
Approach Utilization
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3)
ln (L /P ) it- i 1.173 1.204 . 1.307
(26.58) (28.17) (26.39)
ln (L /P ) i t - 2 -0.265 -0.287 -0.396
(-6.48) (-7.04) (-8.51)
Intuit..! -0.056 -0.061 -0.083
(-4.68) (-511) (-5.04)
H K / p y it 0.033 0.030 0.025
(4.35) (4.52) (3.12)
In An 0.023 0.031 0.058
(4.26) (4.53) (4.56)
d  In An -0.031 -0.249 -0.027
(-1.51) (-9.05) (-0.66)
d \n A i t - i 0.141 0.342 0.227
(7.47) (8.94) (5.86)
Tit -0.075 -0.045 -0.108
(-2.75) (-1.73) (-3.00)
Year dummies yes yes yes
Fixed effects yes yes yes
Serial Correlation -0.07 -0.049 0.53
p-value 0.47 0.48 0.30
Heteroskedasticity 16.39 16.37 10.45
p-value 0.29 0.29 0.29
Obs. 462 462 315
Fixed effects 15 15 11
Years 1964-1995 1964-1995 1964-1995
Notes. See Appendix 2.6.2 for a description on how the different measures of TFP are calculated.
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Table 2.6: Wage equation - Robustness checks
Dependent variable 
Adjustments to TFP  
Independent variables
d  In wu
Regression
Approach
(1)
Capital
Utilization
(2)
Hours
(3)
dlnitfit-i 0.054 0.061 0.004
(1.40) (1.56) (0.09)
a \n (K /L F ) i t 0.427 0.465 0.457
(4.24) (4.24) (4.24)
d In An 0.207 0.265 0.344
(5.89) (5.89) (5.89)
In w n - 1 -0.175 -0.195 -0.188
(-6.47) (-6.65) (-6.65)
In {K /L F ) l t_ x 0.104 0.095 0.056
(5.81) (5.47) (3.03)
In Ait- 1 0.071 0.100 0.132
(5.82) (6.18) (4.93)
In Hit -0.010 -0.010 •0.008
(-2.37) (-2.18) (-1.75)
B D u  * In Hit 0.007 0.007 0.006
(3.12) (3.15) (5.54)
unioriit 0.037 0.036 0.007
(1.83) (1.77) (0.27)
dtaxu -0.045 -0.047 -0.064
(-0.71) (-0.72) (-0.78)
rerit -0.021 -0.022 -0.011
(-1.48) (1.53) (0.81)
d2 In pa -0.205 -0.192 -0.017
(-3.64) (-3.35) (-0.22)
Year dummies yes yes yes
Fixed effects yes yes yes
Serial Correlation 1.06 1.19 0.66
p-value 0.14 0.11 0.25
Heteroskedasticity 16.39 16.39 10.34
p-value 0.29 0.29 0.29
Obs. 462 462 315
Fixed effects 15 15 11
Years 1964-1995 1964-1995 1964-1995
Notes. See Appendix 2.6.2 for a description on how the different measures of TFP are calculated.
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Table 2.7: Investment equation - Robustness checks
Independent variable 
Adjustments to TFP  
Independent variables
din K u
Regression
Approach
(1)
Capital
Utilization
(2)
Hours
(3)
din K u - i 0.936 0.958 0.908
(20.44) (20.94) (17.11)
d  In K u  - 2 -0.124 -0.167 -0.115
(-2-74) (-3.75) (-2.12)
Tit -0.027 -0.026 -0.055
(-2.11) (-1.84) (-2.79)
In w*t -C.012 -0.017 -0.025
(-2.13) (-2.53) (-2.91)
In An 0.018 0.024 0.038
(5.37) (5.10) (4.99)
d b  Au 0.053 0.028 0.033
(5.19) (1.83) (1.50)
d \n A i t - i 0.030 0.030 0.071
(2.88) (2.03) (3.17)
ln (K /P ) i t - i -0.006 -0.007 -0.013
(-1.49) (-1.79) (-2.36)
d ln ( D /K ) it -0.007 -0.008 -0.008
(-2.61) (-2.89) (-2.59)
Year dummies yes yes yes
Fixed effects yes yes yes
Serial Correlation 0.23 0.52 0.65
p-value 0.41 0.30 0.26
Heteroskedasticity 18.34 13.50 16.61
p-value 0.19 0.49 0.12
Obs. 462 462 315
Fixed effects 15 15 11
Years 1964-1995 1964-1995 1964-1995
Notes. See Appendix 2.6.2 for a description on how the different measures of TFP are calculated.
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2.4.2 Simulations
We report the results of two simulations to illustrate the properties of the estimated 
model. In the first, we impose a zero-growth steady state, for expository purposes, 
and allow the level of TFP to increase by 5 percent, once and for all. We trace the 
response of the three endogenous variables to this change. In the second simulation 
we trace the response of the endogenous variables to a once-for-all change in the 
rate of growth of TFP but instead of assuming an arbitrary change in the rate 
of growth, we simulate a productivity slowdown that corresponds roughly to the 
slowdown observed after 1973.
In the third and main simulation we use the empirical model to predict how 
much of the observed change in the unemployment rate can be attributed to TFP 
growth, by holding all other exogenous variables constant and allowing TFP to take 
its observed values.
We make use of our estimates and the identity linking employment with unem­
ployment, Lt + Ut = LFt, where LFt is the exogenous labour force in period t. The 
calculations are done by breaking up the growth terms in the regressions into the 
first difference of the logs and collecting terms, to yield the equations:
In Lt = 1.2 1 2  In Lt- \  — 0.270 In L t ~ 2  — 0.059 In wt~\ +0.027 In kt
-0.055 In At +  0.251 In A t- 1  -  0.164 In At- 2 +  Cx (2 .1 0 )
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In wt = 0.881 In wt~i — 0.058 In wt~2 +  0.503 In kt — 0.420 In kt-i
+0.241 In At -  0.147 In A t~\ -  0 .0 1 0  In ut +  0.503 ln(l -  ut)
-0 .420In (1  -  ut- 1) +  0.006(ln ut * B D t) +  C2 (2 .1 1 )
In K t =  1.954 \n K t- i  -  1.105 In K t- 2 +  0.141 In K t- 3 -  0 .0 1 2  In wt
+0.085 In At -  0.038 In A t- i -  0.026 In At- 2 +  C3 (2 .1 2 )
Two things need explanation. The Ci are “constants,” by which we mean all vari­
ables net varied in the simulations. The terms containing ln(l — ut) in the wage 
equation are present because the ratio of the capital stock to the labour force in the 
estimated equations was replaced by the ratio of the capital stock to employment. 
Finally, consistency between equation (2.12) and the other two equations is achieved 
by making use of the definition kt =  (K / L ) t .
Figure 2.2 panels (a) and (b) show the results of the first simulation. We set 
TFP at its sample mean and calibrate the constants Ci (i = 1,2,3) such that all the 
endogenous variables are in a steady state at their sample means. We then let (in 
year 4 in the figures) In A  increase by 0.05 once and trace the paths followed by the 
three endogenous variables in response to this change.
The increase in TFP brings a slow response from wages and the ratio of capital 
to employment, both of which eventually rise by the full 5 percent. But it takes real 
wages 5 years to increase by 4 percent and the capital-labour ratio about 11 years
un
am
pl
oy
m
an
i 
ra
le
CHAPTER 2. UNEMPLOYMENT AND GROWTH: PANEL ESTIMATES 73
Figure 2.2: Simulation of a once-for-all 5% increase in TFP
(a) The response of wages and the ratio of capita] to 
employment
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Table 2.8: Actual and predicted unemployment rate, productivity slowdown
mean TFP mean rate of predicted rate of
Period growth (%) unemployment (%) unemployment (%)
US EU US EU US EU
1960-73 1.90 3.95 4.96 2.26 - -
1974-92 0.80 1.79 6.82 6.60 6.60 5.10
to increase by 4 percent. Although adjustment is not monotonic, the fluctuations 
are not quantitatively significant.17 Unemployment rises by 0.26 percent one year 
after the shock, but the rise is reversed in year 2. Unemployment then falls quickly, 
and two years later it reaches its lowest point of 1 percentage point beiow its initial 
value of 6  percent. The simulation shows that TFP changes bring about sizeable 
temporary unemployment effects, induced by the slow response of wages and the 
capital stock to TFP, but also by internal employment dynamics attributed to lagged 
dependent variables in the above regressions.
Table 2.8 shows the average TFP growth rate prior to 1973 and the average rate 
up to 1992, before growth picked up again. In the second simulation we give TFP 
growth its pre-1973 mean value in year 1 of the simulation (year 4 in figures 4 and 
5) and let TFP grow according to the mean rates in Table 2.8 until the end of the 
sample. We then calibrate the constants C{ (i =  1, 2,3) such that all the endogenous 
variables are in a steady state in the 4 years preceding the shock, with the capital- 
labour ratio and wage rate growing at the same rate as TFP and the unemployment
rate constant at the rate shown in Table 2.8.
17 Adjustment in the aggregate capital stock is monotonic. But because the change in employment 
reverses after one year, change in the ratio of capital to employment also reverses one year after the 
shock.
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Figure 2.3: Growth rates of TFP, wages and the capital to employment ratio follow­
ing the 1973 slowdown
(a) United States
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Figure 2.4: Predicted unemployment response to the 1973 productivity slowdown
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Figure 2.3 shows the response of wages and capital growth to the TFP shock 
and Figure 2.4 shows the response of the unemployment rate. There is a marked 
difference in the simulated series for the United States and Europe, due largely to 
the different TFP shock. TFP growth fell by more in Europe than in the United 
States and this accounts for a predicted rise in unemployment in Europe between 
1973 and 1990 of 2.84 percentage points but in the United States of only of 1.64 
percentage points. Another reason for the differential response is the fact that the 
entitlement to unemployment benefit is longer in Europe than in the United States. 
As unemployment increases, the disincentive effect of the unemployment insurance 
system is stronger, leading to less wage moderation and so to higher unemployment 
in the countries with the longer durations. The effect on unemployment of the 
productivity slowdown is more than half a percentage point larger in Europe when
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the impact of benefit duration is accounted for (dashed line).
The response of wage growth and capital accumulation to the productivity slow­
down in Figure 2.3 follows a similar pattern to the response of the level of wages and 
capital shown in Figure 2.2. The adjustment lags are of a similar magnitude, with 
wages responding faster than the capital stock. Of course, in Figure 2.3 the response 
is in growth rates and because the TFP shock is treated as permanent, wage growth 
and the capital-labour ratio change permanently. The change in unemployment is 
also permanent. Despite the complicated lags estimated in the regressions, once- 
for-all changes in productivity growth do not cause cyclical responses from any of 
the endogenous variables. Also, despite the smaller slowdown in the United States, 
the model gets closer to attributing the full rise in US unemployment after 1973 to 
the slowdown, in contrast to Europe, where our prediction falls short by about 1.5 
percentage points (Table 2.8).
The predictive power of the model is shown in Figure 2.5 panels (a) and (b). The 
figure shows the unemployment rate obtained from the model when we allow TFP 
growth to take its actual values but keep constant all the other exogenous variables. 
Overall, the two figures indicate that the empirical model explains a significant 
portion of unemployment in the two economies, though with some differences. TFP 
growth explains well the trend changes in unemployment in the United States. The 
rise up to the mid 1980s and subsequent decline are picked up by the model. But 
in the European Union, TFP growth explains a lower fraction of the overall change 
in the unemployment rate, and although the model picks up some of the rise up to
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Figure 2.5: Predicted unemployment rate when TFP takes actual values and other 
exogenous variables held constant compared with the actual unemployment rate
(a) United States
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Table 2.9: Actual and predicted unemployment rate
US EU
Period unemployment (%)________ unemployment (%)
actual predicted actual predicted
1970-73 4.96 - 2.26 -
1973-79 6.40 5.80 4.13 3.17
1980-89 7.17 7.39 7.53 4.95
1990-97 6.03 6.57 8.59 4.91
the mid 1980s, it fails to account for the changes in the 1990s.
Table 2.9 reports the average level of actual and predicted unemployment for 
three sub-periods. In 1970-73 we restrict unemployment in the model to be at the 
level of the observed average. In the United States, the slowdown in TFP growth 
after 1973 explains about 60 percent of the rise in unemployment in the 1970s but 
the explanatory power picks up and by the end of the sample the model overpredicts 
slightly the change in mean unemployment. In Europe the slowdown of TFP growth 
explains more than three quarters of the increase in unemployment in the 1970s but 
it does not fully explain the further rise in unemployment that occurred in the 1980s 
and it actually predicts a small decline in mean unemployment in the 1990s, when 
unemployment went up by a full percentage point.
2.4 .3  M easuring th e  fraction o f d isem b od ied  tech n olog ica l progress
In Chapter 1, we showed that TFP growth increases job destruction but it may 
increase or decrease job creation at given unemployment rate, depending on the value 
taken by some key parameters. When technological progress is not fully embodied, 
the overall effect of technological progress on unemployment crucially depends on
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Pissarides, 1998) or more generally, it depends on the fraction A of technological 
progress that can be adopted by existing jobs (Pissarides and Vallanti, 2003). Given 
our estimate of a strong positive effect of TFP growth on employment, in this section 
we investigate whether the estimate imposes any limits on the values taken by the 
parameter A in the model of Pissarides and Vallanti (2003). As the overall effect of 
growth on employment is positive, our estimates imply that A should be high, but
In Pissarides and Vallanti (2003), the steady-state solutions for the three un­
knowns, T, 6 and iz, are given by the following equations18
is consistent with the positive effect of TFP growth on employment found in the data.
the costs of implementing the new technology in the existing jobs (Mortensen and
how high?
(2.13)
(i -  P)(v(*g)<l> -  y ( g p )  = (2.14)
n +  s
(2.15)
(l — e- (n+s)T) m(Q) +  n -1- s
Using these steady state solutions we first calculate the smallest value of A w'hich
We then use the results from this first calibration to find the value of A implied by
our point estimates.
18See section 1.2.2 in chapter 1, for a discussion of the steady state conditions in the theoretical 
model.
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Differentiation of (2.15) with respect to the rate of growth of TFP yields
By (2.15) , um{9) — (1 — u)(n + s) > 0, so if the growth rate reduces unemployment, 
the second term in (2.18) must be negative. The term in the square brackets has 
in general an ambiguous sign, but reasonable parameter values give an overwhelm­
ingly positive value (see below). The intuitive conclusion follows that if productivity 
growth reduces unemployment it is because it increases job creation at given unem­
ployment rate; i.e., that consistency between the theoretical model and estimates 
requires, at the very least, d6/dg > 0. The smallest value of A consistent with a 
positive dO/dg is a lower bound on the values of A consistent with our estimates and 
can be computed for reasonable parameter values.
In order to obtain the effect of TFP growth on job creation, for a given unem-
(2.16)
From equations (2.13) and (2.14) we derive, by direct substitution and differentiation
dT  1 0 6 1
d g 3 ~  l - X d g B '
(2.17)
Substitution of dT/dg  from (2.17) into (2.16) yields
= T [u m (0 ) - ( l -u ) (n  + s)] (2.18)
um(9) — (1 — u)(n -f s)" d9 g 
g{ 1 -  A) dg~9
CHAPTER 2. UNEMPLOYMENT AND GROWTH: PANEL ESTIMATES 82
ployment rate, we differentiate equation 2.14 with respect to g to obtain:
From (2.19) , 69/6g > 0 requires
\y'{\g)(f) -  y'{g)u > 0 . (2 .2 0 )
We obtain the range of A that satisfies (2.20) when the other unknowns are at their
steady-state values. Let A* be the lowest value of A that satisfies (2.20). We obtain
solutions to the following system of steady-state equations
A V (A W  -  y '(9)u  =  0. (2.21)
1 —  e - ( r + s - \ * g ) T
y(x *9) =  .  , ; (2.22)r +  s — A *g
-  e - ( r + s ~ 5
r + s — g 
l (f> — In u
(1  "  A*)<? 
l - ( 3 (
1 —  - ( - g ) T  
y(a) = ------    (2.23)
\nd> l cj ,___
T  = (2-24)
uj = b +  ^  c9 (2.25)
(1 -  P)(y(\*g)<f> -  y(g)u) =  (2.26)
The unknowns are A*, y(Mg),y(g),T,  u;, and 6. The matching flow is assumed to be
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Table 2.10: Baseline parameter values
r 0.04 0 0.50
b 0.300 V 0.50
c 0 .1 0 0 9 0 .0 2
constant-elasticity
m(9) =  mo#77. (2.27)
The parameters were either given standard values or derived by calibrating the 
steady-state equation for unemployment and average job duration. The baseline 
parameter values appear in Table 2.10. The real rate of interest is 4 per cent per 
annum, the value of unemployment income is fixed at the sample mean for the 
United States and the hiring cost is taken from Hamermesh (1993), who estimates 
it on average to be one month’s wages. The average recruitment cost in the model 
is c9/m(9), which depends on the unknown 9. Wages in this economy are about 92 
per cent of the marginal product of labour, giving the values 0.30 for b and 0.10 
for c. The value of 0 needs not be specified. The values for and 77 are the ones 
commonly used in calibrations of search equilibrium models and the value for TFP 
growth is its sample mean.19
The value for the parameter s is obtained by calibrating the expected duration 
of jobs. According to the OECD (1999), the mean duration of jobs in the United
States is 4.2 years (in the UK it is 5 years and in continental Europe 7.3 years). In
19 We calibrate the model to US values because they are the ones that are least contaminated by 
policy on employment protection and other things that are not in the model. However, calibrating 
to European values gives almost identical results.
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the model, the mean duration of jobs is given by (1  — exp(—sT)) /s , so we treat s 
as an unknown and introduce the equation
(2.28)s
Finally, the parameter mo is calibrated from the steady-state equation for unem­
ployment. In our sample the mean unemployment rate in the United States is 6  per 
cent. We treat mo as another unknown and introduce the equation
The rate of growth of the labour force n is assumed to be 0.02.
The solutions for all unknowns are given in Table 2.11. The critical value for A 
turns out to be 0.926. Thus, to get a positive effect from productivity growth on job 
creation, productivity in existing jobs has to grow on average at a rate more than 90 
per cent the rate of growth of new and more advanced jobs. But at this high value 
of A existing jobs fall behind by a very small margin, which at reasonable growth 
rates and job turnover rates, implies that job terminations through obsolescence are 
virtually nonexistent in the steady state. Given a calibrated T  almost equal to 60, 
by the time productivity growth makes a job obsolete, the job is certain to have
ended for other reasons.20
20 Of course, this does not preclude creative destruction from being a powerful influence on em­
ployment in sectors adjusting to new technologies at fast pace, or even at the level of the economy 
as a whole out of the steady state.
n +  s = 0.06. (2.29)
(l — e- (n+3)r ) mo#0'5 +  n +  s
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Table 2.11: Model solutions
A* 0.926 6 6.16 y(Yg) 3.85
T 59.6 U) 0.920 y{9) 3.87
s 0.24 m0 1.63
The other solution values are reasonable. Note that 9 is the ratio of recruitment 
effort to search effort. Although it is usually interpreted as the ratio of vacancies 
to unemployment (in which case the number 6.16 would be unreasonable) we did 
not give it this interpretation. We used the steady-state unemployment rate to infer 
it. It implies that on average the duration of unemployment in the United States 
is 3 months, which is reasonable. It also implies that the average recruitment cost 
per employee is 0.1450, or about 1.8 months'' wages. This is a little higher than 
Hamermesh’s estimate, but changing the parameter c in the computations by a 
factor of 2 changes the recruitment cost but has no influence on the solutions for A* 
or T and s .21
In order to obtain the value of A implied by our point estimates, we use the 
derived values for all the unknowns in Table 2.11 to obtain, from (2.19),
~  = 1.949A -  1.806. (2.30)da 6
21 The computed value for A* turns out to be robust virtually to all reasonable parameter vari­
ations. Increasing b to 0.4 increases A* to 0.937. Increasing g to 0.03 (both the higher value for b 
and the higher value for g are the means for the countries of the European Union) also increases 
it to 0.936. Forcing the mean duration of jobs in the absence of obsolescence to be 10 years (i.e., 
treating s as a parameter and setting it equal to 0.1) increases A* to 0.931. The reason for this 
robust behavior is clear from equation (2.21). Because reasonable values of g are small, the present 
discounted value terms y(Xg) and y(g) are approximately equal to each other. The solution for A* 
is then approximately equal to the ratio of the reservation wage to marginal product. But the only 
reason for a deviation between the reservation wage and marginal product in the steady-state of 
this economy is the existence of frictions, and the frictions implied by the data are not big enough 
to make reservation wages much less than marginal product.
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Equation (2.18) then gives a simple expression, because at values of A as high as the 
computed A* the term um{6) — (1 — u)(n  +  s) is 0, so
d u a  d9 ay =  -0 .47—  I  
ogu  ogv
=  0.849 -  0.916A. (2.31)
The steady-state estimates in Table 2.8 suggest that for each one percentage point 
change in the productivity growth rate unemployment changes in the opposite di­
rection by 1.49 points.22 Therefore, the elasticity of u with respect to g at the mean 
values reported in Table 2.8 is —0.35 (it is higher, —0.50, at u =  0.06 and g = 0.02). 
But this value is sufficiently high to give a point estimate of A above 1, the upper 
limit of its feasible range. So job destruction because of embodied technological 
progress does not appear to contribute at all to the steady-state unemployment 
dynamics.
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we showed that although equilibrium models of employment imply 
that the effects of faster TFP growth can be either positive or negative, empirically 
the effects appear to be strongly positive. We used the estimates to obtain a pre­
diction of the extent to which exogenous TFP growth can account for the observed
22 Because of the way the estimates were obtained, it is more accurate to talk of the change in 
unemployment caused by a one percentage point change in the growth rate, rather than in term of 
elasticities. The estimate of 1.49 is for the United States. For the European Union the estimate is 
1.31. The result for the European Union is in line with that in Fitoussi et al. (2000).
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changes in the rate of unemployment (or employment). The empirical model does a 
good job in attributing the rise in unemployment in the United States after 1973 and 
its subsequent decline to the productivity slowdown and subsequent recovery. It is 
also fairly successful at tracking other dynamics in the US unemployment rate. The 
slowdown in productivity growth in Europe was bigger than the US slowdown, and 
the model attributes a substantial rise in the European unemployment to it. But it 
is generally less successful in attributing the dynamics of European unemployment 
to productivity changes.
We used the results from the empirical model to derive an estimate for the 
fraction of productivity growth that is embodied in new jobs, the factor behind the 
Schumpeterian “creative destruction” . Our estimates imply that an upper bound 
to this fraction is 7 percent, but the point estimate gives a value below zero. This 
implies that creative destruction is not a factor in the steady state of the countries 
in the sample, although the fact that the point estimate is below zero could also 
mean that there are additional forces at work contributing to a positive relation 
between productivity growth and employment. Such forces could be related to the 
supply-side forces identified by Phelps (1994), Hoon and Phelps (1997) and Ball and 
Moffitt (2002), which also imply long lags in the effect of growth on employment. 
More work is needed in linking the demand-side factors estimated here and the 
supply-side factors estimated elsewhere.
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2.6 Appendix
2 .6 .1  G row th accounting
Table 2.12: Growth accounting for the European countries, 1965-1997
GDP growth Percentage contribution from
capital labour TFP
persons hours persons hours
Austria 
Qjt =  0.38
3.1 48.5 9.4 -2 . 8 42.1 54.4
Belgium 
Qk =  0.37
2.7 39.6 1 . 8 - 58.6 -
Denmark 
Qk =  0.36
2.5 36.9 15.7 - 47.4 -
Finland 
Qk — 0.34
3.0 30.7 0.4 -12.5 68.9 81.9
France 
Qk =  0.37
2 . 8 44.4 7.8 -6.7 47.7 62.2
Germany 
a  k =  0.38
2.7 38.9 1 . 6 1 . 1 59.5 60.0
Ireland 
ock — 0.33
4.7 33.4 10.9 6 . 0 55.7 60.5
Italy
ock =  0.35
3.0 31.4 0.5 -10.4 6 8 . 1 79.0
Netherlands 
Qk =  0.37
3.0 34.8 29.5 - 35.7 -
Norway 
Qk =  0.43
3.6 38.6 19.0 2 . 0 42.4 59.4
Portugal 
Qk =  0.38
4.0 41.8 14.8 - 43.3 -
Sweden 
a*: =  0.33
2 . 1 32.7 6 . 8 -4.4 60.5 71.7
U.K.
Qk =  0.36
2 . 2 43.7 5.9 - 1 0 . 0 50.4 66.3
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2 .6 .2  T o ta l fa c to r  p ro d u c tiv i ty  m e asu re s  
A d justing  T F P  grow th  for hours worked
Our basic measurement of labour input is number of workers employed in a given 
country i at a give time t. We can adjust this by taking the average hours actually
ber of EU countries, the US and Japan. Adjusting for hours worked, the aggregate 
measure of TFP growth will be:
where H is the annual hours worked per person in employment.
A d justing  T F P  grow th for capital accum ulation
The basic measure of TFP and TFP growth rate does not take into account the fact 
that countries can experience different cycles and during slowdown in the economic 
activity the capital stock may not be fully utilized. We adjust for this by calculating 
the GDP trend as the fitted values obtained by regressing the observed GDP on a 
quintic trend and adjusting capital stock as follows:
where Y tr is the trend GDP.
T F P  m easurem ent by using th e  estim ation  approach
The aim of using the econometric approach (Fajnzylber and Lederman, 1999) is to
than rely on its calculation based on macro data. Imposing constant return to 
scale, we calculate the TFP growth rate as the residuals obtained from the following 
regression:
Thus, assuming labour augmenting technological progress, the TFP growth rate 
is calculated as follows:
worked per worker. Hours worked is available from ISDB (OECD) for a limited num-
( l - a ) A l n A /i =  A ln T  -  a A ln K  -  (1  — a )(A ln N  +  A ln tf)
estimate the share of capital in output directly from the production function rather
o lq  -f q iA  In
where £it = C{ +  Xt +  £u
A TFPit =
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2 .6 .3  D a ta  ap p en d ix
Sam ple com position
The countries in the sample are:
Austria Germany
Belgium Ireland
Denmark Italy
Finland Japan
France Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Sweden
United Kingdom 
United States
D ata  definitions and sources
L  Total employment (source: OFCD National Accounts).
P  Working age population (source: OECD National Accounts).
L F  Labor force (source: OECD National Accounts).
H Average annual hours worked per person in employment (source: OECD In­
ternational Sectoral Data Base).
w Real labour cost: w = [ -r~p  ] /(L  —Lse//), where WSSE is the compensa-
\dejGDpJ
tion of employees at current price and national currencies (source: OECD Eco­
nomic Outlook), defcDP is the GDP deflator, base year 1990 (source: OECD 
National Accounts), L  is total employment and L seif  is the total number of 
self- employed (source: OECD National Accounts).
K  Real capital stock. The calculation of the capital stock is made according to
is the gross fixed capital formation at current prices and national currencies 
(source: OECD National Accounts) and defipiv is the gross fixed capital 
formation price index, base year 1990 (source: OECD National Accounts) and 
the depreciation rate, 5, is assumed constant and equal to 8 percent, which 
is consistent with OECD estimates (Machin and Van Reenen, 1998). Initial
capital stock is calculated as: K q =  ^ e°-, where g is the average annual
9  +  o
growth of investment expenditure and weo is investment expenditure in the 
first year for which data on investment expenditure are available.
A Total factor productivity (TFP). This is computed using the following formula:
din A =  —\d\nY  — a d ln K  — (1 — a)d\n L], where Y  is gross domestic
1 — a
output at constant price and national currencies (source: OECD National Ac­
counts), K  is capital stock as defined above, L is total employment as defined
the Perpetual Inventory Method: K  = (1 — 5)K-\  4 -
defiiw
, where wen
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above, (1  — a) is a smoothed share of labour following the procedure described 
in Harrigan (1997). Labor share is defined as (1 — a) =  - y .  In order to 
make our measure of total factor productivity comparable across countries, 
we convert both Y  and K  to US dollars using the GDP and gross fixed cap­
ital formation Purchasing Power Parities (1990) respectively (source: OECD 
National Accounts).
r Real long term interest rate deflated by the 3-year expected inflation rate: 
r = i — E(d\np+i), where i is the long term nominal interest rate (source: 
OECD Economic Outlook). E (d \np+i) are fitted values from the regression 
d\np  =  7 1dlnp_i +  7 2d lnp _ 2  +  7 3d lnp _ 3  -I- u, where d\np  is the inflation 
rate based on the consumer price index p (source: OECD National Accounts) 
and the coefficients on the right side are restricted to sum to one, indicating 
inflation neutrality in the long run (see Cristini, 1999).
u Unemployment rate: u — 1 — where L is the total employment and LFLF
is the total labour force (see above for definition and data sources).
union Net union density, defined as the percentage of employees who are union mem­
bers (source: Nickell et al. 2001).
tax Tax wedge, calculated as the sum of the employment tax rate, the direct tax
rate and the indirect tax rate (source: Nickell et al. 2001).
rer Benefit replacement ratio, defined as the ratio of unemployment benefits to
wages for a number of representative types (source: Nickell et al. 2001, con­
structed from OECD data sources).
BD Benefit duration, defined as a weighted average of benefits received during the
second, third, fourth and fifth year of unemployment divided by the benefits in 
the first year of unemployment (source: Nickell et al. 2001, constructed form 
OECD data sources).
p Consumer price index, base year 1990 (OECD, Main Economic Indicators).
D Gross government debt (source: OECD Economic Outlook and for UK IMF
International Financial Statistics). For missing values before 1970, debt is 
calculated using the formula: D — D - \  = D F , where D F  is the government 
deficit (source: IMF International Financial Statistics).
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Chapter 3
C apital M obility and 
U nem ploym ent Dynam ics
3.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the labour market effects of international capital mobility. 
Specifically, our aim is to assess whether and to what extent the remarkable increase 
in capital mobility experienced by the OECD countries in the last two decades has 
contributed to unemployment dynamics.
The benefits of capital mobility are well known: the removal of barriers to fac­
tors mobility increases efficiency and, by lowering the cost of financial transactions, 
improves saving and investment both from a quantitative and qualitative point of 
view. In the long run, higher capital mobility enhances capital accumulation and 
economic growth. However, in a world in which labour is less mobile than capital, 
perfect capital mobility will also amplify the impact of country-specific productivity 
shocks on domestic employment.
The reason why this happens is easy to understand if one considers how an
93
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economy adjusts to a temporary reduction in productivity. In an economy without 
capital mobility, a temporary decrease in productivity leads to a reduction in the 
rate of return to capital and then to a temporary fall in capital accumulation and 
labour demand. Low barriers to capital mobility allow investors to diversify country- 
specific productivity shocks across countries. When a domestic negative shock hits 
the economy, capital flows abroad where the rates of -return are relatively higher. 
This further shrinks the labour demand and deepens the recession. Conversely, if 
the shock is positive, the inflow of foreign capital accelerates the increase in the 
labour demand. These forces result in bigger and sharper fluctuations in labour de­
mand and real wages than would be observed in a closed economy, while the mean 
unemployment rate is not substantially affected. From this perspective, the main 
implication of higher international capital mobility is a reduction of the risk associ­
ated to capital income and an increase of the risk of labour income. Therefore, in 
absence of perfect insurance markets, higher capital mobility may have a significant 
negative impact on the welfare of individuals investing in human capital.
In this chapter we test the link between capital mobility and unemployment 
dynamics by using a panel of 20 OECD countries for the past 30 years. In particular, 
following Azariadis and Pissarides (2003), we are interested in exploring two possible 
roles played by capital mobility - first its effect on the persistence of unemployment 
and second its impact on unemployment responsiveness to idiosyncratic productivity 
shocks. In our analysis we find evidence for both mechanisms: larger penetration 
of international capital significantly amplifies the impact of idiosyncratic shocks on
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domestic unemployment, reduces the duration of the response to the shocks and 
increases unemployment volatility.
The reminder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we present 
the theoretical motivations of our study. Section 3.3 defines the key measures and 
concepts of unemployment volatility and capital mobility that we use in the em­
pirical analysis along with a preliminary analysis of the data. In section 3.4 we 
present the empirical results and simulate the effects of changes in capital mobility 
on unemployment volatility. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical m otivations and empirical evidence
The importance of international capital mobility has been extensively examined in 
the traditional trade theory. However, still little attention has been devoted to the 
macroeconomic effects of capital market integration. Indeed, increased capital mo­
bility can produce undesirable effects in economies whose domestic capital becomes 
more responsive to productivity or price shocks.1
A direct implication of increased international capital mobility is an increase in 
investment volatility as the substitution between domestic and foreign investment 
becomes larger. Using a simple neoclassical model, Razin and Rose (1994) show that
a reduction in barriers to capital mobility enhances investment opportunities and
1 There is a large theoretical and empirical literature which releates changes in the business 
cycle volatility to changes in the degree of capital mobility. On the theoretical side, the effects of 
increased capital market integration on macroeconomic volatility are in fact not clear, and depend 
on the nature of the underlying shocks. For a discussion of this literature, see the survey of Buch 
(2002). The analsysis of the effects of capital market integration on business cycle volatility goes 
beyond the scope of this paper. From now on, we will focus our discussion on the implications of 
increased capital mobility for labour market volatility.
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therefore the volatility of investment. These effects are larger when the underlying 
shocks are idiosyncratic and permanent. A non structural empirical analysis is also 
performed to test the link between openness and volatility suggested by the theory, 
finding little support to the theoretical conclusions.2
Regarding the effects of increasing international capital mobility on the labour 
market, Rodrik (1997) is one of the first who emphasizes the link between openness 
and labour market instability in a world where labour is intrinsically less mobile than 
capital. The main implication of this asymmetry is that workers have to face greater 
instability in earnings and hours worked in response to country specific shocks when 
international mobility of capital increases. Using a simple static model of open 
economy, he shows that the elasticity of demand of domestic labour increases with 
the degree of "openness" of the economy.3 The intuition is easy to understand. 
The demand of any factor used in the production process becomes more sensitive 
to changes in its own price when other production factors (as for example capital) 
respond quicker and to a larger extent to economic changes.4 When an idiosyncratic 
shock hits the economy (such as an exogenous shock to labour demand caused by 
an unexpected change in labour productivity) a flatter demand curve will result in
larger changes in both employment and wages.5
2 One of the main limitations of this kind of studies is the difficulty of design appropriate measures 
for the degree of capital mobility. The most frequently used indicators indicate the existence of 
barriers to capital mobility but they do not measure the intensity of such barriers. As a consequence 
the data (mainly cross sections) are not powerful enough to deliver any clear-cut implication.
3The degree of "openness" of the economy is captured by the increasing cost incurred by firms 
as capital moves across the national borders.
4 As Rodrik pointed out, this can be seen as a direct consequence of the Le Chatelier- Samuelson 
principle.
°The distribution of volatility between wages and employment depends on the slope of the labour 
supply curve.
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Azariadis and Pissarides (2003) analyse the impact of capital mobility on unem­
ployment dynamics using a labour search framework.6 Their one-sector equilibrium 
life-cycle model combines two important characteristics: (1) non-Walrasian labour 
markets with search frictions, and (2 ) asymmetry between international mobility of 
capital and labour, with capital being perfectly mobile across countries and labour 
perfectly immobile. In this framework, unemployment arises in equilibrium because 
of the presence of frictions in the matching process between vacancies (opened by 
firms at a constant unit cost) and available workers. Temporary international differ­
ences in total factor productivity determine the allocation of capital across national 
borders and, through capital adjustments, affect the domestic employment (and un­
employment) rate. They show that in an open economy unemployment fluctuations 
caused by idiosyncratic TFP shocks are wider though less persistent than in a closed 
economy. The intuition is the following. In a closed economy adjustments of capital 
stock (and consequently of employment) after a productivity shock occur gradually 
and are driven by changes in domestic savings. In an economy with capital mobil­
ity, accumulation and decumulation of capital stock do not occur entirely through 
changes in domestic savings. Capital is imported from abroad when a positive TFP 
shock hits the domestic economy and is exported abroad in the case of negative 
shock. As a consequence, the adjustment of employment is faster (instantaneous
under extreme assumptions) in an open economy than in a closed economy. Under
6 The model is a open-economy version of models previously used to study the implications of 
search theory in explaining certain phenomena of the business cycle that the standard neoclassical 
framework cannot explain in a satisfactory way. See among the others Mertz (1995), Andolfatto 
(1996) and den Haan et al. (1997).
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quite general assumptions, the main implications for the unemployment dynamics 
are that: (1 ) international capital mobility amplifies the impact on domestic unem­
ployment of idiosyncratic TFP shocks; (2) it shortens the duration of the effect; (3) 
it rises the volatility of unemployment. Numerical calibrations of the model show 
that the variance of the unemployment rate with perfect capital mobility is almost 
three time larger than in economy without capital mobility. These results appear to 
be consistent with observation that the variability of unemployment has increased in 
the last decades in almost all the OECD countries in parallel with the liberalization 
of international capital markets.
An increased labour market instability in the United States over the last three 
decades as been documented in a number of studies. Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) 
show a substantial increase in earnings dispersion in the US manufacturing sector 
between the 70s and 80s, half of which has been related to the increase in the variance 
of "transitory" movements in earnings.7 The fact that the change in short-term 
earning volatility appears to persist along any dimensions one can cut the data (e.g. 
skill groups, sectors, establishments) may suggest the presence of a common factor 
(such has globalization, but also institutional changes) which have led to greater 
wage instability across and within different groups. Recent evidence in Farber (1996, 
2003) also shows an increase in job insecurity between the 80s and 90s in the United 
States. Focusing on the incidence of job loss over the periods 1982-1996 and 1996-
2001, Farber finds an increase in job loss rates over time after accounting for the
rThe increase of the variance of "transitory" or short-term changes in earnings captures an 
increase of the fluctuations of worker’s earning from year to year.
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state of the labour market.8
As Rodrik pointed out, though neither Farber nor Gottschalk and Moffitt re­
late the declining job security to the increased integration of international markets, 
these facts appear to be consistent with an economy in which greater openness in­
teracted with fluctuations in labour demand has led to greater instability in wages 
and employment.
Regarding the effects of "globalisation" on labour demand, as predicted by Ro­
drik (1997) and Azariadis and Pissarides (2003), a number of papers analyse the 
link between international market integration and labour demand elasticity.9 Using 
data for the US manufacturing sector from 1961 to 1991, Slaughter (2001) finds that 
production-labour demand becomes more elastic over time in the overall manufac­
turing sector and in 5 of the 8  manufacturing industries considered. However, when 
the estimated (time variant) labour demand elasticity is regressed on a number of 
indicators of the degree of trade liberation, the effect of trade liberalization turns out 
to be not robust to the inclusion of time controls, suggesting the presence of a large 
unexplained residuals in changes of labour demand elasticities over time. Following
a similar approach, Faini et al. (1999)10 find some evidence of a positive effect of
8 In the early 90s (during a weak labour market) job loss rates have been found to be higher than 
those recorded during the recession in the early 80s. Job loss also increased substantially in the 
1999-2001 period in concomitance with the beginning of the recession.
9 The indicators of international market integration used in the analysis include both measures of 
trade and capital openness. In fact the effect of international trade on the elasticity of labour demand 
is analogous to that of international capital mobility. The reason is that firms and consumers can 
substitute foreign workers for domestic workers by either investing abroad or by importing goods 
produced abroad (Rodrik, 1997). As explained before, higher labour demand elasticity triggers 
more volatile responses of wages and employment to any exogenous shocks to labour demand.
10This paper follows the approach used in a preliminary version of Slaughter’s study published 
in the NBER working paper series in 1997.
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globalisation on labour demand elasticity for the manufacturing sectors in Italy over 
the period 1985-1995. Finally, Bruno et al. (2003) develop a general framework to 
test the impact of globalisation on labour demand elasticities that generalises the 
previous empirical contributions. First a labour demand equation is obtained from 
the solution of a firm’s cost minimization problem and a trade variable is included in 
this specification. The labour demand is then estimated using an industry panel for 
a number of OECD countries over the period 1970-1996. The hypothesis that high 
international integration affects labour demand elasticity receives strong support for 
France and the UK only.
A different approach is followed in two recent papers by Krishna et al. (2001) 
and Fajnzylber and Maloney (2001), which investigate the link between openness 
and labour demand elasticities in countries experiencing dramatic changes in trade 
regimes.11 Both papers find little support to the conjecture of more-elastic labour 
demand in response to trade liberalization.
3.3 Employment dynam ics and capital mobility: a pre­
liminary analysis
As we have seen in the previous section, the theory predicts that economies with
larger international capital flows have higher volatility of investment (Razin and
11 Krishna et al. (2001) analyse the impact of trade liberalization in Turkey where significant 
import liberalization measures were announced in December 1983 and implemented soon after. 
The 1984 import liberalization program significantly reduced both tariff and non-tariff barriers. 
Fajnzylber and Maloney (2001) use dynamic panel techniques to estimate labor demand relations 
for manufacturing establishments in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico across their periods of reforms.
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Rose, 1994) and unemployment (Azariadis and Pissarides, 2003). In this section 
we consider some preliminary evidence of the relationship between capital mobility 
and unemployment (and investment) volatility by looking at the correlation between 
different measures of international capital flows and our variables of interest. The 
analysis is based on annual data for 20 OECD countries over the period 1970-200112.
We consider three measures of the penetration of foreign capital in the OECD 
countries, namely the FDI inflows (F D I _in), the absolute value of FDI inflows net of 
FDI outflows (FDI_net), and the sum of FDI inflows and outflows as a proxy of the 
overall FDI activity (FD I sum). The FDI flows are normalized by dividing them 
by domestic investment. The data on FDI flows are available from the International 
Financial Statistics of the IMF for almost all the OECD countries for the period 
under investigation.13 Measures of capital mobility based on FDI intensity have the 
advantage that data on FDI are readily available on a comparable basis for a large 
number of countries. However, some limitations remain due to existing divergences 
in the compilation methodologies, definitions and classifications.14
Following a standard approach in the real business cycle literature, we calculate 
the investment and unemployment rates volatility as the standard deviation of the 
cyclical component of the time series under investigation. We detrended the data
using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, setting the smoothing parameter A equal to 100
12 A full list of the countries included in the analysis and the definition of variables used is given 
in Appendix 3.6.4.
13 The IMF publishes annual data on FDI inflows (direct investment in the reporting economy) 
and FDI outflows (direct investment abroad) in the Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, which 
are also available in the International Financial Statistics.
14 For a discussion on the international comparability of FDI statistcs, see the excellent survey by 
Falzoni (2000).
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Table 3.1: Capital mobility and volatility of unemployment and investment rate
FDIiri F D lo u t FJDisum F D ln e t sd  un s d _ in v
1970-2001
sample mean (1 ) 0.084 0.092 0.177 0.059 
1970-1985
0 . 0 1 1 0.072
sample mean (2 ) 0.033 0.032 0.064 0.029 
1986-2001
0.009 0.070
sample mean (3) 0.125 0.138 0.265 0.082 0.013 0.075
sam p le m ean  
ra tio  (3 ) / ( 2 ) 6.721 8.450 5 .642 3 .936 1.667 1.139
as suggested for annual data (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). Raw data on unemploy­
ment and investment are available from the OECD National Account Statistics and 
Economic Outlook.
Table 3.1 reports the sample average volatility of unemployment and investment 
rates and the average of the previously defined measures of FDI flows for the whole 
period (1970-2001) and for two sub-periods, before and after 1985. The striking 
feature of the data is the remarkable increase in international capital mobility after 
the mid 1980s. The sharp increase in FDI inflows affected almost all the countries 
in the sample15 and, in accordance with the prediction of the theory, this coincides 
with an increase in the volatility of unemployment and investment. On average the 
standard deviation of the unemployment rate is almost 70 percent higher in the 
period 1986-2001 than in the previous period while the rise in the investment rate 
standard deviation is about 15 percentage points.
A preliminary assessment of the cross country correlation between unemployment
and investment volatility and our measures of capital mobility is provided in Table
l5Tables 1A-3A in appendix 3.6.1 report FDI statistics, unemployment and investment volatility 
for individual OECD countries.
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Table 3.2: Spearman correlation between unemployment/investment volatility and 
capital mobility ____________________________________
F D Iin F D Isu m F D ln e t
lylu-auui
sd
sd
un
inv
0.54**
0.27*
0.51**
0.42*
1970-1985
0.52**
0.46**
sd
sd
un
inv
0 . 2 0
0.34
0.25
0.03
1986-2001
0.38*
0.32
sd
sd
un
inv
0.59**
0.37*
0.61**
0.43**
0.69**
0.44**
Notes. **5 percent significance *10 percent significance
3.2, where the Spearman correlation coefficients are reported for the whole period 
and for the tv/o sub-periods separately16. The results show that both unemployment 
volatility and investment volatility are strongly positively correlated with all the 
measures of capital mobility considered. The rank correlation is not significant in 
the period 1970-1985, but it turns to be strongly significant in the most recent 
period.
Finally, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 plot each measure of capital mobility against the 
volatility of unemployment rate and investment rate respectively. There is a strong 
evidence that countries characterized by a higher degree of openness to international 
capital flows have higher unemployment and investment volatility. This relationship 
holds irrespective of the measure for capital mobility used. Again the positive cor­
relation is more significant for the years after 1985, when international capital flows 
into and out of the OECD countries recorded a substantial increase.
In what follows we present more systematic evidence of the effects of capital
16 Spearman rank correlation coefficients are reported rather then simple correlation coefficients 
since the former are less sensitive to the presence of outliers than the latter.
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Figure 3.2: Investm ent volatility and capital mobility
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mobility on unemployment dynamics.
3.4 Empirical analysis 
3 .4 .1  E m pirical specification
In this section we present econometric evidence of the effects of capital mobility 
on unemployment persistence and on the adjustment dynamics of unemployment in 
response to TFP shocks as predicted by Azariadis and Pissarides (2003).
The baseline framework is a reduced form dynamic equation for unemployment 
where we include controls for labour market institutions and the (ex ante) teal 
interest rate, which may affect the equilibrium rate of unemployment. We also 
include a TFP shock, a price shock and an import shock which may affect the short 
run dynamics of unemployment17. Among the institutional variables we consider 
two indicators of the duration and generosity of unemployment insurance systems 
(benefit duration and benefit replacement ratio), the tax wedge between the real 
(monetary) labour cost faced by the firms and the consumption wage received by 
the employees and union density18. Fixed effects for each country, a country specific
trend and time dummies for each year in the sample are also included.
17See Layard et al., 1991 and Nickell et al. (2001) for the derivation of the reduced form for the 
unemployment equation.
18 Data on labour market institutions are taken from Nickell and Nunziata Labour Market Insti­
tutions database. The information is available till 1995. Updated series for the years after 1995 are 
obtained from the OECD. Net union density series is updated using the new data in Visser (2000) 
and national sources. All the other data are derived from the OECD National Account Statistics 
and Economic Outlook. See appendix 3.6.4 for a detailed description of the variables and data 
sources.
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The baseline unemployment equation is as follows:
p 9
uit — Y P jU jt- j  +  T Jl j t f P_sh it. j +  Q jinst^ +  q 2 rintjt (3.1) 
j=i j=o
+a 3 pr_shit +  a 4 imp_shit +  c^t +  Xt +  c* +  z\t
where i =  1, ..,20, t =  1,..., 31, t fp _ s h  is the TFP shock, inst denotes the set of 
institutional variables included in the regression, rint is the (ex ante) real interest 
rate, pr_sh  is an inflationary shock and imp_sh  is an import price shock as defined 
in Nickell et al. (2001). Cj and At capture country-specific effects and time effects 
respectively and cn reflects those country-specific factors which may have an impact 
on the change of unemployment. Finally, za captures all the other shocks to the 
unemployment rate, and it is assumed to be serially uncorrelated.
The inclusion of lagged dependent variables can lead to finite sample biases with 
the within-group estimator. The results in Nickell (1981), however, show that the 
magnitude of the bias diminishes in the length of the time series in the panel. Since 
the sample runs for 31 years, the size of this bias is likely to be small. The asymptotic 
unbiasedness of the coefficients crucially depends on the absence of serial correlation 
in the errors. This will be investigated by using a serial correlation test described 
by Baltagi (1995)19.
As a measure of persistence we use the sum of the coefficients on the lags of
p
unemployment, that is p = For p G [—1,1] the cumulative effect of a shock on
j - 1
19The test is an L M  statitistic which tests for an i4/?(l) and/or an MA(1) structure in the 
residuals in a fixed-effects model. It is asymptotically distributed as N (0,1) under the null. See 
Baltagi (1995).
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unemployment is given by 1 / ( 1  — p). A larger p is then associated with shocks having 
a larger cumulative effect on unemployment over time, implying larger persistence 
(Pivetta and Reis, 2001).
Following Nickell et al. (2001), the TFP shock (t fp _ sh  in the equation) has 
been measured as the deviation of the Solow residual from its Hodrick-Prescott 
filtered trend. The existence of a negative relationship between the variable shock 
and the unemployment rate implies that the sum of the coefficients on the current 
and lagged variable shock should be negative. We choose both p and q equal to 2 
and 1 respectively, in order to satisfy standard dynamic properties of the model. 
In particular, the two lags of the dependent variable have been chosen in order to 
obtain serially uncorrelated residuals.
As suggested in the above discussion we are interested in exploring two possible 
roles played by capital mobility - first its effect on unemployment persistence and 
second its impact on the responsiveness of unemployment to an idiosyncratic TFP 
shock. We thus interact our measures of capital mobility with the lags of unemploy­
ment to capture the effect on persistence, and with the TFP shock (both current 
and lagged) to capture the effect on the responsiveness to a productivity shock. We 
also enter the measures of capital mobility in levels to control for any possible effect 
of capital mobility on the level of unemployment rate. The equation we estimate 
takes then the following form:
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“*« =  F,(®i +  j^FDImit-i)uit-j +  +  'y'jFDImii-i)tfp_shu-j (3.2)
j = 1 j = 0
/3 F D Imit—i  +  +  c u t  +  +  q  +  sn
where m  = IN , S U M , N E T , and z^ 20 denotes a set of other controls as in equation 
3.1. We use lagged rather than current values of FDI flows in order to avoid endo­
geneity arising from potential correlation between the error term and current FDI 
flows caused, for example, by unexpected aggregate shocks on employment21.
The measure of persistence now becomes p = ^2 (0j -f 6jF D Im). If we expect
j —1
that capital mobility reduces unemployment persistence, the null hypothesis we want
p p
to test is Ho : ^  0 versus H\ : < 0. If the null is rejected, we can
j=i j - 1
conclude that higher capital mobility leads to a lower persistence of unemployment.
Similarly, capital mobility increases the responsiveness of unemployment to a
TFP shock if the sum of the coefficients on the variable shock interacted with our
Q
proxies for capital mobility is significantly lower than zero. Formally, Ho : ^ 7 '- ^  0
i= o
versus Hi-. E 7 ^ <  0 22. 
i=o
2 0 zu =  (unionn , bdit, b rn t , twu, rin tu , p r_ sh u ,  im p _ s h a )
21 We obtain very similar results when the current value of FDI flows rather than the lagged one 
is used in the regressions.
22 Given that the coefficient on the interaction term is always negative on both the current and
lagged shock (and then the sum of the two coefficients turns to be always significantly less then
9
zero), to save space the t-statistic and p-value of the null hypotesis H 0 : ^  ® are no  ^ reported
j = 0
in the tables with the empirical results.
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3.4.2 Empirical results
We begin in Table 3.3 by showing estimates of the coefficients of a baseline model 
with no interactions with TFP shocks. The estimates are reported for the whole 
sample and for the small countries only, in order to check whether there are signifi­
cant differences in the impact of capital mobility related to the size of the countries 
considered.23
In columns (1), (2) and (3) the lags of unemployment are interacted with the 
net FDI inflows, the sum of FDI inflows and outflow’s and FDI inflows respectively. 
Capital mobility reduces the coefficient on the first lag of unemployment and in­
creases the coefficient on the second lag. The net effect on persistence (the sum of 
the two coefficients) is negative and significant as revealed by the t-test reported 
at the bottom of the table.24 This result is robust to two of the three measures 
for capital mobility considered, namely FDIsum and FDIin, and it holds for both 
the whole sample and the small countries sample. When we consider the net FDI 
inflows, the coefficients on the interactions have still the expected sign, their sum 
is negative and marginally significant, though they are not individually nor jointly 
significant. There is no evidence of any effects of capital mobility on the level of 
unemployment. All the other controls behave as predicted by the theory with union 
density, benefit duration and tax wedge having a positive a significant impact on
unemployment. Real interest rate is well signed and significant as well. As expected,
23The small countries sample is obtained by excluding all the G7 countries with the exception of 
Canada.
p
24 The t-statistic and p-value of the null hypotesis Ho : Yh9'j ^  0 are reported on the lower panel
j = 1
of Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3: Capital mobility and unemployment persistence (whole period)
Un
Independent Variables (1)
Whole Countries
(2) (3)
uit- 1
Uit-2
u u -1  *  F D Irr i i t - i
un—2 * F D I m i t - i
F D I n e tu - 1
F D I s u r n i t - \
F D I in u - i
F D I o u t i t - i
unioriit
bdu
brru
twu
pr_sh it  
im p _ s h i t 
t f p _ s h it 
t f p  shi t—\
Obs.
Fixed effects
1.337
(23.89)
-0.535
(9.97)
-0.506
(0.94)
0.325
(0.64)
0.006
(0.58)
0.040
8 $
W
(0.09)
0.024
(i97i-0.003
(0.24)
-0.005
(0.20
-0.04
(2.90)
-0.090
(5.84)
Serial Com (p-value) 0.43
531
20
1.356
(27.00)
-0.555
8 $
(2.85)
-0.000
(0.08)
0.042
(3.39)
0.008
i,1®
(0.03)
0.024
(1.70
0.03
t 4o7i
(0.16)
-0.051
(3.06
-0.08
(5.61)
0.46
531
20
1.328
(25.26)
-0.527
(10.61)
-0.248
(0.87)
0.091
(0.37)
0.011
(1.63
- 0.00
fe3J?
r3.3i)
0.007
u
(0.30) 
0.026 
(1.84) 
0.039 
(1 '96) -0.000 
(0.30) 
0.015 
(0.53) 
-0.050 
(3.03 
-0.09 
(5.98)
0.31
531
20
F-tests (p-values):
Ho : 0i =  0, 02 =  0 0.31 0.00 0.09
H o : 6 1 + 6 2 >  0 0.07 0.04 0.05
m
Small Countries 
(2 ’)
1.326
(19.69)
-0.538
(8.33)
-0.432
(0 .68)
1.224
O
(0.92)
.  (c
0.2  0
0.041
(2.86)
0.009
(1.73
- 0.00
(0.44)
0.044
(2.65)
0.049
(2 -10)
- 0.002
(0.11)
0.005
(0.15)
-0.035
(1.97)
-0.084
(5.00)
0.29
361
14
1.347
(23.26) 
-0.560
(10.26) 
-0.345
3.80)
.283
(2.77)
-0.000
(0 .11)
0.044
8 $
8 $
8i§?
S I
(0.44
-0.03
(2 .10)
-0.081
(4.77)
0.31
361
14
0.32
0.07
0.00
0.06
131
8 8$ 8
1.329
(21.80)
-0.543
(9.63)
-0.397
(0.84)
0.10
ftSS
0.OO7
-U6]
(2 .68)
-0.051
8.JS
0 .10) 
.023 
(0.76 
-0.03 
(2.14) 
-0.085 
(5.13)
0.16
361
14
0.06
0.03
Notes. Robust t-statistics in parenthesis. Serial Correlation is an LM test distributed N(0,1) under 
the null (HO: no autocorrelation). In columns (1), (2) and (3) the lags of the unemployment rate 
are interacted with FDInet, FDIsum and FDIin respectively.
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both the current and lagged TFP shocks have a negative and significant effect on 
the unemployment rate.
Next we investigate the role that capital mobility plays in increasing the respon­
siveness of unemployment to a temporary TFP shock. Thus we interact the current 
and lagged tfp_ sh with the proxies of capital mobility. The interaction term is ex­
pected to be negative: the higher the economy’s level of capital mobility, the greater 
the impact of a TFP shock on the unemployment rate. From Table 3.4, the interac­
tion terms with both the current and lagged shock are indeed negative, though not 
always statistically significant at conventional levels. The negative effect of capital 
mobility on the persistence of unemployment remains negative and significant.
From a preliminary exploration of our data (paragraph 3.3) we noticed that the 
bivariate relationship between capital mobility and unemployment volatility appears 
to have been significant only since the mid eighties, when capital flows became more 
important in the OECD countries. Prior to the mid 1980s capital flows were much 
smaller and they were not measured as accurately as in the more recent period, so it 
is possible that the earlier measures are dominated by measurement errors, or that 
barriers to international capital mobility render our empirical model inappropriate.
We therefore ask whether the effect of capital mobility on both persistence and 
responsiveness of unemployment to TFP shocks is stronger for the years after 1985. 
Table 3.5 presents these results. We interact both the lags of the unemployment rate 
and the current and lagged TFP shocks with a period dummy taking value 1 for 
years after 1985 and 0 otherwise. We also interact both the lags of unemployment
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Table 3.4: Capital mobility, unemployment persistence and responsiveness (whole 
period)_____________________________________________________________
Hit
Independent Variables i l l
Whole Countries 
(2) 131
Hit — 1
Hit-2
W i t - 1  *  F D Im .i t -1
hu - 2  * F D I m u - 1
F D I n e t i t - i
FD Isum .it- \
F D Iiriit-i
F D Io u t i t - i
unioriit
hd.it
hrrit
twn
rintit
pr shit
im p _ sh n
t f p _ s h it
t f p _ s h it- i
t f p _ s h u  * FDIm it- i
t f p _ s h i t - 1  * FDIm it - 1
Serial Corr (p-value) 
Obs.
Fixed effects
1.340
(23.79)
-0.541
(9.97)
-0.541
(0.70)
0.005
(0.58)
0.038
(2.96)
0.007
SoS
giS
S:S3
(0.28
- 0.00
(0 .12)
-0.057
(3.05)
-0.097
(5.63)
-0.166
(1.55)
-0.170
(1.13)
0.43
531
20
1.366
(25.61)
-0.563
(10.99)
-0.421
giS2
(2.63)
0.000
(0.05)
0.042
&&sa
(0.08)
0.023
fi<S3
i&SS
(0.01
-0.05
(3.24)
-0.096
(5.37
-0.06
(1.69)
-0.075
(1.17)
0.48
531
20
1.343
(24.33)
-0.539
(10.42)
-0.418
ftiS
(0.79)
0.012
(3.33)
0.008
&8S
(1.73)
1.03S
SS8
(0.03)
0.000
(0.45)
-0.061
(3.35) 
- 0.100 
(5.81) 
-0.181 
(1.99 
- 0 .1 2 1
(1.35)
0.26
531
20
F-tests (p-values): 
Ho : e\ =  0 . 0 2  =  0Ho .• e \ +  e'2 ^ o
Ho : 7'i =  0 , 7 2  =  0
0.23
0.05
0.23
0.00
0.01
0.22
0.06
0.03
0.12
Small Countries
1.330
(19.52)
-0.544
(8.32)
-0.485
r a
m
(0.92)
0.038
as
ass
(1.97
- 0.00
(0.15)
0.007
(0.23)
-0.044
(2.16)
-0.091
(4.68)
-0.150
(1.14
-0.14'
(0 .88)
0.28
361
14
1.359
(22.35)
-0.570
(9.99)
-0.421
(2.46)
-0.000
(0.09)
0.043
(3.03)
0.010
(1.80
- 0.00
KV
(2.41
.04
(2.09)
-0.005
(0.32)
0.009
(0.30
-0.04
(2.37)
-0.091
(4.75
-0.07
(1.84
-0.09
(1.40)
0.37
361
14
0.25
0.05
0.46
0.00
0.02
0.16
(3’)
a $  8
1.344
(21.04)
-0.554
(9.45)
-0.541
( 1.10)
0.010
g.04^ass
S:8S
2.52)
.049
(2.07)
0.002
{&$
-0.05(1
(2.46)
-0.096
(5.17)
-0.174
(1.78)
-0.157
(1.62)
0.17
361
14
0.06
0.03
0.14
Notes. Robust t-statistics in parenthesis. Serial Correlation is an LM test distributed N(0,1) under 
the null (HO: no autocorrelation). In columns (1), (2) and (3) the lags of the unemployment rate 
are interacted with FDInet, FDIsum and FDIin respectively.
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and current and lagged TFP shock with the period dummy and the proxies for 
capital mobility. The coefficients of the first set of interactions will capture the 
effects of any factors at play that may influence the persistence and responsiveness 
of unemployment to TFP shock between the two periods rather than capital mobility. 
The coefficients of the second set of interactions will capture the additional effect of 
capital mobility after 1985.25
The results are consistent with those for the whole period and the coefficients 
are significant at conventional levels. In particular, capital mobility is found to 
significantly reduce the persistence of unemployment after 1985, the sum of the FDI 
interaction terms being negatively signed and statistically significant at 10% level 
and 5% level in all the specifications considered. The fact that some coefficients are 
jointly but not always individually significant and their sum is significantly negative 
suggests the presence of some degree of collinearity. Nevertheless, this still indicates 
a significant negative effect of capital mobility on unemployment persistence.
Turning to the effect of capital mobility on the responsiveness of unemployment
to TFP shocks, the coefficients on the capital mobility interactions are negative,
quantitatively important and statistically significant irrespectively of the proxy of 
2oThe specification followed is:
p
uu =  +  9'jd85 4- 9jd85 * F D I m t- \ )u j t - j
j=l 
9
+ ] P ( 7 j +  7jd85 +  7 '<285 * F D I m i t - i ) t f p _ s h u - j  
j = 0
-\-CL l i t  +  ( 3 F D I m i t - 1  +  C t'x it  +  C itt +  At +  Ci +  Sit 
where <285 =  0 if year  G [1970; 1985], and <285 =  1 otherwise.
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Table 3.5: Capital mobility, unemployment persistence and responsiveness after 1985
Small Countries 
( ! ’) (2’) (3’)
uit
Independent Variables i l l
Whole Countries
_J2!_
U , t - 1  
U i t - 2
uu-1 * d85 
uu - 2  * d85
uu - i  * d85 * F D I m i t - i  
uu - 2  * *d85 * F D l m i t - i  
t f p _ s h it 
t f p _ s h i t - 1  
t f p _ s h n  * d85 
t f p  shu - 1  * d85 
t f p _ s h a  * d85 * F D Im it- 1 
t f p _ s h n - 1  * d85 * F D Im it- i
other controls
1.273
(21.55)
-0.453
(7.92)
0.054
(1.36)
-0.097
-(o2:^
(0.94)
-0.038
(1.60)
-0.085
(4.21)
- 0.022
(0.65)
-0.038
( 1 .12)
- 0.221
(2.10)
-0.377
(2.31)
1.293 
(22.16) 
-0.469 
(8.32) 
0.054 
(1.31) 
-0.095 
(2.47) 
-0.420 
(3.16 
0.31 
(2.53 
-0.04 
(1.74) 
-0.085 
(4.16 
- 0.02 
(0.72) 
-0.039 
(1.16 
- 0.10 
(2.71 
-0.17 
(2.57)
1.285
(22 .01)
-0.462
(8.29)
0,049
(1.19)
-0.089
(2.39)
-0.455
(1.36;
0.233
(0.85)
-0.042
(1.73)
-0.087
(4.20
- 0.02
(0.68
-0.03
(0.95)
-0.19
(2.11
- 0.21
(2.14)
1.257
(17.88)
-0.438
(6.37
0.03
(0.96)
-0.090
(2.55
-0.61
-(0°05171
(0.44)
-0.068
(3.20
-0.04
(1.29)
-0.071
(1.89)
-0.230
(1.76
-0.43
(2.32)
1.282
(18.45)
-0.457
(0.79
-0.08
(2.35)
-0.374
(1.90
- 0.01
(0.56
-0.06
(3.13)
-0.050
(1.38)
-0.074
(2.05)
-0.123
(2.83
- 0.22
(2.97)
see appendix Table I^ A
1.272
(18.28)
-0.455
(6.83)
0.032
(0.79)
- 0.080
(2.30)
-0.480
(0.82) 
-0 017 
(0.63) 
-0.071 
(3.23) 
-0.046 
(1.21 
-0.06 
(1.9i) 
- 0.200 
(2.13) 
-0.301 
(2.77)
Serial Corr (p-value) 
Obs.
Fixed effects
531
20
531
20
531
20
361
14
361
14
361
14
F-tests (p-value): 
Ho : B\ =  0, 02 =  0 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.10 0.01 0.07
Ho : 6[ +  9'2 >  0 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01
Ho : 7'i =  0, 7 2  =  0 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.01
Notes. Robust t-statistics in parenthesis. Serial Correlation is an LM test distributed N(0,1) under 
the null (HO: no autocorrelation). In columns (1), (2) and (3) the lags of the unemployment rate 
are interacted with FDInet, FDIsum and FDIin respectively. See Appendix 6.2 for the complete 
table with the coefficients and t-statistics for the other controls.
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capital mobility used. This result shows that, after controlling for all the factors 
driving unemployment, international capital flows have a positive effect on the re­
sponsiveness of unemployment. Consistently with what we found in the preliminary 
analysis reported in paragraph 3.3, this effect appears to be stronger after 1985 when 
the FDI activity is more quantitatively relevant.
To conclude, the evidence in Table 3.5 suggests that countries characterized by 
larger penetration of international capital are more responsive to idiosyncratic TFP 
shocks and consequently experience amplified fluctuations in employment.
3 .4 .3  Sim ulation: unem ploym ent response to  tem p orary  produc­
tiv ity  shocks
In this part of the analysis we illustrate the importance of capital mobility for the 
dynamics of unemployment. By using the results from the last set of regressions 
(Table 3.5), we simulate the responsiveness of unemployment to a (negative) one- 
standard deviation TFP shock. We trace the response of unemployment to the 
TFP shock in a baseline economy with no capital mobility (closed economy) and we 
then compare this baseline case with an economy experiencing positive international 
capital flows (open economy). The exercise is repeated for all the three proxies of 
capital mobility. In order to quantify the effect of capital mobility on unemployment 
persistence and responsiveness in the open economy, we use the sample average of the 
three capital mobility indicators in the period 1985-2001, that is FD Inet = 0.082, 
F D Isum  = 0.265 and FD Iin  =  0.125.
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We then make use of the following equations in the simulations:
ut =  (1.33 — 0.68 * F D I n e t )u t - \  — (0.55 — 0.45 * F D In e t )u t - 2  (3.3)
—(0.06 +  0.22 * F D In e t)sh o ck t — (0.12 +  0.38 * F D In e t)sh o c k t~ i 
+ C onsti
u t = (1.35 — 0.42 * F D I s u m ) u t- i  — (0.56 — 0.32 * F D Is u m ) u t - 2  (3.4) 
—(0.07 +  0.11 * F D Isu m )sh o c k t — (0.12 +  0.18 * F D Is u m )s h o c k t- \  
+ C o n st2
u t = (1.33 -  0.45 * F D I i n ) u t - 1 -  (0.55 -  0.23 * F D I in )u t - 2  (3.5)
—(0.06 4- 0.19 * F D Iin )sh o c k t — (0.12 + 0.21 * F D Iin )sh o c k t- 1 
+Const$
where Consti are “constants,” by which we mean all variables not varied in the 
simulations.
Figure 3.3 shows the adjustment dynamics of the unemployment rate after one- 
standard deviation temporary TFP shock when capital mobility affects both the 
persistence and responsiveness of unemployment to a TFP shock. The initial re­
sponse of unemployment to the shock is larger in presence of international capital 
mobility, the increase of the unemployment rate being on average 0.15 percentage
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Figure 3.3: Response of unemployment to a TFP shock
points lower in absence of capital mobility. However, the adjustment to the pre­
shock level of unemployment is faster in the economy with capital mobility because 
of the lower degree of persistence.
Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 show the adjustment of the unemployment rate to 
a one-standard deviation temporary TFP shock after separating the two effects of 
capital mobility on persistence and responsiveness respectively. It emerges that 
international capital movements significantly amplify the impact on unemployment 
of temporary shocks (Figure 3.4) though the duration of the response is shorter 
(Figure 3.5).
Table 3.6 shows the volatility of the unemployment rate for the period 1986-2001 
generated in the previous simulation where the volatility of unemployment in the
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Figure 3.4: Response of unemployment to a TFP shock - Effect on responsiveness
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Figure 3.5: Response of unemployment to a TFP shock - Effect on persistence
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Table 3.6: Simulated unemployment volatility: 1986-2001
sim u lated  v o la tility  (1986 -2001)
closed open
FDIm economy economy
Sim:
F D In et 0.08 1 1.171
F D Isu m 0.26 1 1.198
F D Iin 0.12 1 1.169
economy without capital mobility (closed economy) is normalized to 1. The results 
indicate that the simulated standard deviation of the unemployment rate in the 
open economy is on average 18 percent higher than in the economy with no capital 
mobility.
Finally, in a second simulation we use our empirical model to illustrate the impact 
of the observed increase in capital mobility on unemployment volatility. We repeat 
the previous exercise for two levels of capital mobility, before and after 1985. The 
results are reported in Table 3.7, where the simulated volatility of unemployment 
for the period 1970-1985 is normalized to 1. Columns 1 and 2 show the simulated 
volatility of unemployment after 1985 if FDI remained to pre-85 levels and if FDI 
is allowed to increase by the observed amount respectively. The table shows that 
the estimated contribution26 of the increase in capital mobility to unemployment 
volatility (Column 3) varies from 12 percent when net FDI inflows are used to
almost 16 percent when the other two measures are considered27. Overall, these
26 The contribution of capital mobility (Column 3) is calculated as the ratio of the percentage 
(simulated) variation of volatility induced by the increase in capital mobility to the total percentage 
(simulated) increase in volatility between the two periods. For example for the measure FDInet, 
the increase in volatility induced by higher international capital flows is 9.2 percent and the total 
increase in volatility between the two periods is 77 percent. Therefore, the estimated contribution 
of capital mobility to the increase of unemployment volatility is 12 percent.
27Table 5A in Appendix 3.6.3 reports the contribution of capital mobility to unemployment 
volatilty for individual OECD countries.
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Table 3.7: Capital mobility contribution to variation in unemployment volatility 
before and after 1985
u n em p loym en t volatility : 1986-2001
simulated 
pre-1985 after-1985 
FDI level FDI level 
(1) (2)
cap. mob. 
contr. (sim) 
(3)
Sim:
F D In et 1.62 1.77 0 .120
FDILu 1.62 1.83 0 .156
F D Isu m 1.53 1.70 0 .158
Notes. The simulated unemployment volatilities for the period 1970-1985 have been normalized to 
one. The contribution of capital mobility (Column 3) is calculated as the ratio of the percentage 
(simulated) variation of volatility induced by the increase in capital mobility to the total percentage 
(simulated) increase in volatility between the two periods.
estimates suggest that the increase in international capital flows observed in many 
OECD countries in the second half of 80s can generate sizeable increases in the 
volatility of unemployment.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we presented empirical evidence for the OECD countries to show 
that increased international capital mobility has contributed to higher variance in 
the unemployment rate. Our findings confirm that unemployment in countries char­
acterized by larger penetration of international capital is more responsive to idio­
syncratic shocks and consequently these countries experience amplified fluctuations 
in employment. The time it takes for equilibrium to be restored, however, is shorter 
with international capital mobility.^
We used our empirical model to simulate the response of the unemployment 
rate to a one-standard error temporary TFP shock. The results suggest that for
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the period 1986-2001 the simulated unemployment volatility in the economy with 
positive international capital mobility is on average 18 percent higher than in the 
economy with no capital mobility.
We then used the model’s estimates to illustrate the extent to which capital mo­
bility can account for the higher unemployment volatility occurred in many OECD 
countries since mid 80s. The model predicts that an increase of international capital 
flows of the same magnitude of that observed in the data after 1985 accounts for 
12-16 percent of the (simulated) increase of unemployment volatility. This suggests 
a significant role played by international flows of capital in explaining the rise in 
unemployment fluctuations.
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3.6 A ppendix
3.6 .1  Su m m ary sta tistics
Table 1A: FDI flows, unemployment and investment volatility: 1970-2001
FD IIn F D Io u t " F D Isu m F D In et sd un sd  inv
Australia 0.067 0.029 0.097 0.04 0.010 0.046
Austria 0.034 0.023 0.057 0.016 0.003 0.031
Belgium28 0.178 0.154 0.332 0.068 0.011 0.056
Canada 0.09 0.080 0.171 0.041 0.011 0.045
Denmark 0.106 0.109 0.215 0.035 0.011 0.078
Finland 0.064 0.138 0.202 0.078 0.022 0.082
France 0.058 0.104 0.162 0.051 0.007 0.039
Germany 0.034 0.055 0.089 0.046 0.009 0.029
Ireland 0.166 0.107 0.437 0.222 0.015 0.072
Italy 0.018 0.023 0.041 0.011 0.008 0.033
Japan 0.002 0.021 0.023 0.019 0.002 0.039
Netherlands 0.138 0.220 0.358 0.091 0.012 0.038
New Zealand 0.147 0.043 0.190 0.106 0.010 0.077
Norway 0.051 0.059 0.111 0.037 0.006 0.064
Portugal 0.063 0.037 0.100 0.040 0.012 0.061
Spain 0.071 0.053 0.124 0.051 0.018 0.056
Sweden 0.139 0.157 0.296 0.100 0.012 0.060
Switzerland 0.095 0.223 0.317 0.133 0.008 0.045
United Kingdom 0.124 0.200 0.324 0.089 0.014 0.042
United States 0.042 0.043 0.085 0.023 0.009 0.042
28 Average FDI flows for Belgium are calculated excluding the are calculated excluding the years 
1999 and 2000. Data from the OECD (2003) show that the increase in FDI activity was largely 
driven by few M&A transactions foe which were paid exceptional high prices. This not truly reflect 
the increase in capital mobility.
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Table 2A: FDI inflows, unemployment and investment volatility: 1970-1985
F D Iin  ' F D Io u t F D Isu m F D In et sd un sd  inv
Australia 0.046 0.013 0.059 0.036 0.009 0.041
Austria 0.015 0.006 0.021 0.009 0.003 0.041
Belgium 0.062 0.019 0.081 0.045 0.010 0.058
Canada 0.069 0.042 0.111 0.045 0.011 0.044
Denmark 0.007 0.013 0.020 0.0413 0.010 0.087
Finland 0.005 0.012 0.017 0.008 0.010 0.048
France 0.018 0.019 0.037 0.006 0.005 0.036
Germany 0.010 0.023 0.033 0.013 0.010 0.036
Ireland 0.054 - - - 0.016 0.082
Italy 0.012 0.010 0.022 0.007 0.005 0.023
Japan 0.001 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.017 0.044
Netherlands 0.052 0.131 0.183 0.079 0.014 0.044
New Zealand 0.077 0.018 0.096 0.059 0.006 0.085
Norway 0.020 0.022 0.042 0.030 0.003 0.056
Portugal 0.020 0.001 0.022 0.019 0.012 0.076
Spain 0.035 0.006 0.041 0.029 0.013 0.050
Sweden 0.009 0.040 0.048 0.031 0.005 0.029
Switzerland 0.038 0.088 0.126 0.054 0.021 0.054
United Kingdom 0.067 0.102 0.168 0.036 0.013 0.030
United States 0.016 0.027 0.043 0.020 0.011 0.047
Table 3A: FDI inflows, unemployment and investment volatility: 1986-2001
F D Iin F D Io u t F D Isu m F D In et sd un sd  inv
Australia 0.090 0.047 0.137 0.045 0.011 0.052
Austria 0.053 0.041 0.093 0.022 0.003 0.017
Belgium 0.270 0.260 0.529 0.086 0.013 0.053
Canada 0.112 0.118 0.230 0.037 0.011 0.046
Denmark 0.162 0.162 0.324 0.047 0.012 0.067
Finland 0.105 0.225 0.329 0.126 0.030 0.107
France 0.085 0.163 0.248 0.082 0.009 0.042
Germany 0.056 0.085 0.141 0.076 0.009 0.022
Ireland 0.250 0.107 0.437 0.222 0.012 0.062
Italy 0.024 0.036 0.061 0.016 0.009 0.042
Japan 0.002 0.026 0.029 0.024 0.003 0.034
Netherlands 0.224 0.308 0.532 0.102 0.009 0.030
New Zealand 0.208 0.064 0.272 0.147 0.013 0.071
Norway 0.073 0.085 0.158 0.042 0.008 0.072
Portugal 0.093 0.061 0.154 0.054 0.012 0.043
Spain 0.095 0.085 0.181 0.066 0.021 0.058
Sweden 0.269 0.275 0.544 0.170 0.016 0.079
Switzerland 0.105 0.248 0.353 0.148 0.011 0.034
United Kingdom 0.181 0.299 0.480 0.142 0.015 0.051
United States 0.068 0.060 0.127 0.025 0.007 0.037
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3 .6 .2  R egression  tab les
Table 4A: Capital mobility, unemployment persistence and responsiveness before 
and after 1985
Whole Countries 
( 1) ( 2 )
Small Countries
m  n  £3i
Uit
Independent Variables 131
Uit- 1
Uit-2
un-1 * d85 
un - 2 * d85
u a -1  * d85 * F D  Imit_i
un—2 * *d85 * FDImit-i
F D I n e tu - i
F D In e t i t - i  * d85
F D Isu n ii t - i
FDIsurriit- i * d85
F D Iir ii t- i
F D I ir i i t -1 * d85
F D Io u ta - 1
F D Io u t i t -1 * d85
unioriit
bdu
brru
tw it
rin tu
(continued)
1.273
(21.55)
-0.453
(7.92)
0.054
(1.36)
-0.097
(2.61
- 0.68
fc£?
(0.65)
- 0.010
(0.41)
0.039
8 $
(0.28)
0.025
8<S3
(1.81)
1.293
(22.16)
-0.469
(8.32)
0.054
(1.31
-0.09
-(o2,4S
8$
(2.53)
0.005 
(0 28) 
-0.004 
(0.24)
0.042
(3.39
0.00
u
§02$
(1.81)
1.285
(22 .01)
-0.462
(8.29)
0.049
{1.19)
-0.089
(2.39
-0.45
(0.85)
-0.003
(0.09)
- 0.011
gig?
(0.049)
0.009
8 $
(3.33
0.00
SiZB
8 0 2 V
ft®
(1.87)
1.257
(17.88)
-0.438
(6.37)
0.038
(0.96)
-0.096
(2.55)
-0.611
ft®
(0.57 
0.00 
(0.31) 
0.001 
(0.05)
0.042
g®
ftisa
ft®
8 $
( 1 .86)
1.282
(18.45)
-0.457
g®
(0.79)
- 0.082
(2.35)
-0.374
8®
(1.90)
-0.005
(0.30)
0.005
(0.31)
0.042
(3.33)
0.008
& 2S
80 2V
ft®
(1.87)
1.272
(18.28)
-0.455
(6.83)
0.032
(0.72)
-0.086
(2.30)
-0.486
8 .2 $
(0.82)
-0.025
(0.79)
-0.014
(0.68)
0.037
ft®
(0.58)
0.045
(3.16)
0.011
(2.03)
0.002
8 ®
8 0 4 V
(2.08)
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Table 4A (continued)
pr_ sh u
im ppr_shit
t f p _ s h it
t f p _ s h u - 1
t f p _ s h i t  * d85
t fp _ sh i t~ \  * d85
tf p _ s h n  * dS5 * F D Im it- i
t f p  shn—i * d85 * F D Im it- i
Serial Corr (p-value)
Obs.
Fixed effects
F-tests (p-value):
H 0 : 6 \  =  0 .  0 2  =  0  
Ho :6 [+ 9 i^0  
H q : Yi  =  t>, 7 2  -  0
-0.007
(0.50
-0.00
(0.20
-0.03
(1.60
-0.08
(4-21)
- 0.022
(0.65
-0.03
(1 .12)
- 0.221
(2 -10)
-0.377
( 2 - 3 1 )
531
20
0.09
0.02
0.02
-0.008 
0.64) 
.002 
(0.08) 
-0.042 
(1.74 
-0.08'
(4 -16)
-0.023
(0.72)
-0.039
(1.16
- 0.10
(2-71)
-0.176
C 2 . 5 7 )
0.35 0.43
531
20
0.00
0.00
0.01
- 0.001
(0.57
-0.04'
(L73)
-0.087
(4.20
- 0.02
(0.68
-0.03
(0.95)
-0.190
(2.11
- 0.21
( 2 - l 4 )
0.26
531
20
0.08
0.01
0.04
-0.005
(0.33)
0.007
(0.26)
- 0.011
(0.44
-0.06'
(3.20
-0.04
( l - 2 9 )
-0.071
( 1 . 8 9 )
-0.230
(i.76)
-0.439
(2.32)
0.21
361
14
0.10
0.02
0.04
-0.006
i)° 0 4l?
(0.46
- 0.01
(0.56
-0.06
(3-13)
-0.050
(1.38)
-0.074
(2.05)
-0.123
(2.83
- 0.22
(2.97)
0.30
361
14
0.01
0.00
0.00
- 0.002
(0.14
0.02
(0.97)
-0.017
(0.63)
-0.071
(3.23)
-0.046
(1.21
-0.06
(1.91)
- 0.200
(2-13)
-0.301
(2.77)
0.14
361
14
0.07
0.01
0.01
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3 .6 .3  S im ulation  tab les
Table 5A: Capital mobility contribution to variation in unemployment volatility 
before and after 1985
u n em p loym en t v o la tility : 1986-2001
simulated 
pre-1985 after-1985 
FDI level FDI level 
(1) (2)
cap. mob. 
contr. (sim) 
(3)
Australia
Him:
F D In et 1.65 1.68 0 .027
F D Isu m 1.62 1.72 0 .086
F D Iin 1.56 1.64 0.080
Austria F D In et 1.53 1.60 0 .076
F D Isu m 1.57 1.66 0 .087
F D Iin 1.49 1 57 0 .094
Belgium F D In et 1.67 1.80 0.097
F D Isu m 1.65 2.08 0.241
F D Iin 1.59 1.94 0.234
Canada F D In et 1.67 1.65 -0.018
F D Isu m 1.68 1.82 0.102
F D Iin 1.60 1.68 0.074
Denmark F D In e t 1.57 1.68 0.103
F D Isu m 1.58 1.91 0.230
F D Iin 1.48 1.77 0.254
Finland F D In et 1.55 1.91 0.255
F D Isu m 1.57 1.91 0.234
F D Iin 1.47 1.66 0.196
France F D In et 1.53 " 1.79 0.215
F D Isu m 1.59 1.83 0.182
F D Iin 1.50 • 1.63 0.138
Germany F D In et 1.57 1.77 0 .165
F D Isu m 1.59 1.72 0.114
F D Iin 1.48 1.57 0.107
Ireland F D In et . .
F D Isu m .
F D Iin 1.57 1.91 0 .238
Italy F D In et 1.55 1.58 0 .033
F D Isu m 1.57 1.62 0.051
F D Iin 1.49 1.51 0 .026
Japan F D In et 1.56 ................. 1 . 6 1 0.053
F D Isu m 1.56 1.58 0 .022
F D Iin 1.46 1.47 0.015
(continued)
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Table 5A (continued)
Netherlands
Sim:
F D In et 1.78 1.85 0 .046
F D Isum 1.77 2.08 0 .162
F D Iin 1.57 1.87 0 .220
New Zealand F D In et 1.72 1.97 0 .150
F D Isum 1.66 1.86 0 .140
FD Iin 1.62 1.85 0 .1 6 7
Norway F D In et 1.63 1.67 0 .037
F D Isum 1.60 1.73 0 .111
F D Iin 1.50 1.61 0 .1 2 0
Portugal F D In et 1.59 1.70 0 .0 9 9
F D Isum 1.57 1.74 0 .146
F D Iin 1.50 1.64 0 .146
Spain F D In et 1.62 1.74 0 .100
F D Isum 1.60 1.76 0 .132
F D Iin 1.53 1.65 0.121
Sweden F D In et 1.63 2.03 0 .238
F D Isum 1.61 2.10 0 .2 7 7
F D Iin 1.48 1.93 0 .3 2 7
Switzerland F D In et 1.70 1.97 0 .1 6 4
F D Isum 1.70 1.93 0 .145
FD Iin 1.54 1.66 0 .118
UK F D In et 1.64 1.95 0 .199
F D Isum 1.75 2.05 0 .163
F D Iin 1.59 1.80 0 .165
US F D In et 1.59 1.61 0 .021
F D Isum 1.60 1.71 0 .0 9 7
FD Iin 1.49 1.60 0 .123
A verage F D In et 1.62 1.77 0 .1 0 8
F D Isum 1.62 1.83 0 .1 4 3
F D Iin 1.53 1.70 0 .14S
Notes. Both actual and simulated unemployment volatilities have been normalized to one for the 
period 1970-1985.
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3 .6 .4  D a ta  app en dix
Sample composition
The countries in the sample are:
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Ireland
Italy
Finland
France
Germany
Japan
Netherlands 
Norway 
New Zealand 
Portugal
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States
D ata definitions and sources
u Unemployment rate (source: OECD Economic Outlook).
sd_un  Unemployment rate volatility. This is calculated as the standard deviation 
of the cyclical component of the unemployment rate. We detrended the data 
using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, setting the smoothing parameter A equal to 
100 as suggested for annual data (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997).
sd_ inv Investment rate volatility where the investment rate is defined as the ratio of 
real investment to real GDP (source: OECD National Accounts). Volatility is 
calculated as the standard deviation of the cyclical component of the invest­
ment rate. We detrended the data using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, setting 
the smoothing parameter A equal to 100 as suggested for annual data (Hodrick 
and Prescott, 1997).
FDIin Foreign direct investment inflows (source: International Financial Statistics, 
IMF) normalized to nominal domestic investment (source: OECD National 
Accounts).
FDIout Foreign direct investment outflows (source: International Financial Statistics, 
IMF) normalized to nominal domestic investment (source: OECD National 
Accounts).
FDInet Net foreign direct investment flows: FD Inet = \FDIin — F D Iou t\.
FDIsum Sum of foreign direct investment inflows and outflows: FD Isum  =  FD Iin  +
tion of employees at current price and national currencies (source: OECD Eco­
nomic Outlook), defcDP  i s  the GDP deflator, base year 1990 (source: OECD 
National Accounts), L is total employment and L seif is the total number of 
self- employed (source: OECD National Accounts).
FDIout.
w Real labour cost: w = W  S S E  \-r-z  ) /(L  — Lseif), where WSSE is the compensa-
dejGDP J
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K  Real capital stock. The calculation of the capital stock is made according to
the Perpetual Inventory Method: K  = (1 — 5)K -\  +  ( -7 -7 ---- ) , where I n
\ d e f l N V  )  _ i
is the gross fixed capital formation at current prices and national currencies 
(source: OECD National Accounts) and d e f i^ y  is the gross fixed capital 
formation price index, base year 1990 (source: OECD National Accounts) and 
the depreciation rate, 5, is assumed constant and equal to 8  percent, which 
is consistent with OECD estimates (Machin and Van Reenen, 1998). Initial
capital stock is calculated as: K q =  ■ - , where g is the average annualg + 0
growth of investment expenditure and Jo is investment expenditure in the first 
year for which data is available.
tfp_sh TFP shock. This is computed as the deviation of the Solow residual from its 
(Hodrick-Prescott) trend (Nickeil et al 2001). The Solow residual is calculated
using the following formula: din A  =   —\d\nY  — a d ln K  — (1 — a)d\nL],
1 — a
where Y  is gross domestic output at constant price and national currencies 
(source: OECD National Accounts), K  is capital stock as defined above, L  is 
total employment (source: OECD Economic Outlook), (1  — a) is a smoothed 
share of labour following the procedure described in Harrigan (1997). Labor
share is defined as (1  — a) =  —
p Consumer price index , base year 1990 (OECD, Main Economic Indicators).
pr_sh  Price shock. This is computed as the change in inflation: pr_sh  =  A2p
imp_sh  Import price shock. This is measured by proportional changes in real im­
port prices weighted by the trade share (Nickeil et al. 2001): imp_sh =
^ A l n ( w h e r e  M  (source: OECD Outlook) and Yn (source: OECD 
Yn \  Py )
National Accounts) are imports and GDP at current prices, Pm  (source: 
OECD Outlook) and Py (source: OECD National Accounts) are the import 
price deflator and the GDP deflator (source: OECD National Accounts) both 
with 1995 as base year .
rint Real long term interest rate deflated by the 3-year expected inflation rate: 
r =  i — E(d\np+i), where i is the long term nominal interest rate (source: 
OECD Economic Outlook). E(dlnp+i) are fitted values from the regression 
dlnp  =  7 1dlnp_i +  7 2dlnp _ 2  +  7 3dlnp _ 3  +  17 where dlnp  is the inflation 
rate based on the consumer price index p (source: OECD National Accounts) 
and the coefficients on the right side are restricted to sum to one, indicating 
inflation neutrality in the long run (see Cristini, 1999).
union Net union density, defined as the percentage of employees who are union mem­
bers (source: Nickeil et al. 2001). For the years after 1995 the series has been 
updated using the new data in Visser (2 0 0 0 ) and national sources.
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tw Tax wedge, calculated as the sum of the employment tax rate, the direct tax 
rate and the indirect tax rate (source: Nickeil et al. 2001). Updated series 
for the years after 1995 are obtained from the OECD. When necessary, we 
extrapolated the series for the period 1999-2001.
br Benefit replacement ratio, defined as the ratio of unemployment benefits to 
wages for a number of representative types (source: Nickeil et al. 2001, con­
structed from OECD data sources). Updated series for the years after 1995 
are obtained from the OECD. When necessary, we extrapolated the series for 
the period 1999-2001.
bd Benefit duration, defined as a weighted average of benefits received during the 
second, third, fourth and fifth year of unemployment divided by the benefits 
in the first year of unemployment (source: Nickeil et al. 2001, constructed 
form OECD data source). Updated series for the years after 1995 are obtained 
from the OECD. When necessary, we extrapolated the series for the period 
1999-2001.
Part III
Job Flows in Europe
132
Chapter 4
Gross Job Flows and  
Institu tions
4.1 Introduction
Recent theoretical and empirical literature has stressed the importance of job re­
allocation in a world where agents (firms and workers) are heterogeneous and the 
matching process between vacancies and workers is costly. When a shock hits the 
economy, the desired allocation of jobs among firms and sectors changes, leading to 
job destruction on the one hand and the creation of new vacancies on the other. 
Because of heterogeneity and other labour market frictions, new vacancies and un­
employed workers do not match instantaneously, implying spells of unemployment 
and vacant positions in the economy (Pissarides, 2000).
Gross job flows may be considered a proxy for labour market flexibility to the 
extent that they provide a measure of the responsiveness of the labour market to 
changes in economic conditions. In recent years, several studies have estimated job 
creation and destruction from longitudinal data at plant or firm level. Studies on
133
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gross job flows have shown that a high number of jobs are simultaneously created 
and destroyed in the economy even when the employment growth is close to zero.1 
This provides evidence of the complexity of the dynamics underlying the adjustment 
process in the labour market and the heterogeneity in the behavior of both workers 
and firms.
The main limitation of the existing studies on job flows is the lack of interna­
tionally comparable job flows statistics (OECD, 1994). A number of problems arise 
when using establishment/firm level data, which become of particular concern when 
doing international comparisons. Differences in definitions, sampling intervals, sec­
toral coverage and sampling frame may lead to misleading interpretations of the 
cross-country differences in estimated job flows.
We examine time series and cross-sectional patterns of job flows for 13 Euro­
pean countries using a unique homogeneous firm-level dataset that covers the whole 
spectrum of productive sectors. We provide comparable estimates of job flows of 
continuing firms, i.e. excluding start-ups and shutdowns, and examine cross-country 
differences and regularities.
Job flow measures in relation to firm characteristics are reported in order to iden­
tify the patterns of job reallocation among different groups of firms within and be­
tween the countries studied. We find important regularities across countries, where 
smaller and younger firms concentrated in services exhibit larger job turnover.
After controlling for firm characteristics, we find persistent cross-country dif­
^ o r  a thorough discussion of the results in this literature, see the excellent survey of Davis et 
al. (1996).
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ferences in job flows that can be partially explained by institutional features. As 
expected, we find a negative effect of policies aiming to protect jobs on the dynamics 
of job reallocation. Similarly, generous unemployment benefits and institutions that 
increase co-ordination in the wage bargaining reduce job turnover.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In section 4.2, we present 
the theoretical motivations of our study and the most relevant empirical evidence. 
Section 4.3 describes the data used in the analysis and defines concepts and measures 
of gross job flows. In section 4.4, we describe gross job flows for different firm 
characteristics and extend the analysis to the multivariate framework in order to 
uncover the main driving factors of labour dynamics. Section 4.5 assesses the role 
of institutional features in explaining persistent cross-country differences in gross 
job flow patterns. In Section 4.6 a number of robustness checks is carried out and 
Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Theoretical motivations and empirical evidence
4 .2 .1  Job  flows: in ternational com parisons
There is a large literature aiming to explain the magnitude and cyclical behavior of 
job reallocation and its components. Empirical studies on job flows include Davis 
and Haltiwanger (1992), Davis et al. (1996) and Haltiwanger and Schuh (1999) 
for the US manufacturing industry, Blanchflower and Burgess (1996) for the UK, 
Broersma and Gautier (1997) for the Netherlands, Albaek and Sorensen (1998) for 
Denmark, Lagarde et al. (1994) for Prance, Dolado and Gomez (1995) for Spain,
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Contini et al. (1991) for Italy, Stiglbauer et al. (2002) for Austria, Faggio and 
Konings (2001) for 5 accession countries and Contini et al. (1995) for countries of 
the European Union. In addition OECD (1994) and OECD (1996) report results on 
job flows for 10 OECD countries between the late 1980s and early 1990s.
The main findings of this literature can be summarised as follows:
• A high number of jobs are simultaneously created and destroyed in all countries 
and sectors regardless of the cycle phase,
•  Job creation and destruction are negatively correlated but not perfectly. This 
implies that, although job creation is clearly pro-cyclical and job destruction 
is counter-cyclical, the volatility of the two flows over the business cycle may 
differ;
• Job reallocation is inversely correlated with capital intensity, more jobs being 
created and destroyed in services than in manufacturing;
•  The intensity of job reallocation depends on some firm-specific characteristics, 
in particular job creation tends to be negatively associated with firms’ age and 
size;
•  Job reallocation is a persistent phenomenon. This implies that the observed 
job flows can not be accounted for by temporary layoff and recall policies.
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4 .2 .2  Jo b  flows and labour m arket in stitu tion s: th eory  and em pir­
ical ev id en ce
Cross-country comparisons of job flows provide the basis for a formal investigation 
of the link between job turnover and labour market institutions and policies. The 
focus on gross job flows instead of net employment changes allows testing sharper 
theoretical predictions of the effects of some institutions. A typical example is em­
ployment protection legislation (EPL). Barriers to the layoff of workers are expected 
to hinder both job creation and destruction, having ambiguous effects on the average 
level of labour demand (Bertola, 1990).
Pissarides (2000) studies the effects of unemployment benefits, employment taxes 
and job subsidies in a fairly general search-equilibrium framework. Both unemploy­
ment benefits and employment taxes decrease job creation and increase job destruc­
tion through an increase in labour costs. Job subsidies reduce the cost of matching 
inducing higher job creation. But job destruction increases as well because of the in­
crease in market tightness that improves the worker’s options in the labour market. 
In contrast, Leonard and Van Audenrode (1993) argue that subsidies to declining 
firms must be supported by taxes on growing firms, which overall reduce job creation 
and destruction and therefore job reallocation.
The role of wage setting institutions on employment dynamics has been em­
phasised in a number of studies. It has been argued that unions may influence 
worker exit behavior through keeping wages above the market clearing level and 
through other ’’non wage” aspects (Farber, 1986; Freeman, 1980). In both cases
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the presence of unions contributes to improve the employee-employer relationship, 
making job separation more costly and consequently reducing job turnover. Sal- 
vanes (1997) points out that more co-ordinated wage negotiations combined with 
wage drift policies might impose an additional restriction to plants when negoti­
ating wages, reducing job creation and therefore gross job flows. However, more 
co-ordinated wage bargaining systems will result in higher job reallocation if they 
compress the wage structure (Bertola and Rogerson, 1997).2
It has been emphasised in the literature that labour market institutions can 
have an impact on the employment.adjustment along the business cycle. Garibaldi 
(1998) focuses on the effects of dismissal costs on the cyclical behavior of job cre­
ation and destruction. Introducing tiring restrictions in a quite stamdard matching 
framework with endogenous job destruction, he argues that when costs associated 
with dismissals are negligible, job destruction is instantaneous while job creation 
takes time. As a consequence job destruction varies more than job creation and 
job reallocation should move counter-cyclically. This prediction is supported by the 
counter-cyclical pattern of job reallocation observed in US manufacturing (Davis 
and Haltiwanger, 1992). However, when firing is costly and time consuming the 
asymmetry in the job flows’ cyclical behavior disappears or might even be reversed 
for stringent enough dismissal restrictions. Thus, taking into account the stringency
of firing laws in Continental Europe, this could provide a rationale for the a-cyclical
2 Bertola and Rogerson (1997) show how wage compression induced by either a centralised bar­
gaining system or by the presence of wage floors, may be conducive to higher job turnover through 
an increase in job creation by the more productive firms and job destruction by the less productive 
ones.
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pattern in job reallocation found in Austria (Stiglbauer et al., 2002) and Germany 
(Boeri and Cramer, 1992) and pro-cyclical pattern found in France (Lagarde et al., 
1994) and Sweden (OECD, 1994).
From an empirical point of view, a preliminary attempt to relate facts with the­
ory within a cross-country framework is due to Garibaldi, Koenings and Pissarides 
(1997). By pooling summary job turnover measures from previous studies, they 
present cross-country bivariate relationships with some labour market institutions 
and policies and find a negative correlation between job reallocation and the strict­
ness of EPL and the duration of unemployment benefits. Similar correlations in 
OECD (1999) show a very weak negative association between different indicators of 
the strictness of EPL and job turnover rates.
Regarding wage setting institutions, Lucifora (1998) for Italy and Blanchflower 
and Burgess (1996) for the UK find a lower rate of job turnover in unionised sectors, 
while Heyman (2001) finds a positive association between job reallocation and the 
degree of wage compression on a panel of Swedish manufacturing establishments, 
supporting Bertola and Rogerson’s hypothesis.
To the best of our knowledge, Salvanes (1997) is the only study that presents 
cross-country multivariate analysis on the effect of labour market institutions on 
labour market dynamics. Pooling cross-sectional sectoral data from previous studies 
for seven OECD countries, he assesses the role of EPL, wage bargaining centralisa­
tion and industrial subsidies on job flows. He finds that stricter dismissal costs have 
a negative impact on job creation and destruction rates. Interestingly, the degree
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of centralisation also has a negative effect on labour market dynamics by reducing 
job creation. With regards to industrial subsidies, the positive impact on job reallo­
cation reported in this chapter contrasts with the negative effect found by Leonard 
and Van Audennrode (1993) when comparing the US and Belgium labour markets.
Therefore, despite the growing number of studies on this area, there is still little 
consensus on the effects of institutions on job flows and no clear pattern emerges 
by looking at cross-country job flow developments. The difficulties in international 
comparisons partly reflect the lack of homogeneous data, which may have affected 
the empirical results presented so far,
4.3 D ata and measurement issues
4 .3 .1  D a ta  sources
Annual firm-level observations over the period 1992-2001 are available from Amadeus 
produced by Bureau van Dijk (BvD). Amadeus contains comparable firm-level data 
for European countries and covers all sectors with the exception of the financial 
sector. BvD local providers collect balance sheet information, sector of operation 
and number of employees from the national Chambers of Commerce, and uniform 
formats are applied to the data allowing accurate cross-country comparisons and 
analysis. Thus, apart from employment data, the dataset includes a wide range 
of financial information and descriptive information (industry and activity codes, 
incorporation year, etc.). There are several versions of Amadeus, depending on the 
number of firms included in the dataset. The version of Amadeus used for our study
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is the top 1 million companies. In order to be included in Amadeus, a firm must 
satisfy at least one of the following criteria: operating revenues equal to at least 1.5 
(1) million euro, total assets equal to at least 3 (2) million euro, number of employees 
equal to at least 15 (10) for the UK, Germany, France and Italy (for all the other 
European countries).
The data has several advantages, which make it especially w<-*ll suited for in­
ternational comparisons. First, the data collection method is reasonably homo­
geneous across countries. This overcomes the problem of previous studies where 
available country data differed on the sources (administrative vs. survey) and unit 
of study (firm vs. establishment). Second, information is provided on narrowly 
defined sectors (2-digit NACE classification) and data on both manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing sectors are reasonably representative. The availability of services 
data is an important advantage with respect to previous studies, where cross-country 
comparisons relied on information obtained from the whole economy in some coun­
tries and the manufacturing sector in others.
There are, however, some limitations in the data. First, it is not possible to 
distinguish between newly created firms and firms that simply enter the sample at 
a given period t but were already operating in the period before. Similarly, it is 
not possible to identify firms’ closures from firms that exit the sample for other 
reasons. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to continuing firms, e.g. firms that are 
in the sample for at least two consecutive periods. Although this is quite standard 
in the literature, it introduces a downward bias in the estimates of job flows. As
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differences across countries in job turnover rates implied by entry and exit have been 
found to be quantitatively relevant (Bartelsman et al., 2003), this may hamper the 
cross-country comparability of estimated job flows. However, the exclusion of entry 
and exit should be less of a problem because it is precisely job turnover of continuing 
firms the component that is more likely to be affected by some of the labour market 
institutions considered in this chapter (OECD, 1999).
Second, the data are available at the firm rather than the establishment level. 
Measuring job flows at firm level understates the actual magnitude of total gross 
flows among plants3 and may lead to longitudinal linkage problems if ownership and 
organisational changes (i.e. mergers, acquisitions, etc.) are not accounted for.4 This 
may be less of a problem with plant-level data, plant being defined in terms of phys­
ical location of production. However, cross-country comparisons of establishment 
data pose serious difficulties since there is important heterogeneity in the definition 
of establishment across datasets (OECD, 1994). This is less of a problem with firm 
data. Similarly, estimates of job creation and job destruction based on year-to- 
year employment changes will also understate the actual flows since short term jobs 
(i.e. seasonal jobs) are likely not to be accounted for. As shown by Blanchard and 
Portugal (2001), the frequency of the data can be quite relevant for cross-country
comparisons of job turnover. Finally, the inclusion criteria in Amadeus introduces
3 Job creation and job destruction resulting from movement between establishments within the 
same firm offset each other at the firm level. As a result, higher job reallocation rates are expected 
at the establishment level. Schuh and Triest (2000) estimate for the United States that job flows 
between firms represent less than 60% of the total job flows between establishments owned by these 
firms.
4See Davis et al. (1996) for a detailed discussion on problems arising from the measurement of 
employment changes at the establishment/firm level.
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a bias against very small firms.
We assess how representative the data is in Section 3.3. Although the results 
yield clear positive signs, these characteristics of the data should be kept in mind 
when comparing our results with previous studies.
4 .3 .2  M easuring job  flows
The conventions of Davis et al. (1996) are followed in defining job flows statistics.
Denote the level of employment at firm /  in period t with n f t and let A n  ft be the
change in employment between period t and t — 1. Let 5 +  be the sH; of firms in
sector S  with Arif* > 0 and S — be the set of firms in sector S  with Arift < 0. We
calculate job creation by summing employment changes in 5+ . Correspondingly,
job destruction is calculated by summing all the (absolute) changes in S - .  Rates of
job creation and job destruction are obtained by dividing by the size of sector. Firm
size at time t is calculated as the average employment between period t and t — 1 .
i.e. Xft — 0.5(rift +  nf t - 1)- Accordingly, the sector size is defined as X st = Y l x ft-
fz s
Job flow rates can equivalently be expressed as the size-weighted average over
firms’ growth rates as follows
JC  =  9 ft~z7 ~ J°b Creation RateX st
JD  =  |p/tl t A  Job Destruction Rate
X stA
where gft = ----— is the growth rate of employment in firm f  and period £.5
Xft
5 The growth measure defined above is monotonically correlated with the conventional measure 
defined as the change in employment divided by the lagged employment, and the two measures are 
approximately the same for small growth rates. Moreover, unlike the conventional measure, which 
ranges from —1 and +oo, this measure of growth rate is symmetric around zero, being bounded in
the interval [-2,2], allowing employment expansions and contractions to be treated symmetrically.
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The sum of the job creation rate and job destruction rate is the job reallocation rate 
(JR). It gives the total number of employment positions reallocated in the economy.
The difference between job creation and job destruction is the net employment 
growth (NET).  Finally, minimum worker reallocation (m inW R ) is defined as the 
maximum between JC and JD and represents the lower bound of the fraction of 
workers who change jobs or employment status (worker reallocation) in response to 
firm-level employment changes.
4.3.3 Sam ple descrip tion
In order to judge how representative our dataset is, we present comparisons with 
respect to official sources. Using information provided by Eurostat and the OECD, 
we compare the employment coverage and yearly net employment changes in our 
sample with labour force survey data. Similarly, we assess how representative is the 
coverage in our sample as regards the distribution of employment by sector and firm 
size.6
Figure 4.1 compares the evolution of employment growth from our sample with 
the growth in the number of employees measured by OECD statistics. Although 
there are some minor inconsistencies, the employment figures in our sample follow 
quite closely the official statistics (the average correlation excluding Italy is 0.8). 
The most significant exception is Italy, which consistently overstates employment
growth. This inconsistency is not related to specific outliers, since tabulations show
6 The final sample covers the EU countries with the exception of Luxembourg and Greece. Greece 
and Luxembourg are excluded from the analysis due to lack of institutional data.
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Figure 4.1: Growth in the number of employees - Comparing Amadeus with Official 
Statistics from the OECD
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that Italian employment growth in Amadeus is always above the mean values of the 
rest of the sample for all breakdowns of firm characteristics.7
Table 4.1 shows the final sample composition and the sample period for each 
country after filtering the observations from outliers.8 The period of observation 
varies across countries but information is available in most cases at least during 
1995-2000. The number of average valid observations per year ranges from almost
90,000 firms in Germany to some 500 firms in Ireland. This implies an annual average 
employment coverage of 25 per cent when compared to figures in the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS).
Table 4 2 shows the distribution of firms and employment by sector and country 
and compares the distribution of sectoral employment in our sample with the distri­
bution calculated using information from the Labour Force Survey (LFS). Although 
there is a bias towards employment in manufacturing, the sample is well represen­
tative of both manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. Moreover the sectoral 
coverage is rather homogeneous across countries and stable over time. Regarding 
the distribution of firms by size classes, our sample is expected to be biased against 
small firms due to the eligibility criteria applied in Amadeus.
Table 4.3 compares the distribution of employment by firm size in our sample 
and OECD (1994) estimates based on the report Enterprises in Europe produced by
Eurostat in 1992 and 1994. It shows that, overall, although there is a biatp- towards
7In the text, we report results including Italy. We have repeated the analyses in sections 4 and 
5 excluding Italy from the sample (available upon request). The main findings of the paper are 
largely unaffected by the exclusion of Italy, although results are somewhat more robust when Italy 
is excluded from the institutional analysis.
8 Discussion of the data selection and cleaning can be found in Appendix 4.8.
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Table 4.1: Final Sample Composition
Panel A: Number of observations per year
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Aus 4028 7558 9609 11465 12490 11588
Bel 21160 24047 25797 27407 26851 28655 29855 30440 30506
Den 10973 13529 14502 15990 17098 6404
Fin 4353 6976 8916 9b40
Fra 23898 27321 38098 51311 55049 61593 71556 74673
Ger 14898 49416 93081 103647 1143S7 124816 125967
Ire 289 454 539 593 661 605 248
Ita 15273 17883 22352 27200 33273 66222 71254 71278 63836
Net 23864 26382 28734 15703 5268 4949 2789
Por 1157 1680 1705 1909 646 476
Spa 9850 23538 38479 47415 54055 66354 69630
Swe 33350 35411 38194 9380
Uk 14474 20909 24254 28946 32936 36393 39090 42231 42758
Tot 50853 86737 148625 226806 325415 382873 444635 486682 487403 15784
Panel B: Average number of observation and sample coverage
Sample period Average number 
of obs. per year
Employment 
coverage (%)
Aus 1995-2000 9486 18.9
Bel 1992-2000 27185 48.6
Den 1996-2001 13083 29.9
Fin 1997-2000 7471 27.5
Fra 1993-2000 50437 23.4
Ger 1994-2000 89459 36.2
Ire 1994-2000 484 5.9
Ita 1992-2000 43205 23.6
Net 1994-2000 15384 9.8
Por 1995-2000 1262 5.3
Spa 1994-2000 44189 24.2
Swe 1998-2001 29334 33.2
Uk 1992-2000 31332 27.2
Notes. Employment coverage is calculated in relation of total employment in the Labour Force 
Survey.
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Table 4.2: Distribution of firms and employment by sector (NACE ocde, rev.l)
Source
Sectors
01-05 10-14 15-37 40-41 45 50-55 60-64 70-74 75-99
Aus %empl Ams 0.002 0.004 0.300 0.014 0.149 0.321 0.066 0.096 0.047
LFS 0.081 0.004 0.276 0.012 0.108 0.283 0.087 0.087 0.061
% firms Ams 0.003 0.007 0.216 0.002 0.182 0.418 0.071 0.081 0.017
Bel %empl Ams 0.004 0.004 0.394 0.021 0.083 0.205 0.142 0.125 0.023
LFS 0.034 0.004 0.294 0.012 0.099 0.271 0.115 0.110 0.061
% firms Ams 0.011 0.003 0.228 0.002 0.002 0 122 0.381 0.080 0.141
Den %empl Ams 0.011 0.002 0.372 0.002 0.078 0.238 0.115 0.159 0.023
LFS 0.054 0.000 0.284 0.010 0.101 0.249 0.105 0.126 0.072
%firms Ams 0.022 0.002 0.254 0.001 0.137 0.306 0.060 0.189 0.029
Fin %empl Ams 0.004 0.004 0.433 0.019 0.066 0.209 0.113 0.123 0.028
LFS 0.093 0.003 0.287 0.016 0.084 0.207 0.106 0.128 0.076
%firms Ams 0.008 0.003 0.281 0.016 0.103 0.329 0.071 0.158 0.031
Fra %empl Ams 0.005 0.006 0.408 0.020 0.073 0.204 0.098 G.151 0.036
LFS 0.062 0.003 0.271 0.031 0.096 0.240 0.094 0.129 0.036
%firms Ams 0.010 0.006 0.270 0.002 U.103 0.329 0.071 0.158 0.031
Ger %empl Ams 0.038 0.007 0.331 0.012 0.123 0.240 0.076 0.098 0.075
LFS 0.004 0.007 0.395 0.019 0.068 0.194 0.111 0.153 0.050
%firms Ams 0.011 0.005 0.281 0.005 0.136 0.336 0.052 0.140 0.035
Ire %empl Ams 0.004 0.009 0.445 - 0.040 0.216 0.149 0.109 0.029
LFS 0.109 0.005 0.244 0.011 0.118 0.267 0.074 0.101 0.072
%firms Ams 0.007 0.021 0.416 - 0.049 0.301 0.072 0.107 0.027
Ita %empl Ams 0.006 0.002 0.592 0.013 0.052 0.157 0.084 0.066 0.029
LFS 0.031 0.008 0.471 0.022 0.119 0.107 0.108 0.071 0.062
%firms Ams 0.011 0.004 0.483 0.004 0.063 0.316 0.045 0.054 0.020
Net %empl Ams 0.013 0.006 0.310 0.009 0.142 0.244 0.080 0.153 0.042
LFS 0.050 0.002 0.229 0.009 0.092 0.294 0.091 0.166 0.067
%firms Ams 0.022 0.002 0.192 0.001 0.138 0.294 0.064 0.261 0.026
Por %empl Ams 0.003 0.006 0.402 0.009 0.140 0.189 0.170 0.063 0.016
LFS 0.120 0.005 0.293 0.010 0.134 0.252 0.051 0.057 0.080
%firms Ams 0.006 0.003 0.382 0.005 0.119 0.391 0.030 0.053 0.011
Spa %empl Ams 0.012 0.011 0.364 0.014 0.093 0.248 0.092 0.119 0.047
LFS 0.095 0.006 0.240 0.008 0.129 0.284 0.075 0.082 0.081
%firms Ams 0.015 0.007 0.307 0.004 0.118 0.366 0.053 0.100 0.031
Swe %empl Ams 0.007 0.004 0.366 0.013 0.070 0.206 0.109 0.179 0.046
LFS 0.041 0.004 0.288 0.012 0.084 0.231 0.102 0.161 0.078
%firms Ams 0.014 0.003 0.207 0.007 0.095 0.378 0.072 0.185 0.039
Uk %empl Ams 0.011 0.009 0.341 0.008 0.045 0.274 0.068 0.157 0.087
LFS 0.023 0.006 0.258 0.010 0.101 0.280 0.094 0.146 0.081
%firms Ams 0.011 0.005 0.287 0.002 0.072 0.252 0.053 0.193 0.124
Notes. LFS is the EU Labour Force Survey. Ams is the final sample from Amadeus. 01-05
Agriculture, forestry and fishing; 10-14 Mining and quarrying; 15-37 Manufacturing; 40-41 Energy 
and water supply; 45 Construction; 50-55 Trade, Restaurants and Hotels; 60-64 Transportation and 
communication; 70-74 Business services; 75-99 Community, social and personal services.
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Table 4.3: Distribution of firms and employment by size
Source
Firm size
Small
1-99
(number of
Medium
100-499
employees)
Large 
500 f
Aus %empl Ams 0.404 0.279 0.317
OECD - - -
%firms Ams 0.906 0.082 0.013
Bel %empl Ams 0.381 0.224 0.395
OECD 0.460 0.191 0 349
%firms Ams 0.939 0.051 0.010
Den %empl Ams 0.410 0.247 0.343
OECD 0.614 0.176 0.210
%firras Ams 0.926 0.063 • 0.011
Fin %empl Ams 0.313 0.269 0.418
OECD 0.443 0.171 0.386
%firms Ams 0.897 0.084 0.019
Fra %empl Ams 0.301 0.246 0.452
OECD 0.501 0.162 0.337
%firms Ams 0.887 0.094 0.019
Ger %empl Ams 0.211 0.215 0.574
OECD 0.446 0.182 0.372
%firms Ams 0.896 0.124 0.027
Ire %empl Ams 0.266 0.452 0.282
OECD - - -
% firms Ams 0.683 0.286 0.032
Ita %empl Ams 0.345 0.268 0.387
OECD 0.714 0.099 0.187
%firms Ams 0.896 0.091 0.013
Net %empl Ams 0.570 0.250 0.180
OECD - - -
%firms Ams 0.945 0.050 0.005
Por %empl Ams 0.217 0.343 0.440
OECD 0.595 0.195 0.210
%firms Ams 0.770 0.195 0.035
Spa %empl Ams 0.406 0.236 0.358
OECD 0.654 0.145 0.200
%firms Ams 0.935 0.055 0.010
Swe %empl Ams 0.391 0.195 0.414
OECD - - -
%firms Ams 0.952 0.039 0.009
Uk %empl Ams 0.154 0.254 0.592
OECD 0.491 0.172 0.338
%firms Ams 0.728 0.219 0.053
Notes. The figures in the table are average values over the sample period. Data for the OECD are 
from the OECD Economic Outlook (based on Enterprises in Europe, 1994).
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of continuing firms according to employment growth rates
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larger firms in our sample, smaller firms are well represented.
4.4 Job turnover and firm characteristics
4 .4 .1  A n  o v e rv ie w
In this Section, we present an overview of recent developments in the job flows in 
the European countries.
Figure 4.2 presents the distribution of the employment growth rates for the whole 
sample of EU countries over the 1992-2000 period. It shows that the employment 
change for 30% of the observations falls in the [-5%, 5%] range. This percentage 
increases to about 50% when the range of growth considered is [-10%, 10%]. It is
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clear, however, that there is a high dispersion of growth rates. Moreover, this figure
also points to a higher concentration of observations in positive growth rates, which
reflects the fact that the period of study is overall expansionary.
Table 4.4 reports the aggregate rates of job creation (JC), job destruction (JD),
job reallocation (JR), minimum worker reallocation (minWR) and net employment
change (NET) in each country, averaged within the sample period. First note the
large flows, both regarding job creation and destruction, observable in all countries.
Although all of the countries registered a net increase of employment within the
period of study, the coexistence of significant job creation and destruction flows is
a broadly based finding. Job creation rates ranges between 4.4% in Germany and
8.6% in Spain, and job destruction rates from 3.0% in Finland and 4.4% in the UK.
These developments led to an average job reallocation rate of around 10% in the EU,
Austria and Germany being the country with the lowest job reallocation (7.9% and
8.1% respectively) and Spain and Italy those with the highest (12.1% and 12.3%).
This means that, on average, one tenth of jobs are either created or destroyed per
year. The minimum amount of workers that have to move to accommodate the
change in job positions or employment status (minimum worker reallocation) varied
between 4.6% on average in Austria and 8.6% in Spain.
The rest of Table 4.4 presents summary statistics of flow rates by sector and
firm’s size, age and capital intensity pooling the information across countries and
years. According to the sector,9 service industries exhibit, on average, larger job
9Sectors are defined according to the 1-digit NACE classification (NACE code, rev 1).
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Table 4.4: Average job flow rates 
---------------------------------1C------- ID------ IK ------ NET— mTnWH
By country
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
Euro area 
Nordic countries
By sector
Agriculture
Mining
Manufacturing
Energy
Construction
Trade, restaurants, hotels
Transport and communication
Business services
Community, social and personal ser. 
By size
1-19 employees 
20-49 employees 
50-99 employees 
100-249 employees 
250-499 employees 
500-999 employees 
1000-2499 employees 
2500 and more employees
By age 
1 year
2-5 years 
6-10 years 
10+ years
By capital intensity 
20% or less 
20-30%
30-40%
More than 40%
4.6 3.4 7.9 1.2 4.6
5.2 3.8 9.0 1.3 5.5
6.2 3.3 9.5 2.8 6.2
7.0 3.0 100 4.0 7.0
5.1 3.2 8.3 1.8 5.3
4.4 3.7 8.1 0.7 4.7
8.5 3.1 11.6 5.4 8.5
8.2 4.1 12.3 4.1 8.2
6.5 4.3 10.8 2.2 6.6
4.9 3.5 8.4 1.5 5.0
8.6 3.4 12.1 5.2 8.6
8.1 3.6 11.7 4.5 8-1
6.6 4.4 11.0 2.3 6.9
5.6 3.7 9.3 1.9 6.3
7.3 3.4 10.7 2.9 7.1
5.8 4.3 10.1 1.6 6.7
3.3 5.8 9.1 -2.7 6.2
4.6 3.9 8.5 0.7 5.3
2.3 4.1 6.4 -1.3 4.8
6.8 4.7 11.5 1.7 7.3
6.8 3.0 9.8 3.4 6.8
5.0 4.0 9.0 0.7 6.3
8.3 4.3 12.6 4.4 8.7
7.6 3.0 10.6 4.2 7.5
10.7 3.5 14.2 6.9 10.7
7.8 3.8 11.6 3.8 7.9
7.4 3.8 11.2 3.3 7.4
7.0 4.0 11.0 2.9 7.1
5.8 3.4 9.2 2.2 6.0
5.7 3.6 9.4 2.0 5.9
4.8 3.7 8.5 2.2 5.3
3.7 3.8 7.5 -0.4 4.7
8.9 3.7 12.6 5.2 9.0
8.4 4.1 12.5 4.3 8.4
7.6 4.0 11.6 2.6 8.0
5.2 3.6 8.8 1.6 5.4
6.5 4.0 10.5 2.5 7.3
5.7 3.7 9.4 2.0 6.5
5.9 3.2 9.1 2.7 6.4
6.1 3.8 9.9 2.3 6.6
Notes. Average values over the sample period
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flows. Business services is the sector with the largest job flows in Europe during 
the period of study, a pattern mainly driven by the strong employment creation in 
this sector, while manufacturing and energy present the lowest JR rates. As regards 
size classes, the concept used in the analysis refers to the average size of the firm in 
two consecutive periods. The average size is used instead of the current size as it is 
expected to give a better indication of the intended scale of operations. We divide the 
sample in eight categories: 1-19 employees; 20-49; 50-99; 100-249; 250-499; 500-999; 
1,000-2,499; and 2,500 and over. The process of job reallocation is clearly stronger 
among smaller firms. In fact, there is an inverse relationship between the size of 
the firm and the intensity of job reallocation. Moreover, this inverted relationship 
is mainly due to the pattern of job creation, which shows a higher variation among 
firm size than the pattern of job destruction. Concerning the age of the firm, four 
groups are considered: 1 year old; 2-5 years; 6-10 years; and more than 10 years. 
Job flows are significant in all age groups and decrease monotonically with thw age 
of firms.
Capital intensity is defined as the capital share (measured as value added minus 
the wage bill) in value added. We distinguish four categories: below 20%; 20-30%; 
30-40%; and more than 40%. According to the estimates in Table 4, there seems 
to be an U-shaped relationship between capital intensity and JR, with firms with 
either low or high capital intensity exhibiting larger turnover rates.
To better understand firm-level job dynamics, it is also useful to measure how 
persistent are the decisions of creating or destroying jobs. Job reallocation may not
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Table 4.5: Average persistence rates
Job Creation Job Destruction
One year Two years One year Two years
Austria 0.92 0.86 0.86 0.79
Belgium 0.80 0.71 0.75 0.63
Denmark 0.81 0.72 0.68 0.54
Finland 0.86 0.80 0.70 0.62
France 0.82 0.74 0.70 0.56
Germany 0.91 0.85 0.87 0.77
Ireland 0.87 0.83 0.67 0.53
Italy
Netherlands
0.85 0.78 0.64 0.52
0.80 0.72 0.68 0.56
Portugal 0.81 0.73 0.69 0.57
Spain U.85 0.78 0.64 0.55
Sweden 0.86 0.79 0.71 0.56
United Kingdom 0.83 0.75 0.71 0.57
Sample mean 0.85 0.77 0.72 0.60
Euro area 0.85 0.78 0.72 0.61
Nordic countries 0.84 0.77 0.70 0.57
M ea n  com p arison  te s t  (w h ole  sam p le)
Differences between JC and JD persistence rates: 
One year 0.13 (13.43)
Two years 0.18 (13.28)
t-values in parenthesis: HO: mean (diff) = 0  vs. HI: mean (diff) >0
Notes. Average values over the sample period
be a persistent phenomenon if it is related to temporary layoffs and recalls. On
the other hand, to the extent that job flows are persistent, they must be associated
with long-term joblessness or worker reallocation across firms. Following Davis et al.
(1996), we define the N-period persistence of job creation as the fraction of newly
created jobs at time t that survives through the period t+N. Analogously, the N-
period persistence of job destruction is defined as the fraction of jobs destroyed at
time t that do not reappear through the period t+N.
Table 4.5 summarises the persistence rates of job creation and job destruction
over a one and two-year horizon. Between 80% and 92% of newly created jobs and
64% and 87% of recent destroyed jobs persist at least one year in our sample of
European countries. After two years the persistence rates in job creation fall up
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to a minimum of 71% in Belgium and to a maximum of 86% in Austria, while the 
persistence in destruction rates vary between 52% in Italy and 79% in Austria. These 
results indicate that firm-level job decisions are highly persistent, while job creation 
appears as a more persistent phenomenon than job destruction. As indicated at the 
bottom of the table, the differences between persistence rates of job creation and 
job destruction both over one and two year periods are statistically significant for 
the whole sample of countries. However, this can be partly explained by activity 
developments, as our results refer to a period of overall expansion and persistency 
rates tend to show a pro-cyclical pattern (Davis et al. 1996).
Some of these results, including the negative relationship between job reallocation 
and firm size and age and the fact that job creation and job destruction largely reflect 
persistent changes, are similar to those reported in Davis et al. (1996) for the US. 
They are not totally comparable, however, as their study refers to the manufacturing 
sector only and includes, apart form continuing firms, start-ups and shutdowns.
As a final exercise, the job flows for the euro area as a whole are estimated and 
confronted with those of the UK, whose labour market is considered to be more 
flexible than that of the euro area on average, and those of the Nordic countries,10 
which lie under a more ’’corporatist” model.11 The average job reallocation rate in 
the UK is 11%, compared with 9.3% in the euro area (see Table 4.4). In addition, 
even if the net employment growth is slightly higher in the UK than in the euro
area, not only job creation is higher in the former compared to the latter but also
10 Nordic countries include Denmark, Finland and Sweden.
11 The ’’corporatist” model implies a broad co-operation between labour market organisations and 
governments.
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Table 4.6: Average job reallocation rates for the euro area, the UK and Nordic 
countries_________________________________________________________
Euro area UK Nordic
countries
By sector
Agriculture 11.0 6.4 ' 11.9
Mining 9.0 10.1 8.5
Manufacturing 7.9 10.1 9.1
Energy 5.8 7.8 11.7
Construction 10.9 14.7 12.4
Trade, restaurants, hotels 9.6 10.4 10.4
Transport and communication 8.9 10.1 8.9
Business services 12.4 13.5 15.3
Community, social and personal ser. 9.6 11.7 12.1
By size
1-19 employees 13.9 17.0 13.5
20-49 employees 10.8 . 14.2 12.7
50-99 employees 10.5 12.6 12.7
100-249 employees 10.3 12.9 12.2
250-499 employees 8.4 11.6 10.2
500-999 employees 8.7 11.4 9.5
1000-2499 employees 7.8 10.8 8.9
2500 and more employees 7.2 8.8 5.4
By age
1 year 13.9 15.8 18.3
2-5 years 12.5 13.7 12.1
6-10 years 10.6 13.0 10.4
10+ years 7.7 10.3 9.5
By capital intensity
20% or less 10.5 11.2 11.0
20-30% 9.3 10.5 10.2
30-40% 9.1 9.7 9.8
More than 40% 10.0 10.3 10.4
Notes. Average values over the sample period
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job destruction. Job flows in Nordic countries lie between these two. Table 4.6 
presents detailed comparisons that confirm the difference in average job reallocation 
among the three areas. All breakdowns by firm size, age and capital intensity reflect 
higher flows in the UK than in the euro area. The same pattern emerges by sectors, 
only with the exception of agriculture. These patterns are confirmed by differences 
in persistence rates across these three areas, which point to more persistent decisions 
in the euro area than in the UK and Nordic countries. Whether or not labour market 
institutions are responsible for th^se differences is something that will be investigated 
in section 4.5.
4 .4 .2  T h e im p act o f firm  characteristics on job  flows
Next, we study the joint impact of the different firm characteristics considered in the 
descriptive analysis on the dynamics of job flows. Some of the firm characteristics 
presented above are highly correlated among each other (e.g. firm’s age and size), 
suggesting the need of moving to a multivariate framework in order to disentangle 
the main determinants of labour market flows. For this purpose, we calculate JC, 
JD and JR rates for narrow sectors defined as the crossing of 4 age groups, 7 sectors 
of activity, 4 size groups, 13 countries, 10 years (between 1992 and 2001) and 4 
capital intensity groups. Then, we regress the sectoral flows on dummy variables 
defined for each of these groups and the aggregate employment growth rate in each 
country-year to control for the business cycle.
We consider two different specifications, depending on whether we include or
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not capital intensity in the definition of the cells. The reason is that Amadeus has 
very limited information on value added for firms in Austria, Germany and the 
Netherlands. Thus, considering capital intensity classes might affect significantly 
the estimates of these countries. When capital intensity crossings are excluded, 
the potential number of cells is 13,440, ascending to 53,760 if capital is included in 
the analysis. In the first case, we have about 7,000 valid observations, and almost
18,000 when capital intensity is considered.12 Reported standard errors are robust 
to heteroskedasticity and country clustering.13
Table 4.7 summarises the results of the OLS regressions for JR, JC and JD on the 
class dummies. Columns (A) to (C) do not include capital intensity groups, which are 
reported in columns (D) to (F). Accoiding to the goodness of fit in the regressions, 
the proposed models do a much better job in explaining the patterns of JR  and JC 
than in explaining JD, suggesting a more important role of idiosyncratic factors in 
the determination of the latter. The results are in line with the descriptive analysis 
discussed in the previous section. Thus, there is a negative relationship between JR 
and JC and the age of the firms, especially when firms are more than 5 years old. 
According to columns (A) and (B), JR and JC are 4 percentage points lower in firms
above 10 years old than in those which have been operating for less than a year.
12 The main reason for missing observations is the different sample periods available for each 
country. See Table 1 for a full description of the sample coverage by year and country.
13We trimmed out outlier observations following the method of detection of outliers in the mul­
tivariate framework developed by Hadi (1992). In order to identify the outliers, we constructed 
categorical variables by age, size, industrial sector, country and capital intensity (if applicable). 
This implied the exclusion of 56 (147) cells in the case of JR, 65 (153) in the case of JC and 101 
(237) in the case of JD in the sample without (with) capital intensity. The results presented in the 
paper refer to the regressions without outliers. Results including outliers, available upon request, 
do not differ importantly with respect to those presented in the text.
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Interestingly, there is some indication of a reversed pattern in JD, with older firms 
significantly destroying more jobs than younger ones. The sectoral dummies confirm 
a higher job reallocation and creation in construction and service than in industry, 
while the latter presents higher job destruction. For instance, job reallocation and 
creation rates in Business services are more than 5 percentage points higher than in 
industry, while the difference in job destruction is not significant.
Similarly, the negative relationship between the size of the firm and job real­
location is confirmed by the multivariate analysis. Indeed, both job creation and 
destruction rates are lower the larger the firm is, although differences are higher in 
job creation than in job destruction. As a result, a firm of more than 1,000 employ­
ees presents a job reallocation rate around 7 percentage points lowei than a firm 
with less than 50 workers, which is explained by 6.2 percentage points less in job 
creation and 1.3 percentage point less in job destruction.
Differences across countries in job flow statistics are statistically significant even 
after controlling for a wide range of firm characteristics. According to the estimates 
of JR, only Spain and Italy show a higher rate than the UK, while all the other 
countries show significantly lower rates. The highest difference compared with the 
UK is observed in Austria, which has a 5 percentage points lower JR rate.14
When ranges of capital intensity are taken into account, all previous results
remain broadly unchanged (see Columns D to F in Table 3). In addition, we do not
14 Interestingly, the UK presented relatively low job flow patterns when compared to many Con­
tinental European countries in previous international comparisons (e.g. OECD, 1994; Garibaldi et 
al., 1997; OECD, 1999). This apparently puzzling result, reversed in our study, might be due to 
the lack of homogeneous data in previous analyses.
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Table 4.7: Firm characteristics and labour market flows. OLS Estimates
Model (A) (S) ( 0 ) (D) (E) ' (F)
Dep var JR JC 
in ass
J ii JR
1 ~in
JC
""in o
JD
■“  A U75J"
(22.46) (20.19) (12.27) (20.01) (13.20) (14.81)
cycle ind 0.001 0.005 -0.003 0.228 0.572 0.286
(1.47) (5.13) (4.68) (2.52) (5.25) (5.87)
0.431 0.507 0.128 0.076 -0.088 0.240
(1.17) (1.64) (1.16) (0.30) (0.41) (2.17)
6-10 years -0.518 -1.347 0.204 -1.491 -1.623 0.304
(5.21) (4.69) (2.07J (8.42) (8.39) (3.51)
10-1- years -4.127 -4.041 0.501 -4.254 -4.424 0.697
(9.91) (9.28) (4.87) (10.34) (10.48) (9.48)
0.265 -0.161 -0.648 0.333 0.234 -0.540
(0.33) (0.22) (3.39) (0.61) (0.54) (2.48)
2.235 1.549 0.446 3.894 2.714 0.636
(2.89) (2.59) (1.36) (4.93) (4.37) (1.50)
1.381 1.825 -0.607 1.672 2.095 -0.554
(3.52) (4.64) (4.41) (6.23) (6.63) (4.18)
Transport 2.451 2.933 -0.807 2.434 2.920 -0.710
(6.51) (7.32) (6.32) (5.08) (6.90) (7.52)
5.484 5.149 0.117 4.891 4.775 -0.191
(8.59) (8.82) (0.99) (8.99) (9.71) (1.73
1.800 2.469 -0.924 1.993 2.678 -1.07:
(4.16) (5.98) (6.10) (4.29) (6.36) (6.89
-1.476 -1.644 -0.045 -1.791 -1.610 -0.33:
(4.35) (5.53) (0.30) (7.23) (7.68) (3.15)
-4.989 -4.276 -1.224 -4.523 -3.746 -0.994
(8.78) (9.69) (4.80) (10.25) (11.62J (4.46)
-6.941 -6.232 -1.302 -5.523 -4.822 -1.034
Age: 2-5 years
Sector: Agriculture
Construction
Trade
Business services 
Other services 
Size: 50-249 
250*999 
1000+
(12.55) (15.71) (5.25) (13.36) (11.31) (4.73)
K-intensity: 20-30% -0.377 -0.008 -0.452
(1.90) (0.03) (5.55)
30-40% -0.367 0.085 -0.169
(1.51) (0.28) (6.39)
40% +  0.557 0.364 -0.030
(3.17) (1.32) (0.21)
Country: France -3.505 -2.169 -1.287 -3.264 -2.295 -0.932
(38.56) (31.46) (18.21) (32.00) (36.23) (13.99)
Sweden -1.004 -1.411 -0.289 -1.988 -1.964 -0.248
(3.56) (6.78) (3.44) (8.12) (10.88) (2.44)
Italy 0.964 0.370 0.177 1.167 0.368 0.320
(5.52) (2.20) (1.58) (7.95) (2.31) (3.91)
Spain 0.718 0.484 -0.008 0.475 -0.087 0.355
(3.22) (1.93) (0.04) (2.46) (0.40) (2.15)
Portugal -3.116 -1.382 -1.939 -2.746 -1.999 -1.505
(12.36) (5.62) (13.31) (8.68) (6.95) (12.07)
Netherlands -1.511 -1.853 -0.147 -4.153 -3.354 -1.636
(11.22) (20.58) (4.80) (23.90) (21.62) (25.41)
Ireland -1.668 -1.078 -1.347 -2.384 -1.693 -1.551
(5.92) (3.77) (6.64) (8.53) (4.19) (8.49)
Germany -3.939 -2.474 -1.404 -3.822 -4.311 -0.231
(15.47) (11.12) (9.40) (13.92) (15.47) (2.07)
Finland -3.588 -2.573 -1.178 -3.389 -2.955 -0.793
(22.21) (26.90) (14.48) (16.88) (19.01) (7.96)
Denmark -4.728 -3.688 -1.176 -5.817 -4.552 -1.453
(17.82) (17.73) (14.86) (20.23) (18.38) (15.52)
Belgium -2.297 -1.195 -1.203 -2.731 -2.172 -0.726
(22.13) (11.30) (15.71) (25.82) (19.07) (13.81)
Austria -5.363 -3.990 -1.825 -5.731 -4.832 -1.003
(20.33) (15.74) (12.07) (19.78) (15.43) (10.66)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 7943 7931 7887 20755 20760 20658
R-squared 0.32 0.33 0.14 0.22 0.22 0.08
Notes. Base case: Age (1 year); Sector (Manufacturing); Size (1-49); Country (UK); Capital 
intensity (less than 20 percent). Calculated standard errors are robust to country clustering, t- 
statistics in parenthesis
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find a systematic role of capital intensity in the determination of job flows.
Finally, we focus on the effects of the business cycle on job turnover. Previous 
country estimates suggest clear pro-cyclical patterns of JR in the US (Davis and 
Haltiwanger, 1999) but either a-cyclical or slightly pro-cyclical movements in Eu­
ropean countries. Our estimates suggest a pro-cyclical character of JR  in Europe, 
although the effect is only statistically significant when capital intensity classes are 
considered.
4.5 Job flows and institutions
The aim of our next set of regressions is to uncover the determinants of country 
idiosyncratic factors in the patterns of job turnover. According to our previous 
discussion, we concentrate on several institutional and regulatory aspects of the 
labour market:
• Tax and benefits systems: including an index of the duration of unemployment 
benefits and the tax wedge between the real (monetary) labour cost faced by 
the firms and the consumption wage received by the employees. The latter is 
normalized by GDP, while the former ranges from 0 (if benefit provision stops 
after 1 year) to 1 (for a constant benefit after 5 years).
• Wage-setting institutions: including an index of co-ordination in the wage
bargaining process which ranges from 1 to 3 according to the increasing degree
of co-ordination. Within our sample, this indicator is time-invariant.15
15 Wage-setting co-ordination, unemployment benefits duration, and the tax wedge are taken from
CHAPTER 4. GROSS JOB FLOWS AND INSTITUTIONS 162
•  Restrictions to hiring and firing: we consider an updated version of the time- 
varying index of EPL reported in Nickeli et al. (2001) and a time-invariant 
index as described by OECD (1999). Both increase with the relative stringency 
of EPL.
•  Sectoral employment subsidies: we include an indicator of the share of sectoral 
and ad hoc state aid as a percentage of GDP.16
Additionally, we include in the regressions the share of workers holding tempo­
rary contracts in the total number of employees.17
The results presented above suggest that failing to control for differences across 
countries in the size, age and sectoral distribution of firms might blur cross-country 
comparisons. Hence, we repeat the cell regressions presented in Columns (A) to (C) 
of Table 4.7 including the institutional indicators.
First we present pooled OLS regressions where the country dummies are sub­
stituted by the institutional variables. A second set of regressions includes country 
fixed effects. The main advantage of this specification is that it allows controlling 
for unobserved time-invariant country heterogeneity. However, together with the 
limitation of not allowing for the inclusion of time-invariant covariates (one of the 
indicators of EPL and wage-setting co-ordination) the fixed effect specification dis­
regards the cross-country information in the data. The latter might severely affect
the efficiency of the estimates of institutional variables given the slow moving na­
an updated series from Nickeli et al. (2001). The information is annual till 1998. When necessary, 
we extrapolated the variables for the period 1999-2001.
16Source: NewCronos Database.
17Source: Labour Force Survey.
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ture of institutions and the short sample period (see Table 1) of our panel. Thus, 
as Heckman and Pages (2000) point out, the reduced time-series variation in the 
institutional data may result in imprecise estimates (high standard errors) when 
country-specific fixed effects are included in the regressions. A final set of regres­
sions treats country unobserved heterogeneity as random. Differently from the fixed 
effect methodology, the random effect methodology allows to exploit both the cross­
country and time-series variation of the data, implying more precise estimates. The 
advantage of this approach in terms of efficiency comes with the cost of imposing 
the assumption of orthogonality between the individual effects and the covariates.
The effects of institutions on JR, JC and JD are reported on Table 4.8. As 
expected, the strictness of EPL has a negative and statistically significant impact 
on JR. This result is similar for both indicators of EPL and robust to the inclusion of 
fixed or random effects in the regression, thought not significant at the conventional 
levels in the pooled OLS specification. It responds to a reduction of both JC and 
JD in countries with more stringent EPL, although only the coefficients on JC are 
statistically significant.
The duration of unemployment benefits and the degree of wage-setting co-ordination 
have similar effects, reducing JR by dampening JC and JD. All these effects are sta­
tistically significant across the different specifications, with the exception of the role 
of benefits on JD when fixed or random effects are present (Columns L and M). 
Results for wage-setting co-ordination are in line with those of Salvanes (1997), 
while the reduction of JC in countries with more generous unemployment benefits
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supports the predictions of matching models discussed by Pissarides (2000).
Regarding the tax wedge, countries with higher tax burdens experience lower 
JC and JR. According to the estimates in Columns (A) to (D), a 10 percentage 
points increase of the tax wedge reduces JR  by 0.5 percentage point. However, the 
tax wedge becomes non-significant although correctly signed when fixed effects are 
included. These results support the predictions of matching models discussed by 
Pissarides (2000), although we do not find statistically significant effects of the tax 
wedge on JD.
Employment subsidies have a negative and significant effect on JD, in line with 
the results.in Leonard and Van Audennrode (1993), suggesting that these policies 
are successful in alleviating job losses. The effect on JC is positive but statistically 
significant only when country unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account.
Finally, the evidence suggests a non-significant impact of the use of temporary 
contracts in the determination of job flows.
The evidence presented is relatively robust to different specifications. When 
country-specific fixed effects are included in the regressions, most of the effects of 
institutions remain statistically significant at standard confidence levels. Moreover, 
,theffact that our findings ^re robust to the use of alternative estimators that do not 
rely exclusively on the time-series variation of institutions is reassuring.
Table 4.8: Labour market institutions and job flows
Model: (A)
OLS1
(B)
OLS'
(C)
Random
effects2
(D)
Random
effects2
(E)
Fixed-
effects1
(F)
OLS1
(G)
OLS1
(H)
Random
effects2
(I)
Fixed-
effects1
(J)
OLS1
(K)
OLS1
(L)
Random
effects2
(M)
Fixed-
effects1
Dependent Variable: JR JR JR JR JR JC JC JC JC JD JD JD JD
Intercept 22.844 23.108 23.539 23.116 27.645 15.665 15.816 16.059 14.023 6.737 6.862 5.663 8.651
(17.06) (17.37) (11.30) (11.31) (7-31) (12.53) (12.68) (9.37) (9.38) (8.37) (8.62) (2.05) (5.07)
Cycle indicator 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(5.61) (4.97) (2.79) (2.55) (1.43) (7.75; (7.51) (9.95) (8.83) (4.27) (4.23) (12.19) (4.56)
Union Co-ordination -0.947 -0.901 -0.713 -0.689 -0.854 -0.829 -1.020 -0.327 -0.302 0.529
(2.08) (2.00) (1.20) (1.21) (2.43) (2.39) (2.04) (1.71) (1.55) (0.41)
Benefit Duration -5.472 -5.816 -6.005 -5.917 -3.855 -3.780 -3.969 -4.773 -4.865 -1.250 -1.435 -0.628 0.007
(3.87) (3.81) (6.21) (6.04) (2.71) (2.84) (2.89) (5.72) (4.52) (3.55) (3.23) (0.79) -(0.28)
Tax Wedge -0.054 -0.052 -0.052 -0.053 -0.147 -0.061 -0.060 -0.028 0.011 0.008 0.009 -0.024 -0.166
(1.84) (1.84) (1.77) (1.86) (0.73) (2.51) (2.52) (1.02) (0.40) (0.56) (0.72) (1.24) (0.28)
Temporary Contracts -0.005 0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.100 -0.020 -0.016 0.006 -0.001 0.019 0.022 0.006 -0.024
(0.14) (0.06) (0.10) (0.02) (1.85) (0.83) (0.65) (0.18) (0.04) (1.19) (1.31) (0.30) (0.39)
Subsidies -0.302 0.207 0.652 0.173 1.119 0.733 0.777 1.044 1.397 -0.841 -0.757 -0.556 -0.493
(0.38) (0.26) (1.17) (0.33) (1.78) (0.99) (1.06) (2.08) (3.97) (4.17) (4.36) (2.29) (1.41)
(EPL) -  time variant -0.493 -1.194 -2.117 -0.307 -9.853 -0.921 -0.122 -0.091 -0.276
(1.14) (3.18) (2.66) (0.93) (2.68) (3.10) (0.61) (0.49) (0.74)
(EPL) -  time invariant -0.678 -0.887 -0.409 -0.224
(1.29) (2.01) (1.10) (1.00)
Observations : 7943 7943 7943 7943 7943 7931 7931 7931 7931 7887 7887 7887 7887
R squared 0.30 0.30 - - 0.23 0.32 0.32 - 0.30 0.12 0.12 - 0.08
Notes: The regressions include age, sector, year and firm size dummies as defined in Columns A to C of Tabie 7. Range values: Co-ordination(1-3); Unemployment 
Benefit Duration(O-l); Tax Wedge(18.61-53.33); Share of Temporary Contracts (4.33-34.99); Employment Subsidies(0.23-1.93); EPL time invariant (0.50-3.70); 
EPL time variant (0.5-3.88). The indicator for the cycle is the aggregate net employment change.
Calculated standard errors are robust to country clustering.
2Maximum likelihood estimation.
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4.6 Sensitivity analysis
The purpose of this section is to investigate the robustness of the regression results 
presented in the previous section.
Table 4.9 presents the results of the institutional regressions when the sample 
is restricted to those years for which we have reliable institutional data. Since 
some noise might be introduced in the extrapolation of the data on institutions 
for the period 1999-2001, we repeat the analysis restricting the sample to only the 
years when information on labour market institutions is available. The results are 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those previously presented.
Aggregate cross-country studies are often criticised on grounds of lack of robust­
ness with respect to the set of countries included in the analysis. Hence, the last 
set of regressions performs sensitivity analysis following the approach proposed by 
Sala-i-Martin (1997) in the context of growth regressions, but focusing on the num­
ber of countries included in the regression. Very briefly, we look at the distribution 
of the estimates of the institutional variables across the full set of regressions that 
result from dropping any combinations of three countries in the OLS, FE and RE 
specifications. Taking into account that the full sample of countries is 13, the re­
sulting number of regressions is 1365 for each institutional variable (910 for union 
co-ordination, since this variable is not included in the fixed effect specifications). 
For each institutional variable, we take averages of the estimated coefficients and 
their standard deviations across the different regressions. Under the assumption of 
normality, these two statistics are sufficient to calculate the cumulative distributive
Table 4.9: Labour market institutions and job flows: 1992-1998
Model: (A)
OLS1
(B)
OLS1
(C)
Random
effects2
(D)
Random
effects2
(E)
Fixed-
effects1
(F)
OLS1
(G)
OLS1
(H)
Random
effects2
(I)
Fixed-
effects1
(J)
OLS1
(K)
OLS1
(L)
Random
effects2
(M)
Fixed-
effects1
Dependent Variable: JR JR JR JR JR JC JC JC JC JD JD JD JD
Intercept 22.871 23.603 24.354 23.952 21.002 16.216 16.687 17.265 17.990 6.479 6.767 6.017 7.273
(17.01) (18.65) (11.30) (11.58) (7.55) (11.11) (11.89) (10.75) (3.35) (8.45) (8.81) (6.23) (2.51)
Cycle indicator 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(5.97) (5.25) (2.49) (2.46) (1.56) (7.81) (7.81) (8.91) (6.74) (4.99) (4.92) (9.87) (3.29)
Union Co-ordination -0.755 -0.668 -0.462 -0.483 -0.745 -0.685 -0.789 -0.251 -0.216 0.058
(1.60) (1.53) (0.88) (0.97) (2.03) (2.04) (2.04) (1.41) (1.24) (0.20)
Benefit Duration -5.861 -6.802 -6.269 -5.923 -1.765 -3.679 -4.317 -4.229 -2.220 -1.730 -2.112 -1.269 0.089
(3.89) (4.38) (5.18) (4.87) (0.92) (2.57) (3.08) (4.41) (0.84) (3.32) (3.34) (2.39) (0.05)
Tax Wedge -0.063 -0.057 -0.083 -0.085 -0.038 -0.079 -0.075 -0.080 0.010 0.013 0.016 -0.001 -0.005
(1.93) (1.97) (2.48) (2.66) (0.65) (2.85) (2.95) (3.10) (021) (0.89) (1.24) (0.04) ‘(0.13)
Temporary Contracts -0.001 0.007 0.012 0.012 -0.123 -0.015 -0.009 -0.009 -0.085 0.017 0.021 0.028 0.016
(0.04) (0.25) (0.29) (0.32) (1.00) (0.62) (0.41) (0.29), (0.74) (1.26) (1.55) (1.60) (0.38)
Subsidies -0.144 0.177 -0.276 -0.684 0 562 0.770 1.005 0.644 ’ 1.285 -0.765 -0,627 -0.802 -0.611
(0.18) (0.21) (0.43) (1.15) (0.81) (1.24) (1.34) (1.16) (4.29) (4.03) (3.13) (2.86) (1.43)
(EPL) -  time variant -0.549 -0.898 -3.083 -0.285 -0.484 -1.539 -0.184 -0.157 -0.426
(1.41) (2.13) (4.0 J) (0.74) (1.46) (2.05) (0.95) (0.89) (0.82)
(EPL) -  time invariant -0.973 -0.620 -0.574 -0.358
(1.94) (1.42) (1.40) (1.53)
Observations: 5470 5470 5470 5470 5470 5465 5465 5465 5465 5433 5433 5433 5433
R squared 0.30 0.30 - - 0.31 0.31 0.31 - 0.32 0.14 0.14 - 0.15
Notes: The regressions include age, sector, year and firm size dummies as defined in Columns A to C of Table 7. Range values: Co-ordination(l-3); Unemployment 
Benefit Duration(0-1); Tax Wedge(18.61-53.33); Share of Temporary Contracts (4.33-34.99); Employment Subsidies(0.23-1.93); EPL time invariant (0.50-3.70); 
EPL time variant (0.5-3.88). The indicator for the cycle is the aggregate net employment change.
'Calculated standard errors are robust to country clustering.
2Maximum likelihood estimation.
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Table 4.10: Sensitivity analysis: robstness with respect to the set of countries
Coeff. © S H
(D)
C D F/w
Dependent variable: Job reallocation (JR) 
EPL-time variant -1.286 0.549 0.990 0.953
Union co-ordination 0.915 0.618 0.930 0.905
Benefit duration -4.924 1.440 0.999 0.974
Tax wedge -0.046 0.039 0.881 0.837
Temporary contracts -0.042 0.051 0.796 0.782
Subsidies 0.502 0.703 0.762 0.815
Dependent variable: Job 
EPL-time variant
creation (JC) 
-0.684 0.384 0.962 0.913
Union co-ordination -0.967 0.471 0.980 0.952
Benefit duration -4.490 1.158 0.999 0.996
Tax wedge -0.032 0.031 0.851 0.824
Temporary contracts -0.005 0.035 0.561 0.714
Subsidies 0.992 0.579 0.957 0.919
Dependent variable: Job 
EPL-time variant
destruction (JD)
-0.156 0.257 0.728 0.756
Union co-ordination 0.291 0.430 0.751 0.872
Benefit duraiion -0.387 0.569 0.752 0.830
Tax wedge -0.011 0.017 0.749 0.818
Temporary contracts -0.002 0.025 0.526 0.792
Subsidies -0.584 0.299 0.974 0.919
Note: Pooled results of the RE, FE and OLS regressions presented in Table 4.8 for all the combina­
tions that result from dropping up to three countries from the sample. Total number of regressions: 
1365 (910 in the case of union c o - p j dination). Cn- cumulative distributive function under normality 
assumption. C n n ' -  cumulative distributive function under non-normality assumption
function (cdf) of the estimates and apply standard confidence levels. However, even 
if the estimates in every regression follow a t-Student distribution, it might be the 
case that the distribution of the estimates is not normal. Following Sala-i-Martin
(1997), in this case we can still compute their cdf as the average of the individual 
cumulative distributive functions.
Table 4.10 presents the results of the sensitivity analysis. According to the nor­
mality criterion (Column C), the results in Table 4 do not depend on the set of 
countries included in the analysis in the cases of EPL, wage-setting co-ordination, 
employment subsidies and the duration of unemployment benefits. These institu­
tions retain their significance at the 95% level in those cases in which they were 
found significant with the full sample. The significance is somewhat weaker in most
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cases when non-normality is assumed (Column D), but results remain largely con­
sistent with those of Column C. The most remarkable change with respect to Table 
4.8 regards the tax wedge, which becomes non-significantly correlated with JR and 
JC when the set of countries in the sample varies.
4.7 Conclusions
This chapter presents an analysis of job flows for a panel of 13 European countries 
in the 1990s using a dataset of continuing firms that covers the whole spectrum of 
productive sectors and, given homogeneity in the definitions and sectoral coverage, 
permits cross-country comparisons.
We estimate the joint effect of different firm characteristics on job flow rates. We 
find that both the size and age of the firm have a negative impact on job reallocation. 
Similarly, firms located in services typically exhibit stronger patterns of job flows 
than firms operating in manufacturing.
Even after controlling for a number of firm characteristics we find significant 
cross-country differences in labour market dynamics. Thus, we investigate the role 
of institutional aspects of labour markets in the determination of job turnover. Once 
controlled for sectoral and firm characteristics, we find that the strictness of employ­
ment protection legislation has a negative effect on job creation and therefore on job 
reallocation. Similarly, the extent of wage bargaining co-ordination and the generos­
ity of unemployment benefits reduce both job creation and job destruction. All these 
results are robust to different specifications and different sets of countries included
CHAPTER 4. GROSS JOB FLOWS AND INSTITUTIONS 170
in the regressions. The role of other institutions such as the tax wedge, the use of 
temporary contracts and employment subsidies on job dynamics are less clear-cut, 
suggesting the need of further empirical and theoretical work.
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4.8 A ppendix
4 .8 .1  D a ta  clean ing
The following observations are dropped from the initial sample in Amadeus:
•  Firms for which only consolidated accounts are available. In order to avoid 
double counting, only unconsolidated accounts are included in the analysis.
•  Observations for which employment growth rate is missing value. In this case, 
the observations and not the entire firm is dropped from the sample,
• Observations where the growth rate of compensation per employee is less then 
-50% or more than 50% within two consecutive years. The aim of this filter 
is to clean for possible outliers. We experimented with different cut-off values 
always obtaining similar results. Most of the observations dropped are well 
above or below these figures.
As regards the latter, we believe that the information on wages is useful, com­
bined with that of employment, to detect the presence of outliers in our data. A 
disadvantage of this filter, is that additional noise might be introduced using the 
wage information. We checked the consistency of the filter constructing an analo­
gous one using the information on added value. Both the coverage of the dataset 
and the empirical results are not significantly affected by the use of the alternative 
filter. The percentage of observations that both the wage and value added filters 
that we apply indicate to be not outliers is more than 95 percent of all the usable 
observations.
C hapter 5
Job Flow Dynam ics and Firing 
R estrictions
5.1 Introduction
Following Davis and Haltiwanger’s (1990, 1992) seminal papers, a large empirical 
literature has looked at the stylized facts of job creation and job destruction using 
firm or establishment level data for different OECD countries. A branch of this 
literature has focused on the relationship between job turnover and the business 
cycle. A pro-cyclical movement of job creation and counter-cyclical movement of 
job destruction is observed in all studies, but the volatility of these two flows along 
the business cycle differs across countries. Estimates for the US, Canada and the 
UK show that the increase in job destruction during economic downturns tends to 
be stronger than the increase in job creation during upturns, resulting in counter­
cyclical movements of job reallocation (the sum of job creation and job destruction). 
By contrast, estimates for continental European countries present a less clear-cut 
picture, with job reallocation tending to be a-cyclical or slightly pro-cyclical. How­
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ever, different sources of data and a high degree of heterogeneity across these studies 
make difficult any cross-country comparisons.
Garibaldi (1998) shows that cross-country differences in employment protection 
legislation may explain the observed dichotomy in the cyclical behavior of job flows 
between the Anglo-Saxon and European countries. When costs associated with 
dismissals are negligible, job creation takes time while job destruction is instanta­
neous. As a consequence, job destruction varies more than job creation within the 
cycle and job reallocation moves counter-cyclically. This prediction is in line with 
the counter-cyclical pattern of job reallocation observed in Anglo-Saxon countries, 
which are characterized by relatively low dismissals restrictions. However, when 
firing is costly and time consuming as in Continental Europe, the asymmetry in 
the job flows’ cyclical behavior disappears or might even be reversed for stringent 
enough dismissal restrictions.
This chapter overcomes previous problems of comparability of job flows statistics 
by using a unique homogenous firm-level data set that covers the whole spectrum 
of productive sectors, and provides an empirical assessment of the relationship be­
tween the cyclical behavior of job flows and labour market institutions. Thus, the 
contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, it provides a set of estimates of the 
cyclicality of job flows for sixteen European countries in the nineties, and exam­
ines differences and regularities across sectors. Second, it investigates empirically 
Garibaldi’s main hypothesis and extends the institutional analysis of the behavior of 
job turnover within the business cycle considering other labour market institutions.
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Our findings indicate important differences across sectors in the cyclical behavior 
of job turnover. Typically, service industries present a pro-cyclical pattern while 
manufacturing industries always react more slowly to the business cycle. Aggregate 
job turnover rates exhibit either an a-cyclical or pro-cyclical pattern in European 
countries, though with important cross-country differences. These differences are 
partially explained by labour market institutions. The tighter firing restrictions are 
the less volatile job destruction is, resulting in a higher positive correlation between 
job reallocation and net employment changes (our measure of the cycle). This 
finding is robust to a number of specifications and is in line with the theoretical 
predictions of the matching model described by Garibaldi (1998). When the role of 
other labour market institutions in explaining job flow dynamics is considered, we 
find that more generous unemployment benefits, a higher tax wedge and a larger 
use of temporary employment counter-balance the effects of employment protection, 
reducing the correlation between job turnover and net employment changes.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Next section briefly reviews 
the cross-country evidence on the relationship between job flows and the business 
cycle and presents summary statistics of this relationship for our panel of European 
countries. Section 5.3 spells out the empirical strategy and Section 5.4 presents the 
main characteristics of the data. The main results of the chapter are presented in 
Section 5.5. Section 5.6 draws some concluding remarks.
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5.2 Job flows and the business cycle
The prevailing view in the business cycle literature predicts an unambiguous pro­
cyclical behavior of job creation and counter-cyclical behavior of job destruction. As 
a consequence, the effect of the cycle on job reallocation (the sum of job creation 
and job destruction) remains undetermined. Previous evidence regarding the cyclical 
patterns of job reallocation is far from conclusive. Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) 
and Davis et al. (1996) find a negative relationship between job reallocation and the 
cycle in the US manufacturing sector. The same cyclical pattern in job reallocation 
has been observed for Canada (Baldwin at al, 1994) and the UK (Konings, 1995). 
For the countries of Continental Europe the evidence is mixed and in general job 
reallocation has been found to follow an a-cyclical pattern. In particular, an a- 
cyclical pattern has been found in Austria (Stiglbauer et al., 2002), Italy (Contini et 
al., 1995), Spain (Dolado and Gomez, 1995) and Germany (Boeri and Cramer, 1992) 
and a slightly pro-cyclical pattern has been found in France (Lagarde et al., 1994) 
and Sweden (OECD, 1994). Hence, as suggested by Garibaldi (1998) the empirical 
evidence suggests a clear dichotomy in the cyclical behavior of job flows between 
the Anglo-Saxon countries and Continental Europe.
However, whether the dichotomy in the cyclical behavior of job reallocation 
should be regarded as a stylized fact is still an open question. This is because 
the existing empirical studies are usually based on internationally incomparable job 
flows statistics (OECD, 1994). For example, differences in the sectoral coverage 
and sampling frame may lead to misleading interpretations of the cross-country
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Table 5.1: Correlations between job reallocation and net employment change
Whole economy Services Manufacturing
Austria 0.17 0.18 -0.26
Belgium 0.45* 0.40* -0.11
Denmark 0.05 0.27 -0.12
Finland 0.48* 0.47* 0.65*
France 0.68* 0.79* 0.22
Germany 0.51* 0.53* -0.06
Greece 0.75* 0.84* 0.55*
Ireland 0.53* 0.84* 0.33*
Italy 0.26* 0.39* 0.19
Luxemburg 0.41* -0.15 0.34*
Netherlands 0 32* 0.29* -0.06
Norway 0.64* 0.82* 0.21
Portugal 0.90* 0.94* 0.58*
Spain 0.70* 0.70* 0.60*
Sweden 0.51* 0.43* 0.65*
Switzerland 0.25* 0.57* 0.04
United Kingdom 0.37* 0.56* -0.41*
Note:* 5 per cent significance. Yearly data for a total of 28 sectors, of which 11 are manu­
factures and 12 sendee industries. For a definition of the sectors see Footnote 2.
differences in the cyclical behavior of job flows. While some of the country studies 
previously mentioned focus on establishment data for the manufacturing sector, 
other studies rely on firm level data for the whole economy.
Table 5.1 shows our own calculation of the correlation between job reallocation 
and net employment growth for the countries in our sample.1 The correlations are
calculated for each country across a total of 28 sectors.2 We present the results for the
^ h e  main advantage of our analysis comes from the fact that our data are comparable across 
countries and are available for both the service and manufacturing sectors. See section 5.4 for a 
detailed description of the dataset used in the analysis.
2 The sectors are: Agriculture, forestry and fishing; Mining and quarrying; Food, Beverages 
and Tobacco; Textiles; Wood Products; Paper products, Publishing and Printing; Refined petro­
leum, nuclear fuel and chemical products; Rubber and plastic products; Other non-metallic prod­
ucts; Basic metals and fabricated metal products; Machinery and equipment; Electrical and optical 
equipment; Transport Equipment; Other manufacturing sectors; Electricity, gas and water supply; 
Construction; Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles; Wholesale trade, except for motor 
vehicles; Retail trade, except for motor vehicles; Hotels and Restaurants; Transport and commu­
nications; Financial intermediation and insurance; Real estate and renting; Computer and related 
activities; Research and Development; Public Administration, Defense and Education; Health and 
Social Work; Other community, social and personal services
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economy as a whole, and then for the service and manufacturing sectors separately. 
From Table 5.1 it emerges that job reallocation is strongly positively correlated 
with net growth in all countries. The correlation is still positive and significant 
in services. In manufacturing, job reallocation follows an a-cyclical or pro-cyclical 
pattern in Continental Europe, while job reallocation and net employment changes 
are significantly negatively associated in the UK. The latter is in line with previous 
empirical evidence and with Garibaldi’s theoretical insights.
5.3 Empirical m ethodology
Davis et al. (199G) show the importance of firm and sectoral characteristics in 
the determination of job flows in the US. As shown in Chapter 4, in Europe firms 
operating in service industries consistently present a higher degree of job turnover. 
Thus, failing to control for compositional effects might seriously blur cross-country 
comparisons. The proposed methodology takes this fact into account. We calculate 
yearly job creation (JCijt), job destruction (JD ijt) and job reallocation (JR ijt) rates 
at the sectoral level for a total of 28 sectors. We follow the standard definitions of 
job flow measures as described in Davis and Haltiwanger (1990). JCijt in period t , 
country j  and sector i equals the weighted sum of employment gains over all growing 
firms in sector i and country j  between t — 1 and t. Similarly, JDu equals the sum 
of employment losses (in absolute value) over all contracting firms between t — 1 
and t. It follows that net employment change N ETu  =  JCu — JDa  and the job 
reallocation rate JR u = JCu + JD u .
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Our basic empirical strategy is based on the following reduced-form specification
JFijt =  a+ N jt'Y+D0+Ijtri+(Njt * Ijt) 4>+Hj+£ijt for * =  1, •••, 28 and j  =  1 , 1 6
where JFijt denotes the different measures of job flows (JCijt, JDijt or JR ijt), Njt 
is a business cycle indicator, D is a set of sectoral and year dummies, b  denotes a 
vector of institutional indicators and fij is country unobserved heterogeneity. The 
coefficients of interest are captured by the vector <p, which corresponds to an in­
teraction term between the different institutional indicators and the business cycle 
indicator. We consider two different indicators of the cycle, depending on the level 
of aggregation: the aggregate net employment change, which is measured per coun­
try and year; and the sectoral employment change, which is measured per country 
and year for the 7 macro-sectors of activity for which information on the use of 
temporary contracts is available.
Two different assumptions "will be made about the nature of the country unob­
served heterogeneity. Our basic specification will include country fixed effects. The 
main limitation of the fixed effect specification is that it disregards the cross-country 
information in the data. This might severely affect the efficiency of the estimates 
of institutional variables given the slow moving nature of institutions and the short 
sample period of our panel. Thus, as Heckman and Pages (2000) point out, the 
reduced time-series variation in the institutional data may result in imprecise esti­
mates (high standard errors) when country-specific fixed effects are included in the 
regressions. A second set of regressions overcomes this problem treating .country
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unobserved heterogeneity as random. Differently from the fixed effect, the random 
effect methodology allows to exploit both the cross-country and time-series varia­
tion of the data, implying more precise estimates. The advantage of this approach in 
terms of efficiency comes with the cost of imposing the assumption of orthogonality 
between the individual effects and the covariates.
It is well known that in the presence of measurement error the bias incurred in 
a standard OLS regression might actually be exacerbated by the inclusion of fixed 
effects. One advantage of our synthetic panel is that we know the number of firms 
from which we draw the summary measures of job flows in each country, sector and 
year. This allows us to construct weights as the share of the number of firms in 
each sector in the total number of firms. The weights are country specific, such that 
each country has an equal weight in the final regression. Weighting the fixed effects 
regressions is expected to mitigate the impact of measurement error.
5.4 The data
Annual firm-level observations over the period 1992-2001 are available from Amadeus 
produced by Bureau van Dijk (BvD). Amadeus contains comparable firm-level data 
for European countries and covers all sectors with the exception of the financial 
sector. Information on balance sheets, sector of operation and number of employ­
ees is collected by the national Chambers of Commerce and homogenized by BvD
applying uniform formats to allow accurate cross-country comparisons.3
3See section 5.4 of Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the advantages and limitations of the 
data set used in the analysis and Appendix 4.8 for an illustration of the data selection and cleaning
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We have extended the data used in the previous chapter to include three countries 
originally excluded from the sample. These are Greece, Norway and Switzerland.4 
Thus, the final sample comprises 16 European countries. The yearly coverage varies 
depending on the country, but in most cases information is available for the period 
1995-2000.
The institutional variables considered in the analysis are the following:
• Restrictions to hiring and firing: we consider an updated version of the time- 
varying index of EPL reported in Nickell et al. (2001) and a time-invariant 
index as described by OECD (1999). Both increase with the relative stringency 
of EPL.
• The availability of temporary contracts has been constructed from the National 
Labour Force Surveys. It is defined as the share of workers holding tempo­
rary contracts in the total number of employees measured for the 7 sectors of 
operation used for the definitions of the cells.
• Tax and benefits systems: including an index of the duration of unemployment
benefits and the tax wedge between the real (monetary) labour cost faced by
the firms and the consumption wage received by the employees. The latter is
normalized by GDP, while the former ranges from 0 (if benefit provision stops
before 1 year) to 1 (for a constant benefit after 5 years). Both series have been
strategy.
4 Greece, Norway and Switzerland were excluded from the sample in Chapter 4 because of the 
lack of information on some of the institutional variables, namely sectoral employment subsidies 
and the index of co-ordination in the wage bargaining process. Since in this chapter we focus on 
EPL, temporary contracts, tax wedge and benefit duration only, we can reintroduce such countries.
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updated from Nickell et al. (2001) using OECD information.
5.5 Empirical results
5 .5 .1  Job  dynam ics and firing restr iction s
We concentrate first on the effects of employment protection on the relationship 
between job flows and the business cycle. Table 5.2 presents the results of the fixed 
effects regressions for JR, JC and JD on the aggregate NET employment change and 
its interaction with the index of employment protection. The specification also in­
cludes country, sector and year dummies. First note that according to the goodness 
of fit of the regressions, the proposed models do a much better job in explaining the 
patterns of JR and JC than in explaining the sources of JD, suggesting a more im­
portant role of idiosyncratic factors in the determination of the latter. We find con­
sistent regularities in the sectoral patterns of job flows across countries. Typically, 
service industries present higher JR rates than manufacturing sectors, the difference 
lying especially on a higher JC rate. The sector with the highest turnover rate is 
Computer and related activities, while Electricity, gas and water supply presents 
the lowest JR  rate in the sample. Note also that most of the sectoral dummies are 
clearly significant, suggesting the importance of controlling for compositional effects 
before drawing cross-country comparisons.
Employment protection legislation (EPL) has a negative effect on both JC and 
JD, which translates into a lower JR  rate. When evaluated at the average level 
of NET, the effect of EPL remains statistically significant on JC and JR. This
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Table 5.2: Job Flows. Sectoral Effects
(1) (?) (3) (1) 2) (3)
N E T
JR
-0.399
JC
0.290
JD
-0.689
(continued) 
Sector 15
JR
-4.305
JC
-3.844
JD
-0.461
N E T * E P L & a Sector 16 (5.62)0.692 a (0.75)-0.636
(5.21) (3.03) (6.65) (1.01) (2.66) (1.50)
E P L -1.824 -0.837 -0.987 Sector 17 -2.378 -0.373 -2.004
(3.11) (1.60) (3.34) (3.83) S (4.90)Sector 2 -2.147 -1.630 -0.517 Sector 18 -0.408 -1.158
(2.82) (2.34) (0.84) (0.64) (1.68) (2.88)
Sector 3 -3.155 -2.130 -1.025 Sector 19 -1.094 1.024 -2.118
(4 .81) (4.96) (2.31) (1.59) a (5.09)Sector 4 -3.333 -2.569 -0.764 Sector 20 -0.482 -1.083
(5.11) (6.13) (1.69) (0.60) (1.07) (2.23)
Sector 5 -3.069 -1.253 -1.816 Sector 21 -2.902 -1.220 -1.682
(4.62) (2.76) (4.09) (4.59) H «aSector 6 -3.861 -2.428 -1.432 Sector 22 4.238
(6.31) (5.74) (3.40)
Sector 23 s® f.4-32}Sector 7 -3.907 -2.384 -1.523 1.997
Sector 8
(6.05)
-3.092
(4.33) (3.45)
Sector 24 C3-43) (3.65)9.670 (1.16)-1.173 -1.914 8.316 -1.354
(4.95) (2.55) (4.58)
Sector 25
(10.20) (13.18) (2.86)
Sector 9 -3.649 -2.277 -1.372 1.436 2.387 -0.951
(5.79) (5.28) (3.09)
Sector 26
(2.22) (5.32) (2.25)
Sector 10 -2.638 -1.524 -1.114 -0.125 1.469 -1.594
(4.27) (3.71) (2.44) (0.15) (2.35) (2.85)
Sector 11 -2.608 -1.424 -1.184 Sector 27 -1.348 1.207 -2.555
(4.35) (3.50) (2.81) (2.02) (2.38) (6.16)
Sector 12 -0.712 -0.138 -0.574 Sector 28 -0.648 1.102 -1.750
Sector 13
(0.29) Q*?5I (1.07) (2.58) (4.35)-2.809 -1.997 -0.812
(3.86) (4.01) (1.52) Country Du Yes Yes Yes
Sector 14 -1.828 -0.733 -1.095 Sectoral Du No No No
(2.95) (1.75) (2.44) Countries 16 16 16
Sector 15 -4.305 -3.844 -0.461 Obs. 2727 2727 2727
(5.62) (8.72) (0.75) R-squared 0.52 0.57 0.23
Note: Reference Sector: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing. Sectoral Definitions: Sector 
Definitions. 2: Mining and quarrying; 3: Food, Beverages and Tobacco; 4: Textiles; 5: Wood 
Prod.; 6: Paper Prod.; 7: Refined Petroleum and Chemical Prod.; 8: Rubber and Plastic 
Prod.; 9: Other Non-metallic Prod.; 10: Basic metals; 11: Machinery and Equipment.; 12: 
Electrical and Optical Equip.; 13: Transport Equip.; 14: Other manufacturing sectors; 15: 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply; 16: Construction; 17: Sale, Maintenance and Repair 
of Motor Vehicles; 18: Wholesale Trade; 19: Retail Trade; 20: Hotels and Restaurants; 
21: Transport and Communications; 22: Financial Intermediation and Insurance; 23: Real 
Estate and Renting; 24: Computer and Related Activities; 25: Research and Development; 
26: Public Administration, Defense and Education; 27: Health and Social Work; 28: Other 
Community, Social and Personal Services. Robust standard errors, t-statistics in parenthesis
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finding supports the predictions of dynamic models of labour demand as discussed 
by Bertola (1990), and is in line with previous empirical studies and with the results 
in Chapter 4. JC (JD) presents a clear pro-cyclical pattern (counter-cyclical) when 
evaluated at the average level of EPL. Similarly, JR  has also a pro-cyclical pattern, 
suggesting that the response of JC to a cyclical upturn is stronger than the response 
of JD to a cyclical downturn. Most importantly, the sign of the interaction term 
NET*EPL suggests that JD is less responsive to the cycle in countries with more 
stringent EPL. This finding supports Garibaldi’s main theoretical prediction. For 
high values of EPL JD becomes even pro-cyclical. We also find that more stringent 
EPL increases the responsiveness of JC to the business cycle5.
Table 5.3 shows that these results are fairly robust to a variety of specifications. 
For completeness, Column 1 repeats the results reported in Table 5.2. Column 
2 shows that these results do not change when year dummies are included in the 
analysis. The interaction term NET*EPL is signed as expected and statistically 
significant at conventional levels. Random effect estimates, reported in columns 3 
and 4, do not change the main results presented so far. Columns 5 to 8 repeat the 
specifications presented in Columns 1 to 4 using the sectoral NET instead of the 
aggregate NET as an indicator of the business cycle. Again, the main message of
the regressions is not altered.
5 In Garibadi’s model the simulated effect of EPL on the cyclical behaviour of JC is not linear. 
JC is more pro-cyclical for higher or lower values of EPL and less pro-cyclical for intermediate 
values of EPL (U-shaped relationship). We do not look for the presence of such non-linearities and 
we treat JC and JD symmetrically.
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Table 5.3: Employment protection and the cyclical behavior of job flows
& & & & & & &
Job reallocation 
NET -0.399
Aggregate NET 
0.004 -0.278 -0.063 0.145
Sectoral NET 
0.199 0.049 0.088
(1.73) (0.01) (2.54) (0.51) (0.74) (1.06) (0.89) (1.58)
NET*EPL 0.487 0.384 0.335 0.285 0.199 0.184 0.165 0.153
EPL
(5.21) (4.041 (8.57) (6.83) (2.99) (2.91) (8.19) w-1.824 -3.49o -0.954 -0.932 -1.628 -2.847 -0.678
Overall NET1
(3.11) (5.05) (3.34) (3.02) (3.06) (4.87) (2.50) (2.24)
0.789 0.940 0.539 0.632 0.631 0.648 0.451 0.462
R-squared
(8.79) K) (13.25) (12.71) (8.28) (8.65) (5.17) (18.13)0.51 0.52 - - 0.54 0.56 -
Job Creation
NET 0.290 0.528 0.356 0.531 0.503 0.528 0.437 0.495
(1.36) (2.23) (3.94) (5.18) (3.83) (4.12) (10.42) (10.67)
NET*EPL 0.257 0.196 0.163 0.118 0.113 0.105 0.090 0.080
(3.03) (2.22) (5.08) (3.45) (2.41) (2.341 (5.82) (5.165
EPL -0.837 -1.848 -0.256 -0.176 -1.005 -1.392 -0.288 -0.233
Overall NET1
(1.60) (3.17) (1.32) (0.89) (2.82) (3.51) (1.63) (1.27)
0.917 1.010 0.754 (X820 0.778 0.786 0.656 0.656
(11.91) (11.55) (22.68) (20.19) (15.07) (15.33) (35.34) (33.48)
R-squared 0.56 0.57 - - 0.69 0.70 - -
Job Destruction
NET -0.689 -0.524 -0.597 -0.547 -0.318 -0.329 -0.383 -0.366
(7.18) (4.79) (9.32) (7.53) (5.40) (4.63) (4.67) (10.98)
NET*EPL 0.230 0.188 0.163 0.156 0.081 0.078 0.075 0.073
(6.65) (5.10) (7-12) (6.35) (3.84) (3.23) a (6.04)EPL -0.987 -1.647 -0.578 -0.548 -0.247 -1.454 -0.287
Overall NET1
(3.34) (4.64) (4.22) (4.09) (2.78) (4.50) (2.38) (2.41)
-0.127 -0.067 -0.199 -0.168 -0.119 -0.138 0.199 -0.188
R-squared
(3.55) (1.58) (8.41) (5.86) (5.17) (4.49) (13.93) (12.45)
0.21 0.23 ” 0.24 0.26 “
'lim e dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Sectoral du. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Obs. 2727 2727 2727 2727 2727 2727 2727 2727
Note: Robust standard errors, t-statistics in parenthesis. 1The overall cyclical effect is 
evaluated at the sample mean of the EPL indicator.
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5 .5 .2  T e m p o ra ry  e m p lo y m e n t a n d  o th e r  la b o u r  m a rk e t in s t i tu t io n s
The previous section shows the importance of firing restrictions in the determination 
of the cyclical movements of job turnover. In this section, we extend the analysis 
to consider the effects of other labour market institutions which are likely to play a 
role in the responses of JC and JD to cyclical movements. We consider in turn the 
effects of temporary employment, unemployment benefits and the tax wedge.
Temporary employment might facilitate employment adjustment in countries 
with stringent employment protection legislation (see for instance Dolado et al., 
2002). In most cases, fixed-term contracts have lower firing restrictions, with shorter 
advance notice periods and less generous severance payments. Even if fixed-term 
and open-ended contracts imposed the same restrictions to firing, repeated fixed- 
term contracts for a short period of time might be used as a way-out of stringent 
employment protection legislation. Hence, we expect that temporary employment 
counter-balance the effects of EPL in the job flow dynamics. Other things being 
equal, JD should react more rapidly to an economic downturn in sectors with a 
larger usage of temporary workers, resulting in more counter-cyclical movements of 
JR  in those countries where fixed-term contracts are more extended.
Many empirical studies have showed that longer-term unemployment insurance
entitlements lead to longer unemployment duration6. Using a search and matching
framework, Pissarides (2000) shows that more generous unemployment insurance
increase labour costs, resulting in an increase of equilibrium unemployment due to a
6 See for instance Bover et al, 2002 and the references therein.
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Table 5.4: Institutions and the cyclical behavior of job reallocation
&&&a &&& a
Job reallocation
NET 0.161 0.222 0.063 0.114 1.279 1.335 1.096 1.204
NET*EPL
(0.81) (1.18) (1.14) (2.01) (3.93) (4.33) (8.07) (8.74)
0.207 0.193 0.181 0.173 0.216 0.197 0.153 0.142
EPL
(2.98) (2.961 (8.33) (7.91) (3.44) (3-18) (5.12) (4.721
-1.485 -2.816 -0.756 -0.824 -2.342 -3.328 -1.064 -1.403
NET*Temp. Empl.
(2.81) (4.80) (2.81) (2.71) (4.68) (5.41) (3.39) (3.62)
-0.288 -0.361 -0.425 -0.532 -0.965 -1.054 -0.850 -1.012
Temporary Empl. s (1.09)7.985 (2.09)4.930 (2.8411.287 (3.13)12.331 H(4.86)8.380
(2.25) (3.13) (2.65) (3  04) (3.71) (4.07) (3.89) (4.38)
NET*U Benefits - — -0.602 -0.612 -0.622 -0.637
(3.00) (3.01) (6.35)
0.066
(0.07)
(6.53)
U Benefits Duration — — — - -1.263
(0.74)
-3.046
(1.80)
-1.446
(1.26)
NET*Tax Wedge - - — — -2.108 -2.047 -1.605 -1.680
Tax Wedge a a H(5.7lJ7.058
(0.S7) (0.46) (1.97) (2.41)
Overall NET1 0.632 0.652 0.455 0.474 0.547 0.566 0.413 0.438
(8.09) (8.47) (18.29) (18.08) (9.30) (9.44) (16.07) (16.28)
lim e  dummies 'No Yes No Tes No Pes Yes No
Countries 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Obs. 2727 2727 2727 2727 2727 2727 2727 2727
R-squared 0.55 0.56 - - 0.56 0.58
Note: Robust standard errors, t-statistics in parenthesis. xThe cyclical overall effect is 
evaluated at the sample mean of the institutional indicators.
lower JC rate and higher JD rate. The effect of the tax wedge on job flow dynamics 
are expected to go in the same direction (Pissarides, 2000).
Table 5.4 presents the results of the extended institutional analysis on the dy­
namics of job turnover. Since the indicator of temporary employment is available 
at the sectoral level, we restrict the analysis to the sectoral NET. Columns 1 to 
4 present the basic results including the share of workers holding temporary con­
tracts. The results suggest a clear positive direct impact of temporary contracts on 
JR. Moreover, the interaction term TEMP*NET presents a negative sign, suggest-
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ing that job turnover is less pro-cyclical in sectors (and countries) where fixed-term 
contracts are extensively used. Note that this effect is only statistically significant 
in the random effect specifications. Columns 5 to 8 include the tax wedge and dura­
tion of unemployment benefits in our regressions. Both the interactions of the two 
institutional variables with the cycle are negatively signed and statistically signif­
icant. This suggests that in countries with more generous unemployment benefits 
and a higher tax wedge job creation becomes less responsive to the cycle relatively 
to job destruction. As a result, job reallocation is more pro-cyclical. Moreover, 
the interaction teim TEMP*NET becomes statistically significant even in the fixed 
effect specifications when these two variables are included in the analysis. Finally, 
note that the coefficient of EPL*NET is in line with the previous regressions.
5.6 Conclusions
This chapter provides a set of comparable cross-country estimates of job flows dy­
namics using a unique homogenous firm level data set that covers the whole spectrum 
of productive sectors for 16 European countries. Relying on data for 28 sectors, this 
chapter characterizes the dynamics of job flows during the 1990s, examining differ­
ences and regularities across sectors and countries. In line with the results found in 
the previous chapter, we find consistent sectoral patterns across countries, with job 
flows responding more rapidly to net employment changes in services than in man­
ufacturing sectors. Differences across countries confirm the prevailing view, where 
job reallocation in the manufacturing sector presents a higher correlation with net
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employment changes in Continental Europe than in the UK. However, differences 
across countries in the volatility of job creation and job destruction of the service 
sector present less clear patterns.
Garibaldi (1998) shows that differences in employment protection legislation may 
explain the differences in the cyclical behavior of job flows across countries. The 
tighter the firing restrictions, the less volatile is job destruction and the higher the 
correlation between job reallocation and net employment changes. Using standard 
panel techniques this chapter provides an empirical test of Garibaldi’s theoretical 
insights, which are strongly supported by the data. Consistently across a variety 
of specifications, we find that more stringent employment protection increases the 
responsiveness of JR to the business cycle. When the role of other labour market 
institutions in job flow dynamics is considered, we find that more generous unem­
ployment benefits, a higher tax wedge and a larger use of temporary employment 
at the sectoral level counter-balance the effects of employment protection, reducing 
the correlation between job turnover and net employment changes.
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